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―...any thorough study of political phenomena must be rigorously interdisciplinary. This 
comprises part of the allure of assemblages, since they can be employed to develop concrete 
relations between academically separated phenomena, without subsuming them under a single 
alldetermining logic or field of study (sociobiology, and its reduction of the social to evolution, is 
perhaps the most extreme case of this recently). This means that part of the difficulty of 
interdisciplinary work is in establishing ‗bridge concepts‘ that can connect disparate fields while 
retaining their heterogeneity. In other words, theory itself must become an assemblage.‖ 
 
--Nick Srnicek ―Assemblage Theory, Complexity and Contentious Politics The Political Ontology 
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process. This thesis would not have been possible without them, as with the support of David 
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What is a social movement? How does a social movement come to be? How does a 
social movement influence institutions? Why do social movements, forming in 
different parts of the world and out of different cultures, appear to use similar 
tactics? Do social movements use issues to advance the empowerment of their 
members, or do individuals become empowered through social movements to 
affect issues that affect their interests? How do social movements respond to 
political repression? How do they use media and available social technologies to 
claim legitimacy?1 
These questions demonstrate some of the profound ambiguities intrinsic to the theorizing of 
collective social entities, questions that begin to sprout up with disturbing persistence after one 
insists upon a frame of analysis that privileges the empiricism of embodied experience; that 
accounts for affect, ephemerality and emergence. Does it make sense to talk about a social 
movement as having agency, possessing wants, desires and goals? How can we speak of political 
agency in a collective sense? Here I will argue that such questions may productively arise from a 
prior challenge to the metaphysical assumption of essentially homogenous social units, an 
assumption which is a necessary requirement for universal notions of objective data in a great 
deal of social science research. This smooth and featureless social unit frequently grounds the 
model-based approach to social systems, and enframes the process of generating hypotheses 
and specifying the experimental conditions under which researchers become entitled to draw 
definitive conclusions. Yet what justifications for this homogenous metric do we truly have? Are 
there any empirical features of social space that suggests it can and should be understood 
                                                        
1 In search for a fitting way to begin this thesis, I plugged in the search terms ‗questions about social 
movements‘ into the search engine Google and found a post attributed to the social movement scholar 
Fabio Rojas called ―a list of problems in social movement theory‖ from which these questions are 




through the metrical logic of grid-think?2 In spite of the homogenous blank unit‘s hegemony 
within social science research, there are many good reasons to be suspicious of this presumed 
metaphysics of same-ness. One needs no arcane instruments or equations in order to observe a 
surprising degree of variance in social reality, embedded in diverse local contexts and specified 
moment by moment through the non-linear spider web of multi-valent causation. A cursory 
glance through the basic fieldwork on evolved cultural practices around the world suggests that 
in fact difference may be more appropriate basic assumption operative principle than that of a 
universe populated by unitary static identities that seems to underlie the creation and 
manipulation of these homogenous units of analysis.  
Social science‘s grid-think and the application of metrical conceptual technology to social 
systems should not deserve insulation from critical scrutiny simply because of its long 
methodological history, the grand accumulation of studies and citations. The conceptual 
laboratory approach towards social systems itself has never been adequately justified. It is as if 
modernist social scientists have formed some compact to pretend that there are no significant 
differences between evolved social systems and say, mitochondria, or hydrology. As if social 
systems were insular closed circuits that in no way co-inform the way that they are understood 
from a theoretical perspective even as theoreticians attempt to work against (or don‘t) the 
influence of how certain arrangements of power seem to want to be understood. There is no 
natural logic of fitting units to categories, or categories to one another, because there is, at base, 
no such thing as social nature. Only contingent iterations of material relations. Social scientists 
has been searching for a fantasy world of static knowable objects conforming to totalizing 
theories of social nature, and in doing so they have created this fantasy world for themselves.  
The history of scientific mis-steps is littered with the over-eager application of assumed 
theoretical principles to local contexts where they met with either hubristic catastrophe or 
                                                        
2 for a greater examination of the evolution of contemporary grid-think and its relation to violence in 
modern epistemology see Rey Chow ―The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and 
Comparative Work‖ Duke University Press, 2006 
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endless tinkering to no great end. Western philosophy itself has not fared much better. As 
Graham Harman observes: 
The world resists our efforts even as it welcomes them. Even a system of metaphysics is the 
lengthy result of negotiations with the world, not a triumphant deductive overlord who 
tramples the details of the world to dust. The labour of fitting one concept to another 
obsesses a Kant or Husserl for decades, and even then the polished final product will be 
riddled with errors detectible by a novice. 3 
 
The machine of theory-creation for social sciences seems to be in trouble. It seems like we‘ve 
raised the bar to impossible heights: one must simultaneously presuppose some notional 
expectation of the behavior dictated by underlying properties without scripting reality according 
to some highly appealing and universally applicable schema composed of homogenous units of 
analysis. These Ptolemaic rotations drawn first and only in our imaginaries of false mastery to 
simplify reality to our liking will inexorably fragment into ever-tangled epicycles, escaping our 
grasp and finally bursting like soap bubbles. The world is more complex than a Newtonian 
mechanism; the universe of culture exponentially more so. Our experience of highly complex 
and internally variant social systems should make us highly skeptical at the outset of assuming 
that a mereology of homogeneity (where the assumed sameness of the parts is axiomatically 
generalized to the social whole) can adequately represent the chaotic becomings of any collective 
social assemblage. There is no grand ‗social‘ as such, merely an aggregate of the local. 
In this thesis, I shall seek to explore the multiplex dynamics of groups of people who engage 
in political activity digitally, through the communications technology that grounds the internet, 
often at great distances from one another. However, at a very fundamental level I am still talking 
about groups of people, and the properties that emerge from the complexity of these groups. The 
social distance between two lovers divided by the Pacific Ocean may be significantly smaller 
than the social distance between two reclusive neighbors sharing the same apartment building, 
                                                        




or two students at the same school. We perhaps have grown used to thinking about groups of 
people in a particular way that artificially generalize ascribed qualities of individuals to 
macrosocial behavior, when in fact the behavior of groups may be radically internally distinct. 
In other words, our grammar for collective entities is the same of individual people, allowing us 
to attribute a singular consistent subjectivity to the group or organization, syntactically 
suspending our disbelief  that ―it‖ somehow possesses needs, wants and desires (―the Party 
wants this‖, ―the Corporation desires that‖, ―the People require‖ and so on). This grammar 
insinuates an odd mereological disjunct by appearing to suggest that the Group is somehow 
separate and free-floating from its constituents, as if understanding groups as social units 
necessarily entails understanding them as unified, and internally homogenous.  
In many cases, there may be good ideological reasons for creating this conceptual distance 
between collectivity and constituent, particularly when what ―the People want‖ is in fact only 
what certain elites want and what most people might happen to want is dangerous to the 
stability of controlling interests. As Slavoj Zizek has noted, this is the paradigmatic mode of 
Stalinist propaganda, and became a rhetorical means of coopting the revolutionary democratic 
potential of the Leninist revolution for the bureaucratic totalitarian form of the consolidated 
Soviet state. However, it is by no means unique to that historical period, and in fact seems to be 
historically evolved from the arrangements of medieval feudalism after which, as Zizek argues, 
the notion of Good becomes an ideological stand-in for the subjectification of the State: ―...Good 
... assumes the form of subjectivity: instead of the substantial State, we obtain the Monarch who 
is able to say ‗l‘Etat, c‘est moi.‘‖4 Because Good functions as an absolute, the relation it 
constructs between the social subjects of a given state is one of inexorable bound-ness without 
political agency; like it or not, subjects of the Monarch become who we are. Zizek identifies 
words like ―God‖, ―the Nation‖, ―the People‖ and so on as ―master signifiers‖ in the structuralist 
sense, by which he means that they don‘t really refer to anything tangible that can be 
                                                        
4 Slavoj Zizek The Sublime Object of Ideology Verso; 1989, p.210 
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experiences as itself, and thus come to function as the point in a social order where the 
operation of ideology becomes most bare.   
However, one need not rely on structuralist analysis (or a Lacanian understanding of the 
subject) to see that there is something about our vocabulary for collectivities that conceals the 
internal pluralism for any social formation even as it seeks to reveal an external unit in play with 
other macro-scale social formations. These group identities can also be understood through the 
lens of what Gilles Deleuze refers to as ―transcendent signifiers‖; understood as supra-
organisms or and framed in a language of modern idolatry which is already willing to 
axiomatically sacrifice on its behalf (―in the name of God, Nation, Father‖, ―to preserve 
freedom‖, ―to secure the peace,‖ ―for the greater good.‖) The axioms surrounding collectivities 
come to function as unspoken Zizekian absolutes, but insinuated at a much more mundane level 
that ground the very conditions of possibility for social action. For it is a much-observed 
historical fact that once one has accepted certain axioms as necessary, one can draw almost any 
conclusion from them, since they have become reasons in themselves. Anti-state Leninism 
becomes statist Stalinism, anti-elitist Christianity becomes the Catholic Church‘s indulgences, 
anti-taxation American revolutionaries becomes the IRS and so on. The formation of social 
organisms as ―wholes‖ or constellated through units is both a form of rhetorical tyranny and a 
way of romanticizing the calculation to organize collectively. The formula of axioms is less 
important than that they can be properly inculcated and disseminated, to function at a level so 
basic that they are essentially no longer up for debate. Rationality can only be internally 
established within a particular set of axioms, but after that in only relates extrinsically to 
different registers of axioms both social and physical. As Deleuze has argued, this is how such 
signifiers function to underlie many other collective orders:  
Every society is at once rational and irrational. They are necessarily rational in their 
mechanisms, their gears and wheels, their systems of connection, and even by virtue of the 
place they assign to the irrational. All this presupposes, however, codes or axioms which do 
not result by chance, but which do not have an intrinsic rationality either. It's just like 
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theology: everything about it is quite rational if you accept sin, the immaculate conception, 
and the incarnation.5 
 
The creation and manipulation of units of collectivity that grammatically operate as subjects can 
be understood as a part and parcel of a larger project of nested sense-making, populating a 
conceptual world with knowable objects that obey particular rules . No rationality can be 
intrinsic, it must function in relation to some external arrangement of motivations, whether 
physical or social. The move here follows the an implicit ideological tradition in the West from 
medieval times; the goals and needs of a social group (say, for example, a social movement) are 
determined by the leaders, who also act as the voice of the group in relating the subjective 
preferences of the holized collectivity. Social movements become organismic in the sense that 
their constituents are made into organs; some assuming the roles of the passive sensorium 
(looking, listening; gathering data, collecting intelligence), while others form the active physical 
components of the musculature (the ―leg-work‖; striking, collecting signatures, participating in 
direct action) and those that assume the privileged position of the cogito are named the leaders 
and are responsible for making decisions, expressing preferences, allocating resources and so 
on. They become the name of the movement in the same way that our identity (the ‗I‘) is 
associated much more powerfully with our conscious states, wants and desires than our eyes, 
ears, noses and muscles. The subtle grammar of totalitarianism is at work here, constructing a 
series of implicit axioms, of absolutes that bind individuals to a total unit, and yet 
simultaneously stir the passions of individuals to feel as though they share an unquestionable 
common purpose in ways that perhaps would be otherwise unachievable. 
Applying the critical concepts of both social theory and metaphysics should thus not be 
understood as fatty verbiage, but rather as the crucial methodological work necessary to 
understand the limitations that scholars ought pragmatically adopt when establishing the units 
and selection criteria of doing social research.  Questions of what can be said to exist (in what 
                                                        
5 Gilles Deleuze ―Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974‖ Semiotext(e), 2004 p. 261-263 
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sense do groups ―exist‖, in what sense are they merely the expression of some axiom 
unjustifiably presupposed?) are the lenses through which we audit the social field; they provide 
selection criteria that allow us to form blocs of sensible objects out of streams of raw data, 
parsing and establishing elements of the world nested within and between one another. Through 
the juxtapositional pairing of theoretical concepts with particular cases of collective action, I 
hope to illuminate substantive counterinstances to dominant theoretical paradigms with the 
goal of elucidating a frame of analysis that is itself opposed to the very concept of a metrical 
social unit.  Instead, I will argue that a truly empirical frame of analysis ought to view group 
dynamics simultaneously at multiple levels of detail through an ontology of process rather than 
definition, asking ―what does it do?‖ and ―how does it work?‖ instead of ―what is it?‖. Drawing 
on the work on emergent ontological forms of Gilles Deleuze and Bruno Latour primarily via 
scholars such as Graham Harman, Nick Srnicek and Manual De Landa, I shall seek to sketch an 
approach to theorizing digital collective action which will attempt to undermine the illusion of a 
singular, unified and autonomous social whole by exposing every unit as an assemblage of 
constituents, which nevertheless exceeds the sum of its parts in surprising and often 
unpredictable ways. 
There are several key concepts which I will draw on throughout this text which I would like 
to describe here as best I can, though a great deal of literature exists investigating many of the 
theoretical underpinnings of these terms which I will not directly engage. First, is the notion in 
Deleuze‘s writing of an abstract machine. Deleuze borrows this term from automata theory, 
where it refers to the theoretical model of a computational device processing strings of symbols 
through a particular sorting mechanism. Abstract machines are a way of understanding flow, or 
the processual movement between finite states by way of deterministic criteria. For example, 
you can imagine a string of random numbers sorted by an abstract machine that separated odd 
numbers from even numbers. However, for Deleuze, the determinism of the empirical abstract 
machines are limited by nonspecified space, determined ad hoc or by pure chance. In other 
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words, abstract machines are almost never as wholly deterministic as the odd/even sorter, but 
break down and make mistakes just as much anything else. The order of the machine‘s process 
is itself captured from the chaotic raw material of pure immanence in the same way that a 
system of axioms is captures a series of rational relations from the terrain of the irrational. In 
this relationship, the abstract machine functions to determine an immanent code from a 
material virtual space into a material actual space, in the same way that syntactical concepts 
evolve within and through conjunction with actual uses of grammar (Where did ―ain‘t‖ come 
from? and how did it exist outside of ―proper language‖ even as it continued to thrive for so 
long?), or the relations between enumerated objects are preceded by the mathematical relations 
between numbers (The way in which ―two cats‖ is preceded by the concept of ―two-ness‖ which 
makes the conjunction legible). One may think of an abstract machine as similar to a blueprint 
for a building, which is then actualized through specific decisions which are left to the builders 
and construction crew, and includes nonspecified space (e.g. the color of paint for the interior 
walls, the choice of quarry for the stones) which are progressively specified as the building is 
completed. The process of the abstract machine is specified in advance, but the result is 
contingent on any number of factors left to chance. The system as a whole is both deterministic 
and chaotic, specified and nonmetric. 
The second key concept is the Deleuzian concept of the assemblage.6 An assemblage is a 
combination of elements themselves of heterogeneous origin and composition, which form a 
super-structure which is not a totality. We may think of social entities as such formations, 
formed through the flows of matter and energy through lengths of historical time in nonlinear 
combinations. Assemblages are united, but are not unities and can be distinguished as parts or 
wholes with respect to the level of detail at which one chooses to analyze them. Thus, 
                                                        
6 See especially Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society (London: Continuum, 2006). It is 
interesting to note that Deleuze and Guattari‘s original term was ‗agencement‘ which roughly translates to 
‗layout‘ or ‗scheme‘, but also includes the suggestion of agency immanent to the arrangement itself, rather 
than localized around any particular point. see John Phillips ―Agencement/Assemblage‖ in Theory, 
Culture & Society May 2006 vol. 23 no. 2-3 108-109 
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assemblages can both be said to always have existed with respect to substance, but never have 
existed with respect to essence. Their existence at a given time is of less interest than their 
movement between ranges of times, the ways in which they grow and shrink, evolve and become 
seemingly new while maintaining many of their previous characteristics. One may thus say that 
every sort of entity is at once an assemblage, composed of assemblages, part of a larger 
assemblage. Thus, the term ought to be understood as highly generic, and is useful insofar as it 
carries virtually no mereological baggage in terms of presumed hierarchy in part-whole 
relations. In other words, it has predominantly negative characteristics, rather than positive 
properties, relative to the dominant grammar of collectivities. 
The third key concept is the actant, furnished by sociologist Bruno Latour. Consider the 
actant as a void unit of agency, not tied to human consciousness or privileging a particular 
material locus or subjectivity. The notion of actant is almost entirely empty, since it simply 
implies that the referent described possessed the potential to affect the process and/or outcome 
of a movement of material within its local context, wherein power/knowledge is always already 
networked. To say that an actant ‗caused‘ something is to assume that there were already many 
other causes, since the social space of the actant is already collective. The utility of an actant is in 
describing the power of an entity to affect the material and ontological conditions of other 
actants. Unlike an actor or organization or institution, an actant does not possess abstract 
properties which are concretized in local instantiations, but exists as a singularity in the passage 
of spacetime, irreducible beyond its concrete contexts of space and place. Actants are 
ontologically local, and cease to be themselves once removed from space, time and contextual 
relations to other actants. The transient nature of indexical properties (we are forever passing 
through ‗now‘, forever leaving the familiar ‗here‘) mean that actants cannot be said to 
ontologically endure in any meaningful way, since their identity is embedded within a 
continuum of persistent change. 
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I will make use of these methodological concepts in the process of investigating the explosive 
social action that took place in South Korea in 2008 following the negotiation of a trade 
agreement with the United States that contained a provision allowing for the shipment to South 
Korea of beef which had been preserved for a longer time period than American health officials 
deemed ―safe‖ for consumption. Appearing to have been sparked primarily over fears of 
contaminated beef and the possible outbreak of ―mad cow disease‖ (bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy), the scope of the protests confounded Western media, by some estimates 
reaching numbers unprecedented in recent South Korean history and shutting down the 
nation‘s major urban economies, forcing the government to capitulate. While on the surface, this 
episode may appear to conform to classical dynamics of social movement theory, insofar as it 
featured many flesh-and-blood South Koreans protesting in the streets, I will argue that in fact 
this collective action, which was predominantly organized and disseminated through on-line 
forums, represents the actualization of a new abstract machine of organizing under-girded by 
the power of digital social networks, and where the old categories of affiliation, membership and 
shared purpose no longer apply. 
 Social movements constellated within digital political ecologies provide a critique of these 
metaphysical presumptions in the mere facts of their existence, the mode of their operation. 
Social movements that emerged within and through digital space are fundamentally distinct 
assemblages from the classical model of social movement. Their members may never have met 
or even explicitly communicated with one another. Their members may not even identify as 
members, but rather may take actions expressing solidarity with particular demands or against 
particular situations. Individuals may be embedded within the concept of the group only in the 
moment of their action; sending or forwarding an email, re-posting a link, expressing approval 
or outrage through online comments, or even ―voting with fingers‖ to increase the visibility of 
specific issues or causes merely by viewing a site or news item. Viewed through this lens, a 
―social movement‖ when articulated digitally may bare so little resemblance to the classic object 
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of theoretical analysis described by Doug McAdam or Scott Tarrow, and that using the same 
term for both may only add confusion and prevent hamstring productive discussion about on-
the-ground tactics.  
However, we must resist the temptation to fetishize the novel as entirely new, or what in the 
context of nuclear technology Gabriel Hecht has referred to as ―rupture-talk‖. According to 
Hecht, the technology and the ―nuclear age‖ that it inaugurated have been pervasively described 
through a perceived rupture with the past; ―During those first decades of Cold War, the only 
consensus in public debates was that, for better or worse, nuclear technology had changed the 
world forever.‖7 Hecht goes onto attribute this discursive framing of nuclear issues in Western 
policy discussions as situated through the perspective self-understood global supremacy that 
was then being undermined first by advancing decolonization movements in Asia and Africa and 
the emergence of the Soviet Union as a perceived ideological opponent to traditional power 
relations of social status and labor. ―Rupture-talk‖ over nuclear weapons was therefore a 
framing not of the nuclear technology itself, but an expression of anxiety over re-structuring of 
geopolitics which superficially reduced the hegemony and control of the traditional colonial 
powers. It was also, Hecht argues, a process of cultural amnesia by which the West was able to 
distance itself from the horrors of its colonial past, while simultaneously render invisible the 
colonial arrangements of uranium extraction in West Africa and in the United States on 
indigenous lands, and the testing of nuclear explosives on indigenous lands globally. There is a 
similar temptation to use rupture-talk in describing the ways in which digital technology has 
enabled new modes of dissent. However, this rupture-talk already presumes the perspective of a 
manager deeply invested in the power relations of the status quo, which identifies a ―rupture‖ 
with the past through anxiety about whether or not digital social space has made traditional 
edifices of power obsolete. In other words, to say that ―digital technology has changed 
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everything‖ to some degree presupposes certain valences of managerial anxiety about 
fluctuations in social space, while simultaneously obscuring the persistence of violent power 
relations that digital technology has not up-ended. 
Witness the rupture-talk, for example, following the use of Twitter as a forum for dissent 
during the social upheavals in Iran in 2009, heralding a ―revolution‖ in the country, and Twitter 
as the new ―medium of a movement‖.8 The event has even been dubbed ―the Twitter Revolution‖ 
in the American media. The internet, brought to oppressed peoples of the world by American 
military know how, has finally outwitted those fearsome mullahs! The Western media‘s 
fetishistic focus on the technical novelty of social networking in a political context even 
provoked some low-key chiding, as the causes of the defeated protestors were soon forgotten, 
while Twitter was carried off for yet another victory lap in the self-congratulatory consciousness‘ 
of editorialists and media critics.9 One former Bush aide even suggested awarding Twitter the 
Nobel Peace prize.10 It is not difficult to see how such a techno-fetishism betrays exactly the sort 
of smug hubris of rupture-talk that makes those who are its objects uncomfortable. As Hamid 
Tehrani, an Iranian blogger wrote: "The west was focused not on the Iranian people but on the 
role of western technology. Twitter was important in publicising what was happening, but its 
role was overemphasised."11  
If ―Twitter has changed everything‖ in new democratic social movements in Iran or later in 
the Arab Spring, then perhaps the West can finally wash its bloody hands of that unpleasant 
colonial legacy that seems to continually resurface. Or the botched installation of the US-backed 
Shah in Iran that became a key impetus for the Islamic Revolution. Or the decades-long 
                                                        
8 Lev Grossman ―Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement‖ TIME, June 17, 2009 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html#ixzz17wJTEtjB 
Washington Times ―EDITORIAL: Iran's Twitter revolution‖ June 16, 2009 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans-twitter-revolution/ 
9 Business Week ―Iran's Twitter Revolution? Maybe Not Yet‖ June 17, 2009 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2009/tc20090617_803990.htm 
10 Mark Pfeifle ―A Nobel Peace Prize for Twitter?‖ Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 2009 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0706/p09s02-coop.html 




financial and geopolitical support for the brutally repressive dictators that the Arab Spring was 
aligned against. These are legacies which the actual digital activists on the ground have not 
forgotten, which is at least one important reason they are less compelling candidates for the 
Nobel Peace prize than a Western corporation. From the perspective of a Western social media 
user, the importance of Twitter and the constant discussion of how innovation is changing social 
space provides self-evident justification for declaring a ―rupture‖, which of course the West gets 
to take a good deal of the credit for. From the perspective an Iranian activist, social media 
represents perhaps little more than a set of potent new tools in the same struggle, a struggle in 
which the West is hardly blameless. 
This example illustrates the importance of situated cultural frames to social movements, 
insofar as they provide publics with a way of interpreting and contesting the meaning of social 
action. Following Irving Goffman pathbreaking work in Frame Analysis, theorists such as David 
Snow et al. have persuasively argued that there is nothing about a particular instance of political 
oppression, police brutality, publicized case of corruption and so on that somehow intrinsically 
begets movement participation, rather social movements are constantly engaging in tactical 
contests of meaning over the interpretation of grievances which allow them to become politically 
meaningful. The painstaking construction of over-arching interpretational frameworks is, for 
Snow et al., co-productive with mobilizing to achieve short-term activist goals as movement 
participants ―...jointly develop rationales for what they are or not doing.‖ 12 
While there are no deterministic criteria for predicting how the tactical interplay between 
social movements and authorities will play out in digital space, the notion of a political 
opportunity structure developed by Peter Eisenger will prove a useful point of departure for 
understanding confrontations between once-marginal actants working in concerted solidarity 
                                                        
12 see Gamson, William Talking Politics (New York: University of Cambridge Press) 1992 
Snow, David, Rochford, E. Burke. Jr. Worden, Steven, Benford, Robert "Frame Alignment Processes, 
Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." American Sociological Review 51: 464-481, 1986 
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against the entrenched interests of powerful elites.13 While political opportunity theory does not 
tell the whole story, we can understand it as functioning on multiple levels of material 
conditions and inter-subjective perceptions of those conditions in terms of necessity (but not 
sufficiency) for effective social movement action. I shall devote a significant portion of this text 
to describing the texture of emergent political opportunity structures in digital space. 
In describing the ways in which digital technology has radically altered the possibility of 
contentious politics and collective becomings, I shall attempt to avoid falling into this trap of 
assuming the perspective of a Westernized control-society bureaucrat, anxious about the future 
of the nation-state. There are certainly many cases of digital social movements behaving quite 
similarly to more conventional social movement, as in the case where well-established activist 
groups create an online presence that reflects and enhances the organizing power for 
―conventional‖ collective politics. Grassroots political campaigns such as those organized around 
the 2008 election of President Barack Obama in the United States illustrate this latter approach 
perhaps most vividly. However, it is precisely this extreme variance in the emergence, evolution, 
and praxis of online social movements undermine the viability of theoretical approaches which 
consider ―social movements‖ as homogenous collective entities defined by essential and 
ahistorical properties. Terms like ―membership‖, ―participation‖, and ―shared purpose‖ mean 
fundamentally different things for movements that emerged through digital network space, and 
they come with different individual expectations and collective possibilities. Only by 
problematizing the assumptions of ―social movements‖ as stable conceptual entities, as well as 
the theoretical project of social taxonomy writ large that seeks to sort movements into ―types‖14 
can we avoid the pitfalls of assuming homogeneity at the outset, and thereby begin to articulate 
fluid theoretical frames that are better able to account for empirical variance.   
                                                        
13 David S. Meyer, Protest and Political Opportunities, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 30: 125-145 
(Volume publication date August 2004), (doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110545) 
14 ―Types‖ in the same ways that modernist biologists were once inspired by Linnaeus to sort every 
creature into the conceptual basket provided by a Latin name, arranged on a tree of nested categories, 
epitomizing Harman‘s description of metaphysics as ―fitting one concept to another‖. 
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There are particular cases where digital collective action really does present entirely new 
opportunities for contentious politics, confounding most classical expectations of social 
movement organizing. I will explore these dynamics through an examination of the on-line 
guerilla efforts of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), and their use of 
participatory ‗tactical media‘ to thwart efforts by the Mexican government to assert control over 
the Chiapas region of Southern Mexico. In the EZLN, we see a hybrid or parallelized form of 
digital organizing that nevertheless escapes the control of directly involved stakeholders to 
frame the conflict within localized terms. In particular, this case study will examine the 
participation of the Electronic Disturbance Theatre (EDT) in organizing electronic acts of civil 
disobedience against the Mexican and American government websites using the software 
FloodNet to crash the websites via an electronic ―sit-in‖ in 1998. This case study will also explore 
the embedded contestation in framing these acts as justified civil resistance to an unjust policy 
of military intervention on the one hand, and renegade acts of ―cyberterrorism‖ on the other. We 
will see how even though the EZLN and EDT adopted unconventional technical means in 
pursuing their goals, that the organizational structure of the movement closely resembles a 
conventional picture of affiliation, group membership and cohesion of purpose, with a 
centralized (if anonymous) vanguard leading the way.  
  Understanding the response of elite media and governmental apparatuses is absolutely 
crucial to see how the social meaning of these collective actions were contested and continue to 
be contested as new social movements and develop strategies in the hopes of achieving future 
victories. The assumption that social movements must act as cohesive, unified social actors with 
a set list of specific goals must be problematized in light of the empirical evidence surrounding 
the successes of these digital collective actions where gains were achieved by allowing for fluid 
experimentation, spontaneous alliances and the accumulation of political will around 




chapter one: lifecycle of a digital movement, south korea, 2008 
 
 
In June of 2008, South Korea was unexpectedly plunged into mass social turmoil, following 
ROK15 President Lee Myung-Bak‘s decision to lift the ban on imports of American beef two 
months earlier. The streets of Seoul were choked with protestors numbering between 100,000 
and a million, waving signs, singing songs and holding candlelit vigils. By some estimates, the 
protests numerically superseded the movement that democratized South Korea in 1987. For 
over one hundred days, these protestors increasingly brought business as usual to a grinding 
standstill, obstructing key flows of economic traffic and ratcheting up pressure on the Lee 
administration to reassess South Korea‘s economic relationship with the United States. 
Politicians in the South Korean legislature, known as the Blue House, were unable or unwilling 
to satisfy the protestors demands until the political mobilization of massive crowds had climbed 
to a fever pitch in late June, triggering a power struggle in the Blue House and raising profound 
questions about the future of US-ROK ties. The international media was flummoxed. How could 
tens of thousands of South Koreans take to the streets over an issue as seemingly arcane and 
peripheral as the nitty-gritty details of a beef import agreement? In dozens of articles the 
protests were characterized as an outburst mass hysteria, an irrational reaction to the miniscule 
risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), more commonly referred to as ―mad cow 
disease‖. Particularly in the US media, South Koreans were portrayed as scientifically ignorant 
and nationalistically oversensitive to trade agreements with a nation whose troop presence on 
the border with their Northern neighbor has been a perennial sore spot. In July, the government 
renegotiated the terms of the trade agreement with additional protections against mad cow 
disease, and the protests petered out.16 
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This may seem an odd case to begin a text about social movements in digital space. On the 
surface, this has all the makings of a classical protest, a disorganized crowd of loosely affiliated 
actants uniting around a common goal. However, beneath this surface veneer, the 
organizational dynamics of the contention in South Korea in the summer of 2008 prove to be far 
more complex, deeply integrated within a multivalent social assemblage that was strongly 
grounded in digital space. In late June of 2008 I traveled to Seoul from Beijing where I had been 
living with my girlfriend for the summer prior to my third year of college. The trip was a matter 
of necessity and Seoul was a destination of chance; we were required to leave the country in 
order to renew our visas, and while we had planned to go Hong Kong there happened to be a 
discount on plane fare to South Korea on the day we purchased tickets. Upon our arrival, we 
found the city in the throes of one of the largest mass demonstrations the region has seen in the 
past half-century. The experience of entering this situation with an almost complete lack of 
information proved extremely valuable. I had never visited South Korea, nor had I previously 
studied its political culture or society and thus had few consciously formed preconceptions 
about what I ought to expect. That summer I had been trying to sell essays to a blog called Black 
and White whose editor was interested in getting stories firsthand from China in the build-up to 
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.  It wasn‘t difficult to persuade him that the events that were 
transpiring in Seoul merited coverage. Compared to seasoned journalists covering the issue I 
was clearly inexperienced, and relative to American commentators who had been analyzing ROK 
politics for year I was virtually tabula rasa. Recognizing these limitations, I resolved to 
approach the issue with an open mind, to retrieve as much primary evidence as I could, and to 
thus begin to answer the question that was befuddling American commentators from the Wall 
Street Journal to National Public Radio. Why had South Koreans chosen to take to the streets en 
masse over the issue of the possible contamination of imported US beef?17 
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Protests: How Mobile Technology Has Politically Empowered Thousands of South Koreans‖ Black and 
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The short answer is deceptively simple; the protests were not, in fact, really about beef at all. 
The street-level demonstrations represented the actualization of a complex virtual social 
network, organized primarily by South Korean youth in digital space. The perception of the 
―eruption‖ of the anti-beef social movement pervasive in the international media had far more to 
do with the fact the South Korean public‘s discomfort with the trade deal had largely been 
under-reported, creating the perception that it suddenly appeared, as if from nowhere. In fact, 
tensions had been building for months since immediately after the deal was signed before 
reaching the multitudinous scales of late June. Before that, negotiations over the US-Korean 
Free Trade Agreement under the Bush Administration had allowed for the formation of a well-
developed anti-trade coalition adept at mobilizing their members and creating provocative 
media events, albeit with limited political success.18 While the anti-trade coalition in Korea, 
largely consisting of unions and social groups representing farmers, was not able to stir public 
sentiment to the heights that successfully de-mobilized renewed negotiations for the FTA (the 
fate of which is now seen to largely hang with the political will of the 112th US Congress)19, it 
nevertheless stirred the passions of its own members to extreme acts and elicited public 
sympathy. Consider, for example the initially unsuccessful suicide attempt of the KCTU member 
Heo Se-wook through self-immolation, which was explicitly connected with the perception of 
the FTA negotiations as ―secretive‖ and ―undemocratic.‖20 As the former president of the Korea 
Institute of International Economic Policy Choong-yong Ahn put it: ―[w]hile the absolute 
numbers of protesters against the deal in Seoul were not very large, the emotional intensity 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
http://blackandwhiteprogram.com/report/meat-protest 
18 Jamie Doucette ―Korean Neo-Liberalism and Empire,‖ Znet, 7/11, 2006  
http://www.zcommunications.org/korean-neo-liberalism-and-empire-by-jamie-doucette 
19 Yonhap News ―Congress urged to expedite process for Korea FTA's ratification‖ 4/7/2011 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/04/07/52/0301000000AEN20110407000400315F.HT
ML 
20 see the press release by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions ―KCTU union member attempting 
self-immolation as an act of resistance KORUS FTA!‖ openpublished on Bilaterals.org, as well as the 





reached its height with the tragic self-immolation of a Seoul taxi driver outside the talk‘s venue 
in a Seoul hotel.‖21 Episodes such as these demonstrate the perception within Korean civil 
society and of a well-established group of extremely committed stakeholders, nevertheless 
marginalized and mistreated over the issue of trade.22  
During the few days we spent in Seoul, I had the opportunity to interview one of the 
protestors, a friend of my girlfriend who had once lived in the US, named Cheewoo Kim. 
Discussing the evolution of the demonstrations, he urged me to focus on the process of its 
development as more significant than its stated goals, saying: 
―You have to look at how these protests began. At the end of April it was just young kids 
protesting, organized online, worried about bad American beef getting into their school 
lunches. It gave the government a headache because there was no way to stop them, so they 
tried to get control through the schools, through the teachers, by punishing kids. Then 
college kids got involved and then it started getting much bigger.‖23 
 
There are several dynamics in play in Kim‘s observation. First, the boundaries of the 
movement appear initially at the divisions between different strata of South Korean society, 
primarily segmented by age. However, the beginnings of the discussion in terms of school 
lunches and between students may also imply a high degree of gender segregation, as many 
South Korean schools socially segregate students by gender in both school and classroom.24 The 
movement must therefore expand outward to encompass new members, raise awareness and 
find new sympathizers by collapsing the perceived divisions of these social strata. Once 
members of a particular group have begun participating in the movement, it eases social 
barriers of entry for other members of a particular social strata to then join as well. This 
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22 As I will discuss in Chapter 2, the point here is not to develop a direct causal relation between different 
sets of discrete events, but rather the examine the cultural reservoir of frames available to organizers and 
participants interested in bringing their message to a wider public and making the digital meme of their 
message ―go viral‖. 
23 Interview with Cheewoo Kim, conducted by Edmund Zagorin, June, 2008 published in the essay ―Beef 
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segregation in national school systems‖ Research in Comparative and International Education ISSN 1745-
4999 Volume 3 Number 2 2008 
24 
 
preference for social affiliation with similar individuals is known as ―homophily‖ in sociology 
and network theory, and increases in probability the more similar traits a given group of people 
share (e.g. age, gender, socio-economic status) and has been further demonstrated through 
empirical research specifically on social movements.25 In other words, it is easier for a college 
student to join a movement which already includes other college students, than it is to join a 
movement which includes few social peers. This is because many movements form through the 
iterative coalescence of several different socially evolved peer networks, forming a supra-
network capable of moving towards certain defined attractors while also producing and reacting 
to local circumstances. These evolved peer networks are integrated into complex social systems 
which form loops of dynamic interaction with one another (consider the complex social space 
defined within and between genders in the Korean school system, and how information moves 
within this network) and therefore cannot be understood in isolation. If a student engages in an 
act of quotidian protest or resistance at school, the parents of that student are not insulated 
from the social frames motivating their child‘s actions. If the parents feel that they have a stake 
in the movement through their child‘s advocacy, then the movement crosses a gap in social 
space, lowering the barriers to entry for other parents, oftentimes across different strata of 
socioeconomic segments. This is at least one reason why student-driven movements have 
historically had such potential for mass mobilization. 
Dense social connections can be a powerful enabling condition for social movement growth, 
as the message can spread in the same manner as contagious disease, where successful messages 
gain momentum and durability by quickly ―going viral‖. The same process of identifying loose 
social limits through segmentarity and then overcoming barriers to entry for groups outside the 
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initial scope of movement also appears significantly at the divisions between the adult genders 
and social classes (based on profession and access to capital and politically powerful social 
networks) which are pronounced in South Korea, as with many other market economies. The 
significance of the viral model of information for social movement framing is that it allows us to 
understand how new cultural frames enter population segments through particular individuals 
who may act as brokers or who may be exist at the intersection of several different social groups. 
Thus, while social space itself may be stratified along numerous criteria of identity, and social 
groups themselves may be fairly insular even when composed of diverse members, information 
and political messages can still spread quickly if the right information ecologies exist in which 
social networks are embedded.26 
Identity matters. However, first we must be clear about what specifically we are looking for. 
Is the goal of this analysis to understand the typical or average identity of the activists, or to 
understand the idealized identity of social protest which may or may not have animated a 
portion of the individuals participating in the demonstration? While important for analyzing the 
movement‘s historical significance within its local and transnational political contexts, I will 
seek to show that the demonstrations in Seoul in the summer of 2008 in fact historically 
represent quite a bit more than their political consequences to the Lee Administration and the 
Blue House. For what these demonstrations showed par excellence was the power of digital 
networks to organize massive groups of people in a highly developed urbanized society more 
quickly and more directly than anyone had previously thought possible. This was not a 
demonstration to the South Korean government, but to an audience of global inhabitants of 
digital space to whom it represented a concrete instantiation of a new paradigm of collective 
organizing, where the constitution of network relations through mediated cultural space 
represents the emergence of a novel collective form.  
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see also Dale Ganley and Cliffe Lampe ―The ties that bind: Social network principles in online 
communities‖ in Decision Support Systems 47 (2009) 266–274 
26 
 
The significance of the divisions between socially stratified groups in Korean society uniting 
around a common message is neither a story of the forging of new identities or transgressive 
social relations. Rather, it points us to the immanent conditions of a space of social formation 
which itself allowed for and enabled the facilitation of the emergence of solidarity between 
otherwise disparate groups. In other words, there is something about digital space itself that 
allows otherwise alienated segments of a population to come together for a common discussion. 
If we understand the mass demonstrations that erupted in June through the lens of conscious 
oppositionality and a coherent membership identity, we have already begun asking the wrong 
questions. Instead, we must look to the material basis by which the movement was able to 
fluidly to incorporate otherwise divided strata of the South Korean public, overcoming deeply 
entrenched structural co-isolation and loggerheaded interests in order to achieve collective 
action. Digital space, as constituted within online forums and social clubs, played a vital role.  
Personal identity in digital space is intrinsically weaker as discussion participants are 
disconnected from the immediate cultural presentation of their bodies, and discussion is 
inexorably mediated by a space which is already collective. This may disconnect discussants 
from socialized preconceptions about persons from their gender, age and socioeconomic status. 
The face only signifies textually within a chat room. Embodied identity is bracketed around 
icons and avatars, and the identity of discussants in a forum is literally produced through 
dialogue. In digital space, identity does not exist as an abstract parallel to physical presence but 
rather acts as an integrated continuum within the overall production of self-representation and 
social signification to others. This is particularly true for individuals who have been deeply 
socialized within digital space itself, either by sustained frequent use or by early introduction in 
childhood.  Such an understanding of social identity in digital space is particularly true for those 
comfortable with its naturalization as a communication technology used for leisure, rather than 
merely a tool of labor. John Palfrey and Urs Glasser refer to these individuals as ―digital 
natives‖, youth and young adults who grew up not only with the possibility of using digital 
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technology to communicate with their peers, but for whom the use of that technology demands a 
degree of identity-creation (along with the associated options for experimentation) in digital 
space27. While digital nativism has been around since the personal computer (and some would 
argue even earlier) it has become an even more dominant form within mass social space since 
the advent of mobile technology, which allows users to remain perpetually connected and to act 
digitally at will. In South Korea, these digitally native youths are known as ―thumb people‖, a 
playful moniker that refers to the facility with SMS text messaging where an individual can type 
faster than they can speak (or just about)28. This aspect of digital socialization does not imply 
the production of a static identity, but rather functions as a mutant surface of individualistic 
representation conforming instead to the expectation that certain aspects of one‘s digital self will 
be regularly changed and updated. Core components of digital nativism conform to the fast-
paced level of innovation in bubble-era high technology, which create expectations that 
participants ―adapt or die‖ to new interfaces and platforms as they become ascendant.29 To re-
state the cliché of innovation in terms of digitally constituted identities; change is the only 
constant.  
Digital natives are adept at a particularly adaptive sort of individual and collective identity 
formation. Because language in digital social space is both performative (chat-rooms are created 
and named, things said in them characterize how discussion progresses and segments) and 
iterative (each iteration of a conversation, meme, post or re-post alters the local context to 
strengthen the repetition of a particular message for different anonymous audiences) the 
process of identity-creation is immanent to each interactive digital space. ―Web 2.0‖ digital 
space, driven by user-generated content, socializes users to become responsive to conventional 
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peer group structures iterated through comments, re-posts, feedback and so on while allowing a 
degree of playfulness and heterogeneity. This playfulness is much clearly demonstrated when 
digital sub-cultures are considered in contrast to embodied cultural spaces which present the 
image of an identity rooted in biology/morphology and socio-economic conditions and where 
the audience costs of nonconformity may be extremely high. In other words, identity in digital 
space presents a distinct opportunity structure for affiliating oneself with a social movement or a 
political message, an affiliation which may be initially effortless but may have the effect of 
communicating that message across otherwise impassable (or at least difficulty passable) social 
boundaries.  
Movement identities, which are fluid to begin with and may only initially encompass a few 
slogans, images or discussions, can be easily incorporated within individuals‘ and groups‘ digital 
identities, thereby facilitating the transmission of key concepts and relevant social frames 
quickly throughout a social system. These dynamics are particularly at play in virtual worlds 
where individuals and peer groups create co-signifying avatars by arranging imagistic 
combinations to create a virtual embodiment that can be altered at will, with a few clicks or 
keystrokes. In a country like South Korea where commentators often joke that Starcraft30 is the 
national pastime, attending to these dynamics of social space is crucial for understanding the 
evolution of complex signifying and mobilizing systems (e.g. social movement frames) within 
that space. This is not to equivocally argue that South Korean digital space automatically 
translates into enhances social movement activity, or to privilege the existence of a certain 
technology over the social understanding of its use. However, it is important to note that 
barriers to social movement activity which are often all-too-present in stratified social space 
may be lowered in digital space precisely because the transactions costs of individual 
communications are virtually nonexistent. 
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As we will see, these immanent social dynamics served as an important enabling function in 
overcoming communicative barriers between stratified population segments, particularly those 
marked by exclusion or marginalization from official political discourse and South Korean civil 
society. An analysis and literature survey by the South Korean scholar Han Do-Yun confirms 
that this was particularly true in the context of gender, which is one of the most rigid identity 
boundaries in modern Korean society, noting: 
Many married women who were not previously interested in politics or social issues learned 
about the issue of American beef import and the ensuing street demonstrations through 
Internet social communities where they used to share common interests on topics such as 
cosmetics, food, interior decoration, furniture, clothing, TV stars, etc. This social origin of 
new actors shows a fundamental change of the movement‘s characteristics.31 
 
Students protesting against beef in lunches in Korean schools were thus able to quickly and 
easily begin mobilizing concerned citizens reacting to an inflammatory television report32 on the 
risks of BSE in US beef, and to do so on a scale that most traditional social movements might 
take years to organize with great difficulty. The message of the protest spread quickly, changing 
the political opportunity structure for other actors to get involved. The near-immediate speed of 
digital communication enabled a low transaction cost for the dissemination of inflammatory 
frames surrounding the issue. The positive disposition or interest of large numbers of 
individuals towards a political issue tends to become amplified under certain social network 
arrangements. As Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler have argued in their recent book 
Connected, behaviors are infectious throughout social networks through patterns which are by 
no means deterministic but certainly seem to affect probability.33 For example, they have 
documented with significant study contagion as a property of obesity within social networks; if 
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your friend‘s friend gains weight, there is an increased probability that you will as well.34 Obesity 
is not literally contagious, but the information and social habitudes that predispose one to 
engage in activities which facilitate weight gain are mobile within social space, and migrate 
through network connections even if individuals are not themselves conscious of it. While 
particular political views may not be similarly contagious through social networks, the South 
Korean case seems to demonstrate that the level of an individual‘s political activity (measured as 
a degree of intensity, regardless of partisan affiliation) may be socially contagious, reaching 
epidemic proportions through the types of networks found in digital space. 
There are several network properties that digital communities tend to exhibit which 
accelerate the dissemination of information generally, particularly through a digital social 
network such as the chatrooms described above. First, is the density of these networks, which is 
to say that most members of a digital social network who identify as a distinct social group are 
connected to all other members of the group. The point maybe obvious but it is nonetheless 
important; if you‘ve ever played a game of ―Telephone‖ in which a message must be relayed 
through many different participants, one after the other, you know that such communication 
entails a certain degree of distortion and the risk of social fatigue means that the original 
message may never get to every participant intact or at all. The fact that these dense networks 
operate via many-to-many communication systems where dissemination can be simultaneous to 
multiple individuals further decreases the social distance that a message has to travel. Second, is 
the symmetry of many of the types of ties that exist in digital space, which is to say social ties 
that imply reciprocity. The classic example of symmetrical ties is marriage; it is not possible for 
a person to be married to another person without that person also being married to the first 
person. In digital space, Facebook offers a good example35; it is not possible for me to be your 
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friend on Facebook without you also being my friend on Facebook36. However, the same 
dynamic holds at the level of collectives in chatrooms, fora and other virtual communicative 
space at the level of collectivities; if we are members of the same digital agora then our digital 
social tie is typically reciprocal. Where embodied social space consists in heavily striated 
hierarchical structures at least partially grounded in embodied identity (race, gender, age, 
socioeconomic status and so on), digital space may offer a refreshing antidote and an outlet for 
dissensual37 experimentation outside the implicit censorships of everyday life. 
Furthermore, the perception of the spread of information also became a motivating factor in 
accelerating its spread, as more people became interested in ―what everyone was talking about‖. 
This is a phenomenon that network theory scholars have observed in terms of interpersonal ties 
known as a ―positive network externality‖38, and economics scholars have observed in studies of 
so-called ―viral‖ marketing. As the popular e-commerce author Ralph Wilson has suggested, 
viral communication does not rely on centralized dissemination technologies, but rather spreads 
through ―word-of-mouth‖, which on the internet can mean many different communicative 
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pathways within and between multiple overlapping social networks39. While the term ―viral‖ 
does to some extent carry a negative connotation, Dr. Wilson suggests that from a goal-oriented 
economic perspective, the efficacy, efficiency and speed of the virus is precisely what makes it an 
enviable comparison, writing: 
―...you have to admire the virus. He has a way of living in secrecy until he is so numerous 
that he wins by sheer weight of numbers. He piggybacks on other hosts and uses their 
resources to increase his tribe. And in the right environment, he grows exponentially.40‖  
                
Viral communication grows in part by migrating between media and distinct channels of social 
technology. Digital discussions were by no means contained to on-line forums, but spilled over 
into the home, workplace, bar and street, migrating between physical and virtual mediums as 
the additive density of internet chatter about the beef issue increased. On-line forums may have 
further motivated an outbidding phenomenon, where subsequent posters in a comment chain 
were encouraged to re-raise the level of rhetoric of previous posters in order to gain prominence 
in the discussion. Alternately, anonymous posters may hide their identity precisely because 
online comment-chains offer an outlet to vent their aggression and vitriol. Either way, online 
forums may motivate a rhetorical form of positive feedback which may quickly build social 
pressure for collective action, by creating audience-based incentives among the individual 
participants41. This out-bidding process is referred to as ―flamewars‖ or ―flaming‖ among 
initiates of digital culture, and is defined in the Glossary to Digital Activism Decoded as ―[t]he 
act of posting deliberately hostile messages online, generally in chat rooms and on discussion 
                                                        
39 Ralph Wilson ―The Six Simple Principles of Viral Marketing‖ Web Marketing Today February 1, 2000 
http://scr.csc.noctrl.edu/courses/ims375/readings/TheSixSimplePrinciplesOfViAlMarketing.pdf 
40 Ralph Wilson ―The Six Simple Principles of Viral Marketing‖ Web Marketing Today February 1, 2000 
http://scr.csc.noctrl.edu/courses/ims375/readings/TheSixSimplePrinciplesOfViAlMarketing.pdf 
41 I am indebted to Adam Zagorin for suggesting the concept of on-line ―out-bidding‖ as a salient feature 
of digital organizing. Most people who have seen outrageous comments posted by anonymous individuals 
in forums or in the ―Comments‖ section of online publications, to an extent that many sites employ and 
active moderator or a mechanism of collective censorship for hate-speech and/or obscenity, know that 
discussions of hot-button political issues (such as the beef question in Korea) would hardly be immune 
from free-for-all muckraking. 
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boards. ... most ―flamewars‖ start out as a heated debate over a political or social issue ...‖42 
While many social movement theorists dispute the benefit of this propensity of digitally 
embedded discussions for organizing, it seems to motivate quicker confrontations, which may 
speed the development and organization of direct actions as activists feel challenged to ―put up 
or shut up‖ by anonymous provocateurs. 
 It is not entirely surprising that a mass demonstration in South Korea would have its 
rhizomes deeply entwined in digital space. In 2008, the nation had the highest broadband 
penetration in the world, with 70% of the population over the age of six online, and more likely 
than not to possess an extremely-fast xDSL connection, which meant that getting a signal 
sufficient to effectively communicate and socialize in collective digital space was virtually 
guaranteed.43 The near ubiquity of strong connections, wireless hot-spots and internet cafes 
further meant that even before technology went affordably mobile, it was already present for use 
at many distinct loci for casual socializing. For comparison, this connection was typically 10-20 
megabit-per-second, or 10-20 times faster than the average US connection.44 Connection speed 
is important factor to consider as an enabling condition for mobile digital organizing because it 
allows peer-groups to quickly share music, photos and video files from mobile locations, a 
capability that we will see as an enabling factor persisting across many different cases of social 
movements organized through mobile technology, and in particular the recent mass democratic 
uprisings in the Arab world45. However, in South Korea the tendency to keep in constant 
                                                        
42 Talia Whyte and Mary Joyce ―Glossary‖ in Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change, 
IDEBATE Press, 2010 p. 218 
43 National Internet Development Agency of Korea, ―Survey on Computer and Internet Usage,‖ December 
2005, <http://isis.nida.or.kr/english/sub04/ sub04_index.html>. as cited in Jon Phillips ―New Media in 
Seoul After Midnight‖ LEONARDO, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 182–183, 2006 
44 Jon Phillips ―New Media in Seoul After Midnight‖ LEONARDO, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 182–183, 2006 
45 There have been countless episodes wherein the mere release of footage captured on a cellphone has 
been the inciting factor in protest, from the footage of Saddam Hussein‘s execution to ‗souvenir pictures‘ 
taken by Israeli troops of Palestinian prisoners, appropriated by digital denizens to foment outrage. see 
Patrick Jackson and Olivia McLeod ―Mobile phone captures Iraq's cruelty‖ BBC, January 7, 2007 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6225337.stm 





communication with one‘s social group was already previously motivated by a strong culture of 
virtual world participation. The social media market dominance of a single platform, Cyworld,  
was also key factor in ensuring that virtual worlding was not fragmentary from a network 
perspective and moreover in creating a continuous virtual space. Estimates suggest that  90% of 
the 16-33 year old demographic at least possessed a Cyworld account, which functioned as social 
representation of the individual in digital space, similar to a Facebook profile46. While network 
connections in virtual space could be established as ―weak ties‖, in order for them to become 
robust, extended and durable communication and coordination would be required. As with most 
social networks, Cyworld and its adjoining fora represented primarily a competitive/cooperative 
structure for social opportunity, where individuals were motivated to communicate more with 
members of their weak-tied social network in order to build the connections socially to ensure 
the possibility of social mobilization (e.g. mobilizing a social group of not-yet-friends to meet at 
a norae-baang for a night of karaoke).  
In other words, weak ties established between individuals from disparate social contexts 
became the basis for a competitive incentive to cooperate on meet-ups in the embodied social 
field, in order to build one‘s network over time. However, the mere presence of weak ties by 
itself increases the propensity of social movements to spread, by lowering barriers to the spread 
of information. As the network scholar Mark Granovetter has argued, while weak ties may not 
immediately facilitate tight-knit solidarity or social cooperation, they are in fact more valuable 
for disseminating crucial information across a wide range of actors necessary to mobilize mass 
demonstrations.47 
                                                        
46 Jon Phillips ―New Media in Seoul After Midnight‖ LEONARDO, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 182–183, 2006 
47 Mark Granovetter ―The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited‖ in Sociological Theory, 
Volume 1 (1983), 201-233 with particular reference to the initial section, where in discussing individuals 
who have few weak ties, he argues that  ―...such individuals may be difficult to organize or integrate into 
political movements of any kind, since membership in movements or goal-oriented organizations typically 
results from being recruited by friends. While members of one or two cliques may be efficiently recruited, 
the problem is that, without weak ties, any momentum generated in this way does not spread beyond the 
clique. As a result, most of the population will be untouched.‖ 
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It is crucial not to make the mistake of seeing these large networks of weak ties in digital 
space as separate or isolated from the comparatively smaller networks of stronger ties in 
embodied social space, and particularly not to ignore the areas of overlap and causal feedback. 
The virtual worlding of a substantial demographic segment of Korean society did not come to 
substitute for traditional fora for socialization, but rather came to complement the formation of 
internally integrated social groups, gathering and keeping in touch within digital space while 
generally living within a 1-2 hour radius of one another.48 This demographic level of virtual 
socialization and pressure for constant communication reflects an equally staggering market 
saturation of mobile technology. According to Han Ki Chul, director of the Emerging 
Technologies Research Institute, over 70% of the Korean population has a 3G mobile phone, 
which given the number of elderly and young children in the population, ―means that everyone 
who could have a phone, has one.‖49 Korean social networks, particularly within dense urban 
areas such as Seoul, can thus be understood as sensitive receptors and likely amplifiers for 
messages framed as socially relevant. Embodied social activity in areas such as Seoul thus bares 
an ambiguous and continuous input-output relationship with its virtual co-relative, as 
information spreads between groups while migrating between virtual and embodied social 
technologies of communication. Mobile technology means that the absurd distinction often 
erected between digital space of newly proliferating identities and ―properly political‖ space can 
no longer be treated seriously.50 
 In May and early June of 2008, the government‘s reaction to concerned citizens 
demonstrating about the dangers of mad cow disease did not help the situation, particularly the 
use of riot-control measures such as aggressive police presence and water-hoses. By taking the 
protestors quite seriously from the outset, they crafted repressive responses (particularly in the 
                                                        
48 Jon Phillips ―New Media in Seoul After Midnight‖ LEONARDO, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 182–183, 2006 
49 Han Ki Chul, interview, Daejon, South Korea, 28 June 2004. as cited in Jon Phillips ―New Media in 
Seoul After Midnight‖ LEONARDO, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 182–183, 2006 
50 see for example Slavoj Zizek in Sabine Reul and Thomas Deichmann ―'The one measure of true love is: 




case of student demonstrators) that only inflamed public opinion and motivated new groups to 
join the protests, further feeding the positive psychological dynamics of in-group growth, and 
increasing the perceived costs of being ―left out‖. The expansive and inclusive nature of 
solidarity meant that segments of the population who may have ordinarily felt alienated from 
organizing political action felt it necessary to take an interest in the demonstrations. Rather than 
being an ameliorating factor, each new counter-measure became a new mobile point of 
condensation51 for a broader constituency of the South Korean pubic to get involved. As Do-
Hyun argues: 
From a sociological perspective, one important aspect of the protest is that it fostered significant 
interaction between the real world and the world of cyberspace. Chung and Kim (2009) have 
empirically shown how online communities and communication are closely related to the offline 
protest and gatherings that followed.52 
 
However, this may be once again a case of theory catching up with social reality at a crucial 
moment of visibility. If anecdotal reports about Korean society reflecting the prevalence of 
                                                        
51 Through out this text I will refer to such points of condensation, which refer directly to the notion in 
Slavoj Zizek‘s work of ―metaphoric condensation‖, where he argues that the particular demands of 
protestors reflect a desire for resonance with a more universal appeal, as he writes, ―Let us recall the 
standard example of a popular protest (mass demonstration, strike, boycott) directed at a specific point, 
that is, focusing on a particular demand (‗Abolish that new tax! Justice for the imprisoned! Stop exploiting 
that natural resource!‘…) – the situation becomes politicized when this particular demand starts to 
function as a metaphoric condensation of the global opposition against Them, those in power, so that the 
protest is no longer actually just about the demand, but about the universal dimension that resonates in 
that particular demand...‖ from Slavoj Zizek The Ticklish Subject, Verso, 1999 p. 204  – in this case a 
metaphor for the recurrent trope of South Korea‘s ―humiliating diplomacy‖ in the face of American 
demands, particularly on trade, that many perceived to have precipitated the 1997 Asian financial collapse 
and the harsh crackdown against social movements that occurred in its wake. Thus, generalized protest 
condenses around a specific demand, when in fact the protest is resonant with more universalizable 
frustrations against the inequalities arising out of neoliberal restructuring and the ―undemocratic‖ 
conservative repression of attempts to re-balance the scales by South Korean workers. 
See International Business Times News ―US-South Korea FTA: Whose win is it anyway?‖ 12/6/10 
See also Jamie Doucette ―Korean Neo-Liberalism and Empire,‖, Znet, 7/11/2006 
http://www.zcommunications.org/korean-neo-liberalism-and-empire-by-jamie-doucette and in 
particular the contextualization of anti-trade struggles with the perceived stratification of Korean society 
around globalized market interests and the consumption of Western elites, as he writes: ―Korean groups 
are mobilizing here against what they see not only as an unequal negotiating framework between the US 
and Korea, but also against growing social polarization in the wake of escalating market reforms since the 
1997 financial crisis.‖ 
52 Han Do-Hyun ―Contemporary Korean Society Viewed through the Lens of the Candlelight Vigils of 
2008‖ Korea Journal, Autumn 2010, p.6, citing Chung, Il-Joon, and Sang-Don Kim. 2009. ―Inteonet 
gamseong-i ollain hangui chamyeo-wa oplain siwi chamyeo-e michin yeonghyang: 2008 nyeon chotbul 
jiphoe bunseok‖ (The Impact of Internet Emotions on Online Protests and Offline Demonstrations: An 




virtual social activity are to be believed, then this actual-virtual correspondence was used for 
mundane social mobilization as a matter of everyday gatherings, and became an extremely 
useful repertoire of contention, to use Charles Tilly‘s term, taken from the reservoir of everyday 
social practices and appropriated for disseminating critical information about the relevant 
issues and organizing mass demonstrations. This positive feedback relationship allowed the 
demonstrators to overcome barriers in digital space to re-frame the issue of contaminated beef 
in many different terms that could speak to the concerns and local contexts of specific groups 
(e.g. union workers, teachers, parents and so on). However, this frame specialization occurred 
simultaneously with the emergency of a larger general frame, a sentiment of positive social 
mobilization for its own sake. If trade agreements had soured the public mood and attracted the 
ire of unions for their ―undemocratic‖ nature, then the remedy was no mere set of demands, but 
rather taking democracy to the streets in the form of direct action. In other words, the stated 
goal of many of the protestors was simply to protest, in the hopes of making the government of 
aware that the will of the people was not to be ignored. 
This framing question became absolutely crucial for building the demonstrations through 
connections developed in virtual worlds, drawing on the same impulses for casual social 
mobilization that pervaded many everyday Korean fora. As I walked the streets of Seoul in those 
turbulent late June days, the atmosphere would have surprised most Western commentators, 
learning of the protests through headlines such as ―Beef Protest Turns Violent in South Korea‖, 
an example taken from the New York Times which was echoed across the international media.53 
In fact, the atmosphere of the demonstrations was one of carnival, a jubilant festivity spattered 
                                                        
53 Choe Sang-Hun ―Beef Protest Turns Violent in South Korea‖ New York Times, June 30, 2008 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/world/asia/30korea.html 
I should note that I am not suggesting that there was no violent actions that took place in the context of 
these protests, however the media framing of protest violence in general, and in the case of South Korean 
demonstrations in particular tends to a) focus exclusively on the violent elements of large demonstrations, 
even when those elements are proportionately minor and hardly representative and b) blame the 
protestors themselves entirely for the violence and identify the ―unrest‖ as the source of the violence, 
ignoring the role of repressive police tactics and the decisions of policy elites which frequently provoke or 
inflame the violence of demonstrators. 
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with pop choruses from mobile radios and (slightly drunken) singing and even dancing and 
cheers redolent of symbolic Korean-ness. Many demonstrations across Seoul thus represented 
an outpouring of South Korean national pride, not at the behest of their government but in spite 
of it, an articulation of nationalist identity against the mere apparatus of the governing 
institutions. Most protestors were neither angry nor particularly resentful; they rather saw the 
demonstrations as an opportunity to mobilize their friend-group from virtual space in tandem 
with many other South Koreans for a good time and hearty expression of solidarity with what 
was widely perceived as a just cause. This collective sentiment was not improvised for the issue 
of beef imports ad hoc, but tapped into a feeling of emotional collective unity that had been 
forged in the streets of Seoul during the 2002 World Cup. During our interview, Cheewoo Kim 
said that the demonstrations most closely resembled these throngs of football supporters, 
individuals re-articulated as an embodied mass collective in the jerseys of the ROK Red Devils: 
―Everyone came out with red T-shirts, young and old. We felt proud of being Korean, and [of 
being] powerful. Korean people are aware of how much power they have now.‖54 The core of this 
political constituency, according to Kim, was college students, energized with re-articulation of a 
politically self-aware collective identity. This comparison was echoed in the recent study of 
scholar Han Do-Hyun, where he wrote: 
―...the protest was not confrontational. Instead, it was more like a community festival, 
resembling the Red Devil activities of the 2002 World Cup co-hosted by Korea and Japan 
when hundreds of thousands fans poured out into the streets to cheer on the national team. 
The uncensored self-expression and joy expressed by the Red Devils is mirrored by the 
participants of the candlelight protest of 2008 .‖55  
 
Here, once again, we see social identity as a powerful repertoire  available for political 
appropriation within the cultural millieu, evocative of powerful nationalistic symbolism and 
                                                        
54 Interview with Cheewoo Kim, conducted by Edmund Zagorin, June, 2008 published in the essay ―Beef 
Protests: How Mobile Technology Has Politically Empowered Thousands of South Koreans‖ Black and 
White, June 27,2008 
http://blackandwhiteprogram.com/report/meat-protest 
55 Han Do-Hyun ―Contemporary Korean Society Viewed through the Lens of the Candlelight Vigils of 
2008‖ Korea Journal, Autumn 2010, p.6 
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shared memories of collective sentiment. What began as a social identity for mobilizing football 
supporters became a malleable frame of contention for mobilizing supporters for a much wider 
demonstration. By late June many traditional social movement organizations, such as unions 
and teachers organizations had seen the same opportunity for broader resonance of their own 
messages, and had begun using the beef protests as a venue to expand their own coalitions. The 
more particular messages of the protest, specialized to different sub-populations, thus became 
ascendant. By the fever pitch, where the sheer number of people moving in crowds on the street 
led to confrontations which were reported as abstract ―violence‖56, a whole host of groups had 
taken advantage of a politically engaged public and abundant media access to advance their own 
messages. Many of the original organizers of the protests realized that they could not control the 
composition or activities of their new constituents, but (perhaps correctly) concluded that the 
more, the merrier. Needless to say, from a journalistic perspective, the result was perplexing. 
Perhaps the best summary of this heterogeneous form of coalition-building which simply 
operated around shared opportunity (rather than shared message or political goal) was best 
summarized at the time by Korea Times reporter Kim Tae-jong, who wrote: 
Organizers are seemingly unable to control what those attending the candlelight vigils say 
during the protests. Doctors, pharmacists, nurses and dentists demanded the government 
scrap its plan to privatize public medical insurance. Students and teachers denounced the 
new education policies that put greater emphasis on English immerging methods. Basically, 
the coalition takes a stance that it will not attempt to control the slogans of various civic 
groups but their ultimate goal is the renegotiation of the beef deal.57 
 
The coalition became steadily more powerful as the number of demonstrators rose. Their bodies 
blocked the streets of Seoul and brought the engine of the Korean urban economy to a 
screeching standstill, as one might experience during a prolonged holiday caused by snow. The 
                                                        
56 ―Violence‖ in media discourse covers a wide range of actions which are often presumed as negative on 
the part of readers. However, if we follow the argument in Walter Benjamin‘s ―Critique of Violence‖ in 
Selected Writings Vol 1Belknap/Howard, 199 p. 244-248,we see that violence itself is only a means, not 
per se from a notion of inflicting physical suffering but quintessentially a violation of social norms and 
expectations which are understood to imply moral rules. In the same way that the negative association 
with ―crime‖ implies a question of whether or not the law itself is just, the typically negative association 
with ―violence‖ implies a question as to whether or not the power relations structuring the a given social 
space should be violated. 
57 Kim Tae-Jong ―Protesters Want U.S. Beef Safety‖ Korea Times 6/14/08 
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pressure on Lee Myung-Bak‘s ruling coalition increased. In successively more desperate 
attempts to control the situation they finally renegotiated the agreement to meet the protestors‘ 
demands, fired all but one of the top aides and the entire cabined publicly offered to resign.58 
However, the demonstrations had taken on a life of their own, and the protestors would not be 
appeased so easily. For another week they raged through Seoul, and then, dissipated just as 
suddenly as they had come. Substantial protests still occurred for weeks afterward, but they 
were numerically insignificant in comparison with what had proceeded, with numbers in the 0-
10,000 range as opposed to the 10-100,000 and even hundreds of thousands range. Beef 
imports resumed as planned, with renegotiated safeguards in place, and within two years the 
Republic of Korea became the third largest importer of US beef.59 The rising tide of public 
skepticism was mollified in no small part by symbolic action taken on the part of Han Seung-
soo, Prime Minister of South Korea who personally ordered 260,000 won60 of US beef to eat 
with his family, as a public signal of the confidence of government officials in the safety of the 
meat for consumers61. This symbolic act gesture was important not merely as a gesture towards 
concerns with the beef itself, but in confirming the importance of public sentiment in the policy-
making process that earlier repressive responses to the demonstrations had lacked. The 
government now appeared to be responding to the democratic will of the Korean people, at least 
provisionally, and the protestors knew that policy-makers would tread more carefully in the 
future, particularly in their approach to policy process and in the value they placed on making 
the case for trade reforms to the Korean people. In short, the demonstrators had won, achieving 
a remarkable victory that only months earlier would have seemed impossible, or at least 
extremely unlikely. 
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59 Xinhua News ―S. Korea becomes world's third largest U.S. beef importer‖ 7/16/10 
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60 The won is the South Korean currency. 







chapter two: the contentious politics of studying contentious 
politics 
 
 The 2008 South Korean demonstrations are an important case with which to begin our 
discussion of social movement formation and evolution in digital space. While they are by no 
means the first or only instance of such organizing strategies proving successful, the scale of the 
demonstrations and the speed of their formation in embodied social space represents an 
important ongoing paradigm shift from traditional social movement organizing strategies. The 
viral cycles of contention which feature information relevant to social movement organizing 
traveling quickly through large networks of weak ties have become an abstract machine through 
which  many other struggles, enabled by the presence of vast networks of mobile technology and 
formation of social linkages through mobile communication, have crystallized and evolved. 
These movements include among their prominent examples: monks organizing transnationally 
through Facebook in Burma/Myanmar62 (also referred to as the ―Saffron revolution‖), the 2008 
presidential campaign of Barack Obama63, the protests surrounding the 2010 Iranian elections 
                                                        
62 If a history of Facebook is written, this will be recalled as one of the largest and fastest-growing groups, 
surprising because of its responsiveness to material political conditions (rather than the random 
generative cycles of typical meme-dissemination) with some reports indicating membership growth over a 
thousand per hour, continuously for days, reaching the size of at least 300,000, enabling the planning of 
solidarity and support events in 41 cities, in 51 countries on 5 continents. See Burma Campaign UK 
―Facebook Support the Monks In Burma Reaches Over 300,000. Yoko Ono sends message of support‖ 
October 2 2007 
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php/news-and-reports/news-stories/Facebook-Support-the-
Monks-In-Burma-Reaches-Over-300000.-Yoko-Ono-sends-mes 
also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Burmese_anti-government_protests 
63The social media aspect of the 2008 Obama Campaign is an excellent example of how social networks 
and new media become additive and integrative rather than substitutive and dislocating in terms of 
grounding social space within previously existing repertoires. In Obama‘s case, the tremendous grassroots 
mobilization through Organizing for America made use of many conventional organizing tactics for which 
digital social networks as quotidian as email chains and as complex as integrating the new platform, called 
myBarackObama (which allowed users to create and individualized user profile and find other like-
minded organizers in their local area to collaborate on political and fundraising events with) into the 
everyday ground-level dynamics of activists and the calculations of high-level strategy managers. The 
campaign also made use of SMS networks and created internal campaigns for Obama supporters, such as 
YrMama4Obama (http://yrmama4obama.com) which encouraged interested voters to receive real-time 
updates from the campaign. See Mary Joyce‘s ―Preface‖ to Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics 
of Change, IDEBATE Press, 2010 p. 7, as well as Brannon Cullum‘s ―Devices: The Power of Mobile 
Phones‖ in the same volume. 
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(referred to as the Green Revolution, or the ―Twitter revolution‖ in the Western media)64 and the 
mass demonstrations emerging into prominence at the beginning of 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Syria and elsewhere in the Islamic world 
(now being referred to as the ―Arab Spring‖, in reference to the uprisings in Czechoslovakia in 
1968 against the Soviet satellite regime which ended with a Soviet military intervention, which 
was known as ―Prague Spring‖)65.66 
                                                        
64The contestation of framing this struggle around social media, particularly in the Western press and 24-
hour news cycle where ―experts‖ on technology (rather than Iranian culture and politics) were quick to 
credit Twitter with enabling the mass demonstrations. This framing has provoked a great deal of ire from 
Iranian activists, and obscures more than it reveals about the social dynamics and real dangers involved in 
the organization of massive groups of demonstrators in spite of a vast and violent security apparatus and 
surveillance complex centralized in the Iranian state. However, a great deal of this second-order analysis, 
which makes use of both empirical data gathered from activists and takes a critical approach towards the 
media‘s techno-triumphalism, reveals that in many cases informal off-line networks were just as 
important for disseminating information as Twitter or Facebook (posts from opposition leaders often 
urged supporters to spread the word of demonstrations through these more conventional networks) and 
that SMS text messaging and other Web 1.0 technologies formed the basis of much of the strategic vision 
of the organizers. Insofar as Twitter did become a substantive instrument for relaying information in real-
time, it is because its one-to-many structure allowed opposition leaders to incorporate it in the same way 
they had once approached traditional media, by sending instructions to their followers and providing 
updates on the status of their campaigns. See Hahmid Tehrani‘s ―Digital Activism in Iran: Beyond the 
Headlines‖ June 20,2009 http://www.digiactive.org/2009/06/20/iran-beyond-headlines/ 
see also Guarav Mishra ―Iran‘s Twitter Revolution – Myth or Reality?‖ WorldFocus, June 18, 2009 
http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/06/18/irans-twitter-revolution-myth-or-reality/5869/ 
65 Corresponding with spikes in winter wheat prices, mass social unrest which began in Tunisia in the 
early months of 2011 quickly built momentum, spreading through both grassroots offline networks of 
activists who had been consolidating support of fragmentary anti-authoritarian opposition groups for 
decades, as well as new transnational connections and tactics forged in digital space. The ―revolutions‖ 
began without warning and grew much faster than anyone predicted, to date toppling two autocrats, 
spurring substantial concessions from governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and fomenting a political 
chaos in Libya as Moamar Qaddafi has escalated violence against civilians and the United States and 
France have militarily intervened with air support for a no-fly zone and bombing campaigns against 
Qaddafi‘s forces, a situation which may eventually devolve to a protracted civil war. While the ongoing 
nature of these upheavals, as well the security problems associated with participating individuals publicly 
disclosing data about their organizing strategies make it difficult to understand the extent to which digital 
activism played a significant role, unquestionably the points of condensation in several of the power 
struggles have formed around single abuses against individuals which were surreptitiously captured on 
camera and posted to YouTube, generating widespread public outrage and backlash, and fueling an 
escalating cycle of contention. However, there is hesitation among activists to frame organizational tactics 
around digital media, for fear of Westernizing their social movement frame of populist resistance. See 
Sami Ben Gharbia ―The Internet Freedom Fallacy and the Arab Digital activism‖ on Tlaxcala, January 1, 
2011 http://www.tlaxcala-int.org/article.asp?reference=3228 
see also Phillip N. Howard ―Digital media and the Arab spring‖ February 11, 2011 
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2011/02/16/digital-media-and-the-arab-spring/ 
see also Edward Cody ―Demonstrators turn out around Middle East‖ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, April 2, 
2011 http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11092/1136536-82.stm 
66 There are many other examples which I have not listed here, such as the use of viral social media in 
Moldova used to highlight instances of confrontations between security personnel/police and 
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Together, the emergence of these movements represent a paradigm-shift in the process of 
organizing, a shift which necessarily affects both the multi-tiered social space occupied by 
participants and the theoretical structured space through which academics come to understand 
social movements as ontological entities. The term ―paradigm-shift‖ has a particular meaning 
here, derived from Thomas Kuhn‘s work on scientific revolutions, where he demonstrated that 
the normal work that scientists do typically serves to reinforce, rather than destabilize, 
conventional representations of natural laws often against available counter-vailing evidence. 
However, this is a caricature of a much more complex argument. In fact, the crucial point of 
Kuhn‘s work is precisely that there is almost always evidence that points in both directions. In 
examining a series of data-sets overlapping the same area of study, one may find evidence which 
both supports and contradicts the theory in varying degrees. However, it is the theory or 
―paradigm‖ itself which serves as a primary reading tool which allows the data to understood 
through axiomatic criteria of relevance. Kuhn is quite clear on this point: ―...there is no such 
thing as research without counterinstances.‖67 Paradigms thus perform a crucial role at the 
microsocial level of data-interpretation, by forming criteria of relevance68 that allow scientific 
observers to efficiently sort and interpret data either as anomalies that a theory or set of 
paradigmatic expectations ought not tarry with, or as a troubling legitimate counterinstance 
which demands that the paradigm be altered in order to ensure a full range of explanatory value. 
Kuhn‘s analysis is historical, and he notes that the work of ―normal science‖ is almost never in 
this latter category, but rather at best comprises a series of minor modifications which cause the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
demonstrators/dissenter. In this list I have sought to highlight a few prominent examples which may 
provide a useful point of reference for a general audience, a list which seeks to be anecdotal without being 
exhaustive. The aim of this section is not to examine series of case studies in order to identify the 
similarities of organizational dynamics, but rather to highlight difference itself as an operational principle 
in activist scholarship which is both generative of novel articulations of organizing tactics within local 
contexts while illuminating the utility of abstract anti-theoretical concepts which seek to undermine, 
rather than reinforce the academic tendency to homogenize or holize particular examples within over-
aching historical narratives. The omission or inclusion of these particular examples is therefore not 
central to the lines of argument being advanced in this section. 
67 see Thomas Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962 
68 An excellent an excellent introduction to the relation between criteria of relevance and scientific truth 
can be found in Manual De Landa Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy Continuum, 2002 p. 7 
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theory to become ever-more complex and cumbersome. The famous example Kuhn uses is from 
the history of astronomy, where the Ptolemaic model assumed geocentrism as its core premise, 
and was long-guarded by the powerful edifice of the Catholic church. However, difficulties in the 
Ptolmaic model would perpetually arise in tracking the movement of the planets, which ought to 
have traced straight lines across the sky over the months but in fact traced continuous circles. 
Rather than abandon the geocentric paradigm, astronomers invented the notion of ―epicycles‖, a 
theoretical addition to the Ptolmaic system used to make the movement of the planets 
compatible with the paradigmatic explanation. By the time Galileo had come along however, 
other problems had been identified with the Ptolmaic model, and the paradigm had achieved 
sufficient complexity and theoretical cumbersomeness that scholars were more ready to 
abandon it in favor of the Copernican heliocentric model. Kuhn makes a persuasive case that it 
is only in these exceptional cases that entire communities of knowers rapidly shift to a new way 
of understanding the world.69  
The understanding of paradigm-shift is crucial here because it has implications both for the 
ways in which social movements organize and the epistemological practices by which social 
scientists study and come to understand social movements. My thesis will thus primarily focus 
on an argument for paradigm-shift among a community of expert or academic knowers who 
seek to present a coherent understanding of contemporary social upheavals to a general 
audience, and outline some possibilities for what this new paradigm must successfully 
encompass. This new paradigm, as with all supposedly novel explanatory systems, is not ―new‖ 
in the sense of being newly born or original to this writing, but in the same way as apparently 
―eruptive‖ social movements has existed sub-rosa for quite some time, having grown out of the 
poststructuralist concern with the tendency of modern scholarship to objectify and essentialize 
its subject matter, Bayesian concerns about meta-data probability, empirical uncertainty in the 
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application of general principles to specific cases. However, these legitimate concerns are 
generally theoretical in nature. The most significant impetus for this paradigm-shift has become 
the almost total irrelevance of contemporary political science methods for the emergent 
collectivities of activists, and a concurrent return to the tradition of activist-scholarship among 
real-world practicitioners. This tradition is exemplified by scholars who produces practical 
diagrams of power and programs for action that are embedded within the local contexts which 
they seek to describe, and through which they seek to empower marginalized collectivities. 
Furthermore, I would suggest that this new paradigm will gain currency within formal 
theoretical circles in light of the failure of current political sciences to meet the self-set basic 
standards of Popperian falsificationism, or in simpler terms, the failure to adequately predict or 
explain the most significant geopolitical events of the past three decades.70 These failures of 
foresight include, perhaps most significantly, the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as the 
post-Cold War ethnic conflicts of the 1990s and, today most obviously, the emergent forms of 
social upheaval taking place all over the world but perhaps most noticeably in Arab nations71 . In 
other words, with few exceptions, most political sciences lack even the most basic ability to meet 
their own goals of identifying and generalizing essential properties across wide ranges of cases 
and make risky predictions based on those expectations which then provide data which can 
falsify their theories.  
However, in order to successfully argue for a new paradigm, a detailed theoretical 
examination of the current prevalent understanding of social movements within the social 
sciences will prove necessary. I will further need to demonstrate that the cases I have identified 
as being paradigmatic of a new condition of social formation are not mere ―anomalies‖, which 
can be explained as exceptions to the previous rules. As my argument unfolds, it will become 
clear that the ―new‖ paradigm I am calling for is hardly novel, and in fact has existed as a minor 
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disciplinary approach towards studying social formation within academic discourses for many 
decades.  The theoretical task will be to apply the methodological approach of this minor 
discourse to the macrosocial shifts that have occurred more recently in the social world of 
organizing through mobile technology and virtual worlds. This will not consist in picking 
generalizable concepts and applying them to particular case studies, but will rather inhere in 
examining the instances where prevalent academic discourses on both historical time and social 
movement theory run up against Kuhnian counterinstances which may seem difficult to resolve 
by modifying the current paradigmatic approach. By illuminating these cases of indistinction 
and overcomplexity, I hope to then suggest ways in which minor discourses, particularly those 
produced by actants who are themselves involved in social movements and, in particular, 
episodes of digital activism, offer a perspective with supplies unique explanatory value. 
However, before doing this I must successfully make a case that the dominant ontologies of 
political science, which informs prevalent commentary on social movements, have deep 
structural flaws that would prevent them from adequately offering explanations of contentious 
political phenomena, even under rare ideal circumstances. 
I do not believe that this case is that difficult to make. Political science has been a discipline 
whose theoretical discourse has been dominated by post-facto analyses of socially constructed 
representations of ―events‖. These event-images have been necessarily socially constructed 
through a research process which privileges the data of certain actors over others, and is guided 
with typical reference to a quantitative model which predicts actors‘ behavior. Simply because 
the event-images have been socially constructed implies nothing about their accuracy, in the 
same way that the fact that an image is mediated by a pair of eyeglasses does not degrade the 
veracity of its content.  However, among the community of knowers within the political sciences 
disciplines, event-images are constructed through representational data collected through 
research methods that often privilege socially significant actors (i.e. leaders of political 
institutions, researchers who have developed expertise in a segmented component of area 
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studies, individuals who are recognized as ―experts‖ by general audiences and are consulted by 
popular media outlets to explain and interpret ―events‖, such as the 2008 protests in South 
Korea) over causally relevant actants (i.e. groups and individuals who participate and organize 
at the micro-level for collective action which constitutes, from a theoretical perspective, the 
milieu of what one might refer to as ―imperceptible politics‖72). Thus, political science is often 
situated relative to the perspective of ruling elites, and reflects the interests of managers of 
populations and spectators of power-politics, rather than accounting for the perspective of 
actants who participate in everyday value economies of social space. Since it is this latter millieu 
which often features key figures of antiestablishment social movement mobilization, and since 
social movements are often causally responsible for igniting sweeping social change, it is should 
not surprise us that well-regarded and highly credentialed institutionalized knowers so often 
miss the boat. The approach of these institutionalized knowers is symptomatic of what Michel 
Foucault has criticized as ―expert knowledge‖73, in which discourses are dominated by scholars 
who have amassed social capital to disseminate and normalize their viewpoints through 
disciplinary networks of power. Through these networks, novel social phenomena and 
unprecedented combinatorial structures are subsumed within hegemonic terminology and 
discourses of the dominant community of institutional knowers. In other words, new events 
simply end up becoming evidence of old theories.  
However, this critique of ―expert knowledge‖ is not solely of the province of poststructural 
theorists of power relations, or ―Continental philosophers‖, but also has come under the scrutiny 
of a new edifice of powerful knowers in the economics community, and particularly specialists in 
the specialized discipline of foresight studies. Making use of a series of studies in the field of 
―biases and heuristics‖, a field that studies how expert knowers apply commonplace wisdom and 
logically fallacious intuition to the evaluation of probability, artificial intelligence scholar Eliezer 
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Yudkowsky has documented how even Nobel Prize-winning economists systematically 
underestimated the risk structure of particular scenarios based on a dynamic practice of 
producing and relying on conventional wisdom about investment strategies.74 Yudkowsky 
further explores this instance in the case of political scientists who are particularly prone to what 
he terms ―the conjunctive fallacy‖, whereby scenarios are made compelling by their narrative 
specificity, while logically each additional detail and level of specification decreases the 
predictive value of the scenarios, which ought to encompass and account for a degree of 
emergent chaos in the unfolding interaction of complex social systems. Exalting Bayesian 
analysis, which reflexively accounts for the likelihood of particular forecasts over a variable 
range of possible outcomes, Yudkowsky offers a useful approach for assessing the batting 
average of predictive knowers. Unfortunately, political scientists and international relations 
scholars who have a material interest in providing information useful to policy planners and 
achieving professional success through the vindication of their theories do not fare particularly 
well. 
 In this case, we may understand the ―normal science‖ of analyzing social movements 
(and socio-political phenomena more generally) as involving the composition of abstract models 
which map the transcendent relations between idealized actors (consider, for example, rational 
choice theory as a perfect illustration of this practice). This normal science then makes up the 
difference between these models and local contexts by (arbitrarily) assigning and calculating 
values of relative interest in order to map the likely outcomes of particular situations75. These 
models are rarely accurate, even when assigning values counter-factually. This is not because 
the individuals who execute this paradigm are intellectual nincompoops (as a rule, far from it) 
but rather because they have burdened themselves with a task of Sisyphean complexity, and are 
thus forced to rationalize their (lapsed) expertise through a superficial aping of the methodology 
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of many natural sciences. However, this approach serves little purpose greater than allowing 
these scientists of society to assume the veneer and mystical aura associated with a white 
laboratory coat and a rack of test tubes; becoming so-called gurus of the social field. However, as 
Phillip Tetlock noted in his mammoth study of expert predictions in the social sciences, these 
so-called experts have a general predictive accuracy below monkeys throwing darts.76 Meta-data 
studies of expert predictions, such as those conducted by Scott Armstrong and Kesten Green, 
further suggest that the supposed ―expertise‖ of an individual knower has close to zero influence 
on the value of their predictions, and in some case can hamper their likelihood of accuracy, 
writing: 
Unaided judgmental forecasts by experts have no value. This applies whether the opinions 
are expressed in words, spreadsheets, or mathematical models. It applies regardless of how 
much scientific evidence is possessed by the experts. Among the reasons for this are... Bias: 
People have difficulty in obtaining or using evidence that contradicts their initial beliefs. 
This problem is especially serious for people who view themselves as experts.77 
 
Political science is an oxymoron; politics is not a science. At best it is a craft, and at best the 
speculations of these expert knowers approximate the value of socially relevant artwork, except 
without the aesthetic appeal. Such revelations may have disturbing implications for those who 
want the words of these expert knowers to remain highly regarded, on the level of ―science‖ in 
terms of rigorous attention to empirical data, responsiveness to contextual change, and to meet 
the high standards set by Karl Popper‘s hypothetico-deductive methodology. Popper‘s 
falsificationism provides a bright-line between scientific truth in a way that he claims 
distinguishes physics from psychonalysis. This supposition of physics as a legitimate science 
distinct from psychoanalysis rests largely on the basis of physics‘ ability to make risky 
predictions which could prove a theory false, rather than merely searching for evidence which 
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would confirm the theories application. Sadly, as Yudkowsky documents, ―confirmation bias‖ 
(which is exactly the malady of Freudian psychoanalysis which Popper takes issue with) is alive 
and well in political science methodologies, and may even constitute the bulk of what may count 
as Kuhnian ―normal science‖ within political science disciplines. Peer review doesn‘t appear to 
help much either. As Robert Pfeifer and Carl Hoffman have documented, peer review either has 
almost no effect and may often exhibit a negative correlation when the topic of the peer reviewed 
research is considered ―hot‖ or presents an opportunity for increased competition and 
professional advancement among scholars.78 
 Why is this the case? The simple answer is that the subject matter of these disciplines is so 
impossibly complex that it makes predictive accuracy impossible, but it also makes the 
methodological approach of developing and testing models (particularly when those models are 
premised upon static entities and linear relations) hopelessly useless. In the essay God Gave 
Physics the Easy Problems, Steven Bernstein et. al. argue that many of these problems at the 
level of basic data interpretation and analysis by suggesting: 
In international relations, ... it is often impossible to assign metrics to what we think are 
relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of polarity, relative 
power and the balance of power are among the most widely used independent variables, but 
there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures ... Yet without consensus on 
definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much 
wiggle room to be 'tested' decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent 
variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation 
of deterrence outcomes, and about the criteria for democratic governance and their 
application to specific countries at different points in their history. ... The lack of consensus 
about terms and their measurement is not merely the result of intellectual anarchy or 
sloppiness - although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, it has more to 
do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves.79 
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If true, this presents seemingly insurmountable obstacles for a political science grounded in 
classical metaphysics which presumes that social objects have essential properties that can be 
captured by models that can then range across a plethora of particular instances. It is the 
presumption of correspondence between an ideal reality composed of static conceptual entities 
and a material world populated by heterogenous entities and mutant collective entities which 
surprise our theories at every twist and turn that comprises the heart of the problem. Levi 
Bryant refers to this classical ontological position as ―correlationism‖80, and attributes its 
prevalence to the hubristic tradition of the natural sciences to presume the potential for human 
omniscience and the ability of science to generate potent knowledge (―independent variables‖, 
―control situations‖) that allows slivers of sterile knowledge to be insulated from the 
contaminating influence of chaotic social reality. Frequently, when social scientists are 
approached with these sorts of objections, they make claims which can be straw personed as 
―we‘ll we‘re not perfect, but who is? we may not get it right all the time, but we at least get close 
sometimes and in any case our discipline produces valuable contextual data as a matter of 
course during the research process.‖ First, the predictive failure of political science is not merely 
quantitative effect, or in other words, it is not merely that the metaphysics of classical political 
science fails to predict the vast majority of socio-political phenomena, events, outcomes 
(however one chooses to verbalize happenings in the social field). It has also failed to predict the 
most important ones as well, most notably the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab Spring, 
not as a matter of being incidentally asleep at the wheel, but by exclusively focusing on the 
factors deemed relevant to outcomes dictates by neorealist power politics. The question is not 
whether political science is able to attend to macrosocial factors (which may or may not be 
completely obvious to someone who say, regularly reads the newspaper) but whether or not it is 
able to accurately value the relevance of factors which may seem significant (e.g. the portion of 
                                                        





Soviet military budget allocated for deterrence capability upgrades) versus those that play a 
comparatively greater role in the outcome of political power struggles (e.g. the gathering of 
Soviet and Eastern bloc dissidents in coffee houses to discuss poetry, gatherings that became 
insulated networks of political dissenters who were then able to quickly activate for massive 
demonstrations once cracks in the ruling regime became evident following Gorbachev‘s 
glasnost).81 As international relations scholar Nick Srnicek notes: ―The claim that working with 
abstractions and generalities is a ‗close enough‘ approximation of reality is belied by any number 
of case studies which discover the importance of minute details, and the complete failing of 
social science in general to approach the success of the natural sciences.‖82 
This pessimistic examination of the record leads us inexorably to the question: what exactly 
is it that we want political science or scholarly examinations of social movements to do for us as 
a community of knowers or for the general public? What is the most that we should expect from 
a discipline whose subject matter consists in social systems which operate at a level of 
complexity wherein exact prediction is generally impossible and even vague predictions are 
hopelessly probabilistic? The proceeding sections will hopefully elucidate a host of examples 
where engaged scholarship has proved socially valuable, not because it is able to perform in the 
same way as the natural sciences (i.e. by generating theories which can then be usefully applied 
to particular instances and create instructive frames of relevance that can assist knowers in 
interpreting raw data and constructing and modifying models of reality) but because it provides 
tactical advice to political actants, not in terms of dominant solidifications of power 
relationships, but as a way to suggest new possibilities and to create visibility for practices of 
resistance which will facilitate their migration into diverse local contests. In other words, we‘ve 
come along way from Machiavelli‘s time, and political science ought not, in the words of Simon 
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Dalby, be an exercise in ―giving advice to a prince‖.83 Instead, emergent scholarship will seek to, 
in the inverse formulation, write code for a mob, or as Dalby writes in the context of critical 
geopolitics, ―...to investigate how geopolitical reasoning is used as an ideological device to 
maintain social relations of domination within contemporary global politics.‖84 
Even at its best, structuralist analysis of political organizations that fails to take into account 
the fluidity and dynamical relations of evolved social assemblages will continue to grapple with 
these same correlationist difficulties. Consider for example the excellent analysis of modern 
political institutions of John Kenneth Galbraith, the eminent economics scholar and historian, 
who argued in The Anatomy of Power for what he terms a ―bi-modal‖ understanding of 
organizations. ―Bi-modalism‖ is the term that Galbraith uses to refer to the symmetry between 
the internal conditioning used to bring members of an organization into a membership identity 
and the external effectiveness of the organization in advancing its priorities. In other words, a 
highly disciplined organization in which membership is sought and solidarity is high will be 
more effective externally than an organization which is internally heterogenous and dis-
organized. There are a number of reasons why Galbraith‘s analysis here might seem particular 
appealing. First, he explicitly recognizes the artificiality of abstract economic models and the 
ideological axioms of ―market efficiency‖ and presumptions given towards laissez-faire schemes 
for de-regulation which are founded upon the willful blindness of social oligopoly and pre-
existing social capital among entrenched elite interests.85 Second, he is cautious, as many 
correlationist are not, to not take social actors at their face value when collecting data on ends, 
means and formation, but instead attempts to analyze the material relations of their internal 
actors, and is attendant to the microphysical cultural formations within larger entities, such as 
trade unions. However, his structural analysis necessarily falls short in attempting to reduce 
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observable effects to material structural causes.  Furthermore, he does not attribute a specific 
substance or continuous substratum to ―power‖ (such as capital or gender relations) which 
allows him to consider its efficacy in light of local contexts. In bimodalism, the structural 
relation Galbraith is searching for is between the ―internal and external expressions of power 
within an organization‖86 and the extent to which this relation can offer an explanatory and 
perhaps even predictive model for an organization‘s ability to achieve its‘ stated goals. 
Commenting on the ―successful‖ structures of the US Central Intelligence Agency and State 
Department, Galbraith writes that ―...strong organizations require the careful internal 
conditioning of their members for maximum external effect.‖87  
Now, here Galbraith is primarily referring to public agencies and organizations with 
centralized bureaucracies, and perhaps he only means those principles to apply therein. Yet, as 
he attempts to map a complete anatomy of power, he extends the bimodalist axiom in an 
iteration of what would be referred to in social movement theory as a ―resource mobilization‖ 
explanation. While recognizing a space for contextual variance, Galbraith adamantly adheres to 
an input-output relationship based on intentionality and goal orientation relative to what he 
outlines as the ―sources of power‖ (personality, property and monopolization of the means of 
violence), writing that: ―If the purposes of an organization are many and varied, both the 
sources and instruments of enforcement will have to be greater for a given effect than if the 
purposes are few and specific.‖88  
Considering the example of the 2008 protests in South Korea. How can we square this 
explanation of organizational power, for example with reference to the KCTU? In that instance, 
the empowerment of the collective in part derived from the dis-organization of the individual 
groups, the ability to mobilize large groups of people, not around a single unified or coherent 
message but around a generalized outrage and the concomitant impulse towards solidarity and 
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protest as a practice, or in other words as an end itself. The leaders total inability to control the 
message of the mass demonstrators allowed for the emergence of a political opportunity 
structure which facilitated increased participation (and the attendant pressure for the 
government to relent against the activists‘ demands) where diverse groups such as professional 
unions and farmers‘ advocates took advantage of the media spectacle to advance their own 
interest group messages. The generative chaos of the protests became a zone of dissensual 
empowerment, not weakness. The protesters were more interested in having a good time and 
resisting the attempts of police to disperse them than they were in ―indoctrination‖ or 
succumbing to some sort of politically unified group identity outside of the generalized 
sentimental nationalism recalled from the 2002 World Cup. Such a framing approach as 
Galbraith‘s theory recommends, if taken as advice by the movements‘ student organizers, may 
well have spelled death for the rapid but precarious acceleration of the demonstrations.  
In fact, the growth structure of the protest movement had little to do with the identity or 
prior affiliation of the protestors, and certainly not what Galbraith might call their 
―conditioning‖. Instead, it was the heterogeneity of the movement that allowed its message to 
cross the boundaries of social strata and facilitated further intensification as the focus of the 
demonstrations enlarged and migrated to include more political demands. One of the earliest 
acts of digital dissent coalescing dissent was a petition posted on Daum Agora demanding the 
impeachment of President Lee. While this petition was initially targeted at an unpopular 
education policy, as the beef issue rose to prominence student activists appropriated it as a 
symbol of solidarity against the ―undemocratic‖ political process which had consigned them to 
eat potentially hazardous American beef in school lunches. This newfound prominence allowed 
the petition to quickly attract over 1.3 million signatures.89 We can thus see that while 
Galbraith‘s explanations for organizational power may initially seem appealing, when 
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confronting examples of emergent collectivism, they collapse into abstractions primarily from a 
reliance on the metaphysical presumption of self-interested actors and goal-oriented political 
activity. Such a presumption takes for granted that the actants find political activity only as a 
means to an end that would otherwise be intrinsically valueless, rather than as an end in itself. It 
further presupposes that the self-interested or group-interested calculation of perceived costs 
and benefits determine the preference for action of involved parties. These presumptions, 
particularly in the case of group dynamics that we can observe in digital space, seem misplaced, 
and may thus not be useful as descriptors of power in the abstract and certainly not in its 
instantiation in loosely organized collective action.90 They also seem to assume actants which 
pre-exist the application of the model91 (i.e. observing a trade union or government agency that 
has existed before the situation in question presents itself) rather than self-organizing 
collectivities whose networks coalesce around a set of local circumstances. This is a key 
distinction that will be vital for understanding the necessity of process ontology in analyzing 
social movements. If one never steps in the same river twice, then perhaps one is never 
confronted by the same social movement twice, either. 
Traditional social movement theory is a step closer, but still relies on abstract principles of 
collective unity and purposefulness. From this theoretical perspective, exemplified in the work 
―contentious school‖ of Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam and others, the identity of a 
group is intimately linked to the contexts, motivations and social pressures under which the 
group was formed and what activity its members come together to do. Groups can respond to 
any number of mundane or exceptional social conditions, but it is when groups of people have 
formed and self-consciously set out to change their social reality that their particular collective 
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dynamics and organizational logic are truly put to the test. This is what Sidney Tarrow, in his 
book Power in Movement, refers to as ―contentious politics‖; which  
―…emerges in response to changes in political opportunities and constraints, with 
participants responding to a variety of incentives: material and ideological, partisan and 
group-based, long-standing and episodic. Building on these opportunities and using known 
repertoires of action, people with limited resources can act contentiously… When their 
actions are based on dense social networks and connective structures and draw on 
consensual and action-oriented cultural frames, they can sustain these actions in conflict 
with powerful opponents. In such cases – and only in such cases – we are in the presence of 
a social movement….‖92  
 
Tarrow seeks to develop a theoretical frame through which to understand the evolved practices 
of ―modern social movements‖ since their inception as an organizational form at the dawn of the 
Eurocentrically marked ―modern age‖  (beginning around the 1780s in Europe and initially 
articulated by the clashes leading up to the French Revolution and the subsequent collapse of 
the macropolitical edifice of the ancien regime) and thereby understand the ways in which 
social movements have worked to alter the material political realities of their times with varying 
degrees of success. His framework represents an excellent theoretical entry point for our 
examination of collective action insofar that it implicitly resists the notion of narrating discrete 
historical ―events‖ such as protests, strikes, revolutions, and wars as if they are the foundation of 
social change without their own imperceptible histories. Beginning with an understanding of 
historical time is absolutely crucial in practicing scholarship on social movements, because how 
we theorize the unfolding of political action through the fragmented lens of a particular vision of 
a past, aggregated from documents, testimony, artifacts and so on, will powerfully influence how 
we go about answering the questions of how and why a particular social movement emerged at a 
given time.  
Historians and social theorists may endlessly debate about whether or not a particular 
world-shattering event (the first shot fired in the American Revolutionary War at the Battle of 
Lexington and Concord, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand which is thought to 
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have ignited World War I, the perilous train ride Lenin took back from Switzerland to lead the 
vanguard of the Russian Revolution) was in principle inevitable, in other words, would it have 
happened regardless of the contingent social conditions, the unique combination of individuals 
and materials involved in the event and so on. This intuition can be expressed in the aphorism 
that so-and-so was ―only a matter of time‖, and the local conditions of its happening are 
therefore less interesting than the fact that it was always going to happen and now finally has. 
However, this attempt to establish events ―as they were‖ represents a perverse recapitulation of 
the scientific method‘s speculative counterfactuals (a non-falsifiable attempt at falsifiability) 
which strives to discern some underlying property to the ―event‖ itself (e.g. inevitability). This 
equivocation of falsificationism in a context where the conditions for its success are not evident 
does a profound disservice to our understanding of the subject matter. Through the construction 
of ―events‖ as autonomous entities, scholars of history often appear to approach their subject 
matter as dis-embodied observers of the past, whose interpretation of historical data is vacuum-
sealed from the cultural pressures and influences of their own time. There does not seem to be a 
good reason why this sort of alienation and self-amnesia in scholarship is productive. 
Surely, nothing could be more estranged from our everyday experience of space-time and 
memory. Can we ever truly exist outside of ourselves? The practice of historical scholarship, and 
within that practice, the study of evolved modern social movements, is necessarily a traffic of 
representations through which all understandings of history are mediated and contextualized in 
relation to many distorting gravitational valences of contemporary social power. Interpretations 
of historical data are by definition additive, imposing a contemporary academic vocabulary and 
frame of reference in order to make legible a period from which we are historically estranged. 
―Events‖ are not static unities, but are invariably experienced from a multiplicity of contingent 
perspectives and theorized as legible within the aesthetic conventions of historical 
documentation and ―evidence‖ post facto. In philosophical and social science scholarship, the 
methodology which emphasizes this process-relation is known as constructivism, which 
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espouses the centrality of cultural processes to the production of ―facts‖. This emphasis is 
particularly important when those facts occur in a field where interpretation of data allows a 
great degree of freedom (e.g. narrating history). The central tenet of constructivism suggests 
that ―there is no observation without observers‖93, or in other words, there is no observation 
which is not embodied in a particular individuals or set of individuals, who themselves are 
formed as observers through a sustained socialization process conversant with institutional 
norms and cultural practices. The observer-making socialization processes are what cause said 
observers to notice certain elements more than others, to emphasize and obscure different 
readings of fact-sets in order to reiterate pre-established dominant narratives of the past94.  
Consider the way in which the social landscape of May-June 2008 in Seoul, South Korea has 
been marked as an event, both by the American media reacting to the events at the time, by 
bloggers and international audiences reacting to those media reports and by Korean historians 
conducting second- and third- order literature analysis much later. The situated-ness of these 
analyses could not be clearer, as American commentators primarily expressed concerns related 
to the market environment of US companies and investors, as well as engaging in an active 
attempt to alienate Western readers from the political antagonism of the protestors.95 The 
ideological motivation, whether or not explicitly intentional, of hegemonic publications in 
framing the protestors as ―irrational‖ or ―hysterical‖ was two-fold; first, to portray the protestors 
as an aberration in a larger media narrative of strengthening ties surrounding the negotiation of 
the KORUS FTA, and second, to defuse any potential American concerns about mad cow disease 
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by tapping into the public sentiment of ―if our beef is good enough for us, why isn‘t it good 
enough for the South Koreans?‖ Only a few news outlets pointed out that the trade agreement 
allowed for the export of American beef that wouldn‘t have been permitted to be sold in the 
United States owing to recent FDA regulations on mad cow disease, or that a parallel negotiation 
over beef imports that had occurred with Japan had yielded food safety measures conspicuously 
absent from the deal with Korea.96 These two elements of the fact-set were critical to the many of 
the protestors self-understood motivations, which allowed for the creation of the South Korean 
narrative that President Lee had once again cowed to American commercial interests in trade 
negotiations. This perceived subordination, for which it was also perceived that South Koreans 
and particularly students would then have to bear the risk of tainted beef, were among the 
central elements of the protest-narrative that sparked outrage and helped to inflame the mass 
demonstration. By omitting these facts from stories about the protests, American news outlets 
were effectively able to promulgate a media narrative that most effectively advanced the United 
States‘ commercial and geopolitical interests. 
The framing of ―hysterical activists‖ and unruly mobs that would later be described in the 
rhetoric of ―escalating violence‖ that one might expect to read in a story about an opposition 
group‘s riot against the shock troops of an authoritarian regime. But in South Korea? ―Hysteria‖ 
thus became a popular media construction which served as a substitute for journalistic 
investigation into the causes of the protests, or in many cases, even attempting to conduct 
primary source research which may have allowed these writers to come into contact with the 
activists‘ point of view. Needless to say, the American beef industry and its South Korean allies 
who stood to profit from the deal were far more prepared to circulate their version of events in 
official channels.  
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In contrast, Korean historian and sociologist commentators attempted to crystallize a 
historical moment around the symbol of the candlelit vigils.97 In contrast to a reliance on prior 
frames of reference (such as ―rational motivations‖ against which the South Koreans‘ ―hysteria‖ 
was framed), the symbol of candlelit vigils was itself employed by the movement (―the 
candlelight girl‖98) along with the use of the vigils themselves as symbolic protest emerging 
against the backdrop of the severe the Law on Assembly and Demonstration, which prohibited 
collective gathering at night with the exception of ―cultural activities‖.99 Thus the ―candlelight 
vigils‖ became symbolic of the positioning of the movement towards government repression of 
dissent; obeying the letter of the law in order to expose the absurdities of its static restrictions 
and exceptions. This dynamic, the appropriation of the Orwellian ironies of permissible or 
zoned free speech against its regulating design to manage public expression can in a sense be 
read as a mockery not only of the political laws against mass political demonstrations after dark, 
but against the flimsy predictive ―laws‖ of political science which might expect or map the 
production of subversive dissent, surprising the world of theory in its scope and heterogeneity.  
The relationship between the theoretical mapping and incorporation of these eruptive 
episodes into a grand theoretical narrative is further complicated by ambiguities about the 
cultural embeddedness of academic observers. In other words, the correspondence between the 
―official story‖ of history and the past movement and interaction of material in the form of 
bodies (whether chemical, geological, biological or cultural)100 is always subject to some degree 
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of ambiguity, since there is no free-floating atemporal observation deck on which any historian 
would be able to somehow ―objectively‖ position themselves. It is thus impossible to determine 
outside of situated-ness  the extent to which a given historical narrative properly corresponds 
with the polyvocal swarm of perspectives (human and otherwise) through which the movement 
and interaction of material bodies was originally constituted as a segment of temporal flow. 
History as we know it is thus at best a partial reflection seen by a bleary-eyed addict through a 
broken mirror. Even the decision to segment time in a particular way, to identify a coherent 
starting and end point for an event as a way to bracket historical data through a necessary frame 
of relevance is a culturally informed decision, situated in a feedback loop between individual 
interpretation, multiple overlapping discourse communities and a set of data which has already 
been rendered through formal models, which themselves have been influenced by previous 
cultural traditions and so on101.  
Thus, we can begin to distinguish a classical model of constituting history, where in an 
attempt to render the past objective historians necessarily rely on subjective criteria to produce 
historical objects. These historical objects become legible as sequential series of linear events in 
time, suspended in eternity, as one might encounter artifacts on the glass shelves of a museum. 
―The American Revolutionary War (1775–1783)‖, ―World War I (1914-1919)‖, ―Lenin‘s Train 
Ride (1917)‖ have become understood self-evident facts, operating as closed causal systems, in 
order to individuate them as objective units of analysis. In order to become objective, historians 
require this production of ―events‖ as objects. How different this must be from the imperceptible 
networks of social circulation in which pressure builds, slowly and intricately, lapses and 
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subsides, only to burst forth suddenly into the gaze of the official historian, fully fledged, 
suddenly ubiquitous, significant, capable of marking time! This classical model must necessarily 
take historical objects as givens in order to substantiate its own objectivity. In other words, 
historical objects (situated stories that organize skeletal facts into sweeping mythologies) must 
be understood by classical historians in the same light as biologists understand cell proteins or 
physicists measure velocity. Only when the historical objects themselves are understood as 
perfectly natural and immutable facts about the past, bracketed as discrete eternal entities 
inscribed on the great scroll of authorial Time, can the classical model of narrating history 
successfully claim a firm grasp on Truth.  
Of course, all of this palaver about classical historical objects is quite clever, quite convincing 
nonsense. The idea that complex social assemblages responds axiomatically, rather than 
contingently, to deterministic signals is an assumption that has never been persuasively 
justified, and may in principle be unjustifiable. Historians such as Jared Diamond, who have 
attempted to render the historical method as scientific, go to great pains to ignore obvious 
counter-examples and profoundly neglect the role that subjective frames played in sorting 
evidence to reach his conclusions. As critics such as Eugene Goodheart have pointed out, 
Diamond‘s attempt to schematize a thirteen-thousand year history of civilizational development 
and competition largely around the key determinant of geography and pre-existing resource 
distribution can only be persuasive if one entirely ignores substantial counterevidence. For 
example, Diamond ignores the evidence that many non-Western civilizations (notably China) 
possessed far greater advantages and yet were foiled by ―typical aberrations‖ in local political 
and cultural conditions (Diamond‘s phrase, which Goodheart aptly notes is an obvious 
oxymoron)102. This is a model of scholarship in which communities of knowers do not move 
from one paradigm to another according to the variable accumulations of evidence, but in which 
multiple dominant paradigms compete against one another from the comfort of their own 
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epistemological echo-chambers, and intellectual methodologies and terms circulate in the same 
way as novel fashion accessories. While Jared Diamond may initially appear as a red herring to 
our discussion of theories of social movements, his work is a necessary example to empirically 
disqualify the use of deterministic methodology of any kind at the outset. 
We should not be surprised to find these grand theories of human affairs embarrassingly 
lacking, prone to overlooking such ―typical aberrations‖ that complicate the production of 
defined historical objects as discrete causal narratives, where such complications would prevent 
history from assuming its properly authorial voice in perpetuating social hierarchies by 
valorizing particular actants power to act. Where would classical history be without its great 
battles, its kings and generals, its explorers and heroes and other great white men? However, 
classical history‘s attempt to positively correlate dominant social status with historical agency 
inevitably runs into swarms of empirical problems, as Graham Harman notes:  
Any attempt to see actants as the reducible puppets of deeper structures is doomed to fail. 
The balance of force makes some actants stronger than others, but miniature trickster 
objects turn the tide without warning: a pebble can destroy an empire if the Emperor chokes 
at dinner.103 
 
Imagine what it would be like to live in a world where all historical time could be explained by 
simply referring to geography, or the movement of the planets in our solar system, or class, or 
gender, or race some essential structure of the human psyche. What a simple world that would 
be! Fortunately, time unfolds the interaction between material bodies at multiple strata 
simultaneously in much more complex and imperceptible ways than fallible tools of human 
data-collection and story-telling are capable of faithfully representing. Sadly, all of the 
aforementioned ―root cause‖ explanations have had a theoretical following among contemporary 
scholars in the social sciences.104 Establishing sufficient complexity in historical social systems 
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for this devastating objection against deterministic (and particularly, mono-causal or closed-
system) explanations is hardly a tall order. Following Bertrand Badie‘s declaration of the ‗crisis 
of universalism‘ in the social sciences, Anna Leander aptly notes that:  
Since societies do not function in a single way, no single theory, with its gamut of concepts, 
methods and categories, can adequately explain events... In addition, implicit in most 
monocausal explanations is the unidirectional assumption if A (differentiation, economic 
development, strong state) then B (development of a modern state, democratization, 
economic development) - which disregards the evidence that similar events or developments 
might have not only varying but opposite effects in different contexts.105 
 
Even if some hypothetical monocausal relationship between certain material facts about the past 
and evolution of complex social systems were to magically prove accurate, historians would 
surely not be able to verify that relationship with certainty on the basis of the distorted 
representations of the past which constitute most historical evidence. Speculation about the 
historical accuracy of a formal model of observation relative to a transcendent ―observer-
independent reality‖ is thus perhaps interesting only in the same way as speculations about the 
interior topologies of black holes, insofar as neither can ever be verified. This lack of verifiability 
is no mere accident, but is in fact guaranteed by the structural relation between observer and 
dynamically produced historical object (a historical object which is synthesized from evidence 
by the process of observation). As E.H. Carr put it in his key text What Is History?, ―...history is 
necessarily subjective, since man is observing himself...‖106 
What does this mean for understanding emergent social movements? It means that as 
scholars we must be mindful of our own intellectual heritage, and the dynamical relationship 
that it bears to a history of dissent and intellectual freedom that may have once been explicitly 
tied to the explicitly political goals of social movements of the past. It is much easier to 
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understand the conditions of knowledge as political when viewed historically, precisely because 
such conditions of democratic knowledge-production were once fervently desired ideals of 
marginal communities who strove through mud and blood to see them realized and often died 
trying. The process of narrating history is already a form of performative politics, attesting in 
itself to the political conditions for its own possibility (e.g. democratic, authoritarian, partisan 
and so on). In other words, there are political conditions under which every sort of history may 
be produced which in some ways respond to the power structures of the present. This 
responsiveness to power is more obvious in the case of totalitarian regimes, where history 
simply becomes another vehicle for propaganda and erasure, but not necessarily less pervasive 
in democratic ones. The politics of history are further constituted through the specific processes 
of historical narration, the gathering and interpretation of evidence, the arrangement and 
visualization of chronology and the spatialization of historical events in public spaces, museums 
and history books. There is no formal process by which a historical set of circumstances can be 
individuated as a closed object of study which is not already subtly political. A brief stroll by the 
Korean War memorial in Washington, D.C. and the Hall of the War to Resist US Aggression and 
Aid Korea in the Military Museum of the Chinese People‘s Revolution107 reveals as much, both of 
which depict essentially the same series of ―facts‖ (with some noticeable distinctions) with 
different starting points and end points (a war of aggression versus provocation, a settlement of 
victory or capitulation) and yet represent those facts in starkly contrasting ways with embedded 
factual disagreements. An anthropologist from a third culture might easily conclude that both 
monuments are little more than nationalistic propaganda.  
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This is not to say that there is no such thing as actual ―facts‖, but rather that facticity is 
usually limited to a very spare set of banal truths which are then arranged in order to form a 
historical narrative; an act which itself produces political meaning over and above the bare 
factual bones. Histories are stories, the ones we read and form a cultural understanding of our 
past from are not skeletal, but fully integrated mythologies, with our own pantheons of heroic 
and intellectual warrior-gods. This principle holds at much lower registers of cognitive framing, 
as we will see when discussing the potent social framing of chronopolitics in Chapter Three. 
We can see this same force at work in the attempt to disambiguate the accuracy (or direct 
correspondence) of witness testimony about a recent movement and interaction of material 
bodies. Consider the multiple segments in Akira Kurosawa‘s famous film Rashomon (1950), 
which relates the same story of a sexual encounter which may or may not be rape and the death 
of a samurai that may be murder or may be suicide through four differing perspectives, which 
contain mutually contradictory ―facts‖ as witness testimony and therefore complicate the 
viewer‘s understanding of each perspective‘s ―truth‖. Who is responsible for producing the 
―truth‖ of an ―event‖? In this configuration, ―experience‖ is never a given, but rather produced 
through dialogue and contestation, through the contrasts and coalesence points of different 
situated perspectives.  
Problems of observer bias are perhaps most visible in the disagreements among recognized 
experts in a given field who both claim to speak with the authority of their discipline and yet 
reach opposite conclusions. However, the complication of what scholar Donna Haraway has 
referred to as ―situated-ness‖ is surely in play at every level of production for both experience of 
historical reality and the ―evidence‖ that remains as its trace or record, from documents such as 
individuals diaries and correspondences to newspaper articles. Thus, it becomes necessary to 
recognize that scholars are never really talking directly about ―social movements‖ as such, but 
only the aggregated data that has been organized around representations of what the term 
―social movements‖ has meant, mediated by a vocabulary which has both migrated and evolved 
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over time. It is easy to forget that scholarship itself does not stand still. Attending to the 
importance of situated perspective will be absolutely crucial as we follow the evolution of these 
hegemonic representations of ―social movements‖ from unruly mobs and unwashed masses to 
emergent assemblages and complex social superorganisms. 
How, then, can we mark the formation of a social-political group, an association, a ―social 
movement‖ in time? This is a crucial methodological question that must necessarily inform the 
way that we chart the emergence of particular social movements in response to what scholars 
refer to as ―opportunity structures‖; new avenues of possibility combined with the threat or 
failure of old strategies that cause networks of people to change the ways that they collectively 
act. In attempting to narrate the 2008 demonstrations in South Korea; how do we become 
responsible for marking causes, for articulating responsibility within collective frames? As we 
will see later, the many answers to this question are themselves political, each allowing for 
differing articulations of human agency with disciplinary implications. However, this question is 
itself complicated by the mediation of representation that we must rely on as historical evidence 
for questioning and confirming particular theories of social movement emergence and success. 
Consider this introductory remark from noted social movement scholar Doug McAdam, as he 
writes: 
A fairly strong consensus has emerged among scholars of social movements around the 
question of how social movements arise. Increasingly, one finds scholars emphasizing the 
importance of the same broad sets of factors in analyzing the origins of collective action. 
These three factors are: (1) an expansion in the political opportunities or threats confronting 
a given challenger; (2) the forms of organization (informal as well as formal) available to 
insurgents as sites for initial mobilization, and (3) the collective processes of interpretation, 
attribution and social construction that mediate between opportunity/threat and action.108 
 
Each of these criteria necessarily seems to entail a reliance on historical evidence about how 
actants in social movements perceived the terrain of opportunities, threats, available 
organizational forms, and collective processes of interpretation. The extent to which digital 
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technology enables the conditions of possibility for collective social action is thus intimately 
linked to the extent to which technology is understood as accessible, organizational and political. 
In other words, the ―objective‖ conditions of possibility for social change at a given historical 
moment are directly linked to the subjective perception of engaged social actants vis-a-vis their 
chances for success and their means of achieving it. A door without a frame, outline or handle 
can hardly be understood as an exit. An invisible fire extinguisher is not very useful during an 
emergency. This point may seem obvious but it is worth emphasizing, as a great deal of what it 
means to trace the evolution of social movements turns out to run parallel to a history of 
philosophical ideas about the individual‘s capacity for action, the way that collectivities ought to 
organize and share power as citizens inhabiting a national space and the limitations that ought 
be placed on sovereignty in order to avoid the dangers latent in concentrated power. It is no 
accident that Euro―modern‖ social movements evolved in conjunction with Enlightenment ideas 
about politics at in the second half of the eighteenth century. Ideas become the condition of 
possibility for recognizing and articulating the injustice of certain arrangements of power, to 
make arguments for or against a particular cause, and to take action and sustain it over time.  
This relation between political philosophy and social action can best be expressed at the 
individual level in what Doug McAdam refers to as ―cognitive liberation‖ in his major work 
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930—1970109; rendered as the 
capacity to understand one‘s own situation as unjust and believe that one has the ability to do 
something to change it. Here McAdam makes the compelling argument that a key factor the civil 
rights movements victories was itself this positive condition of cognitive liberation. In other 
words, to the extent that organizers eventually overturned many institutional edifices of white 
supremacy, they were successful in large part because they fervently believed that one day they 
could and would Overcome.110 As we shall see, this crucial relation between thought and action 
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traces the cultural production of our representations of social movements throughout their 
historical evolution. 
In putting such a high premium on scholarly methodology in understanding social 
movements, this text can hardly be ignorant of its own disposition towards the formation of 
knowledge of the historical past, in particular with relation to establishing criteria for relevance 
and applicability of evidence. In articulating my argument about how social movements have 
evolved to use digital technology, I shall attempt to move towards a practice of what the 
philosopher William James has termed ―radical empiricism‖, which is a pragmatic approach to 
truth-conditions which attempts to make concepts reflect and adapt to multiple strata of pure 
sensible experience. Radical empiricism, particularly in its appropriation by Gilles Deleuze, is 
distinct from classical empiricism as it understands embodied affective experience not as an 
insensate instrument for conducting scientific measurements, but to positively articulate the 
points of synthetic convergence between the human inter-subjective neurotechnologies of 
individual and cultural perception/interpretation and the material world which provides the 
basis for sense-stimuli. For radical empiricism, the sensoriums and the minds which interpret 
data are not passive silos waiting to store neutral information. As Jones et al. put it, radical 
empiricism   ―... seeks to avoid the somewhat reductive, vulgar, ‗abstracted‘ empiricism which 
sees the task of empirical work as uncovering a singularity which pre-exists perception, or as the 
imposition of a pre-formed grid of decipherment onto a passive object. ... For Deleuze, 
empiricism is not about reduction or ‗discovery‘, but about expansion, production, creativity and 
difference.‖111 
Where most studies of social movements seek to provide an abstract model that can explain 
and predict why and how social movements form, organize, evolve, succeed and dissipate, this 
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text shall seek to provide what Michel Foucault has described as ‗diagrams of power‘112 which 
explicate the co-production of material, social and conceptual technology with the evolution of 
contentious politics and the emergence of novel collectivities. From a theoretical perspective, we 
can once again take Rashomon as a point of departure for evaluating the success of such power 
diagrams, as we do not want to postulate the existence of some abstracted, dis-embodied 
historical reality as ―the way things really were‖, for this would rely on an artificial use of 
perspective that cannot be squared with the inexorable embodied, situated-ness of sensible 
experience that a commitment to radical empiricism entails. Disagreements among audiences of 
that film may hinge on whether or not the disagree-ers previously believed that ―reality‖ is a 
single discrete object perceived differently by many situated actants or rather is itself 
ontologically half-constituted through a poly-vocality of subjective synthetic perception and 
interpretation at multiple simultaneous levels.  
This second possibility is illustrated through what Gilles Deleuze has called ―partial-objects‖, 
which is his way of noting that there is both matter and the synthetic rendering of perception 
and interpretation through naming that constitute the radical empirical reality of what any real 
object ontologically entails113. Every object, insofar as we perceive it, is thus only partially 
external from us, only partially liberated from the affective desire entwined with our situated 
perception. Every partial-object is thus a multiple, appearing fully constituted as distinct 
ontological entities to different spatialized perspectives114, every event multiple115 events and so 
on. Are the contradictions in the four testimonies of Rashomon an accurate representation of 
the variance of human experience, or in the case of each contradiction, was one or both of the 
witnesses wrong? 
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In his essay The Rashomon Effect: When Ethnographers Disagree, Karl Heider argues that 
the most interesting aspect of disagreement among social science scholars is not per se the 
subject  matter which is being contested but rather that such disagreements are viewed by 
scholars as severe problems for the credibility of the discipline to deliver on ‗hard truth‘, when in 
fact ―...the value of thinking about the Rashomon Effect goes far beyond the relatively few cases 
of ethnographic disagreement that we shall be able to turn up. The sorts of influences, biases, or 
predilections we can examine here are at work in all ethnography, even when it is 
unchallenged.‖116 In other words, given the variability and range of perspectives and 
interpretations available, we should be surprised that social scientists reach agreement on 
anything at all! The fact that they do is more likely than not a result of their own socialization 
process, the indoctrination phases of graduate education through which scholars becomes 
professionalized and disciplined, and which allows the discipline as a whole to form a certain 
degree of consensus and homogeneity that then translates into members of that discipline being 
asked to speak with authoritative credibility on germane topoi.117 However, for a historical 
practice of radical empiricism which relies on representations as a substantial anchor to the 
partial-objects of past happening, it is crucial both to historicize the production of such 
representations within the dominant ideologies of scholarly practice as well as to read the 
structure and composition of representations as the aesthetic traces of cultural practices which 
may also be relevant. The famous sociologist Melvin Pollner brilliantly captured this point in his 
1974 text Mundane Reason: Reality in Everyday and Sociological Discourse, writing that 
―...the production of ‗objective‘ or scientific accounts of human behavior are themselves 
permeated by rich, subtle practices and assumptions which are typically ignored or 
unrecognized – just as they are in everyday life... [this] implies that human sciences may be 
naively founded on a problematic supposition and thus may comprise a folk discipline, that 
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is, a form of inquiry which is not so much ‗about‘ members‘ assumptions as it is ensnared by 
and an expression of those assumptions.‖118  
 
There are several important implications here. The first is that social truth is both pluralistic 
and non-metric, and the virtues of building theories with wide-ranging exactitude and rigid and 
specific designation are limited if not outright counter-productive. In other words, scholars 
should perhaps spend less time trying to knit theories that fit all shapes and sizes of specific 
cases and posit difference or variance as a virtue rather than constantly searching for conceptual 
homogeneity. The second, and perhaps more important point, is that doing social theory 
involves making subtle political choices in how we describe reality. If the history of social 
movements demonstrate anything, it demonstrates that ideas can be politically powerful, and 
that philosophy matters to the evolution of marginal communities‘ material conditions, access to 
social technologies of resistance and so on. Insofar as scholars implicitly or explicitly rely or reify 
particular assumptions about the way the world works and the mutability of particular aspects 
of social reality, they may reinforce the conservative aspects of the status quo. Such a tendency 
among extremely institutionalized communities of knowers should hardly surprise us, however 
it nonetheless represents a brand of elite complicity with networks of power/knowledge that 
function as authoritative gatekeepers for privileged strata of discourse.119  
This elite complicity is most pernicious precisely in academic and professional disciplines 
that deny their political nature, or hide from the history of their dynamic relationship with social 
engagement, in which they have produced ideas with political utility. In his book Disciplined 
Minds: A Critical Look at Salaried Professionals and the Soul-Battering System That Shapes 
Their Lives, which follows the disciplinary pressures and selection procedures in professional 
training programs, and particularly graduate programs, which privilege conformity primarily on 
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students120, Jeff Schmidt argues in a section aptly titled ―The Politics of Not Getting Political‖ 
that it is precisely the professional insistence on neutrality and objectivity among teachers and 
research academics that prevents them from understanding the profound ways in which their 
ideas shape the cultures and systems of power/knowledge in which they are embedded.  
Following neomarxist critiques of worker alienation, Schmidt argues that it is precisely the 
stultifyingly apolitical veneer of academic professionalism that disavows the possibility of 
engaged resistance against socially negative technologies of enculturation that prepare students 
for lives of rule-following safe-not-sorry conformity, metered and scheduled time, deferring to 
authority and tolerating boredom.121 Central to Schmidt‘s argument is that a decision not to 
resist or question the power relations of the status quo is precisely what allows individuals to 
become conduits of perpetuating and reinforcing violently exclusionary social orders, 
particularly in relation to class, race and gender. In this schema, opportunities for politicizing 
moments of everyday exclusion are systematically erased by the continuous iteration of 
majoritarian social frames, such as the mythological ―equal playing field‖, the just pay-off of 
hard work, and the valuable lie of equal opportunity for upward mobility known locally as the 
―American Dream‖. It is against these social frames that McAdams concept of ―cognitive 
liberation‖ becomes important par excellence. Schmidt argues that one of the main ways that 
academic disciplines depoliticize their professional practitioners is through the same alienating 
division of assembly-line labor of classical Fordist production models, sub-dividing the 
intellectual tasks and specifying so abstractly that the political implications of aspects of 
teaching and thinking ceased to become apparent. He extends his argument across many 
disciplines, even arguing that: 
Even philosophers, who at one time struggled to develop thought that encompasses all 
human endeavors, are now hired on the basis of their willingness and ability to carry out the 
minutely specialized work of analytical philosophy. Consequently, they increasingly identify 
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themselves as masters of the associated specialized tools and methods, rather than as 
independent moral and political thinkers.122 
 
One thing that this text will seek to suggest is that, from a historical perspective, if philosophers 
are becoming the equivalent of intellectual technocrats unconsciously reinforcing dominant 
power relations, social movements may need to cultivate alternative reservoirs of conceptual 
possibility to draw on in achieving new strata of cognitive liberation.  
 The politics of framing social movements through scholarly analysis further extends to the 
way in which scholars choose to contextualize agency within spatio-temporal loci. This is why a 
proper theorization of temporal motion and sequence is so vital to scholarship about social 
change. Consider the historical ―event‖ as a primary unit of hegemonic analysis, and the way 
that Vassilis Tsianos et al chose to problematize this concept at the beginning of their book 
Escape Routes:  
... the (left's) fixation on events cannot nurture the productive energy required to challenge 
the formation of contemporary modes of control in Global North Atlantic societies. An event 
is never in the present; it can only be designated as an event in retrospect or anticipated as a 
future possibility. To pin our hopes on events is a nominalist move which draws on the 
masculinist luxury of having the power both to name things and to wait about for salvation. 
... if we highlight [events‘] role in social change we do so at the expense of considering the 
potence of the present that is made of people's everyday practices: the practices employed to 
navigate daily life and to sustain relations, the practices which are at the heart of social 
transformation long before we are able to name it as such.123 
 
Thus, we can identify narrating social change through time with implicit political framing 
choice, what George Wallis referred to as ―chronopolitics‖. Chronopolitics are simply the politics 
of historical space constituted by a disposition to a particular construction of historical time, 
which grounds possibilities for collective organizing. These chronopolitical frames become 
deterministic of how and when people relate to time in the precise terms of social action, or 
when they choose to ―seize the moment‖ plucked from the stream of history, as Wallis notes: 
―Perspectives on the future are articulated with current belief systems concerning the nature of 
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society and of social change. Since the struggle of intrasocietal groups to change and to resist 
change comprises much of the history of any society, a knowledge of prevailing 
conceptualizations of change and of ideologies concerning it is an important part of the study of 
social change itself. More specifically, beliefs concerning the future and roads to it will have 
significant influence upon current political behavior.‖124 Wallis goes onto give the example of a 
political progressive who has been inculcated with the ―scientific‖ notion of time presented by 
Social Darwinists, who is thus lead to believe that his political views are anachronisms of an 
outdated understanding of history, and that indeed pressing for reforms or against perceived 
inequalities will only complicate the ―natural‖ movement of social evolution towards its ultimate 
perfection. Examples like this can be found throughout history, and in particular among Leftist 
groups in the early twentieth-century. In particular, this naturalizing chronopolitics framed the 
debates surrounding scientific Marxism, which held similar views about the dialectical evolution 
of history towards given points, thus seeming to obviate the necessity or even desirability of 
actively initiating a political revolution (lest one pre-empt the ripening of a pre-ordained 
historical moment).125 If this caricature of dialecticism has failed to make this understanding of 
history sound absurd, consider that it rests largely on a pseudo-scientific spiritualism which 
recognizes the causal primacy of both materialism and a Hegelian Spirit of history the driver of 
most events. Importantly, within this idiotic understanding of historical time, material power 
relations count for everything and human agency counts for almost nothing, as if humans played 
no role in assembling the apparatuses of power and distributing exclusive access to them. 
Making a further case against the dialectic, a philosophical artifice which literally insinuates a 
totalitarian explanation for the fabric of reality itself126, provides an explanation for the change 
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of human consciousness similar to the explanation that botany provides for the germination of 
seeds, and further operates to ready our sensibilities to the logic of authoritarian axioms, is 
needless to say beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in summarizing the disposition of the 
literature of contemporary scholars to the subject, I would direct readers to Benjamin Noys 
succinct piece in The Philosophers’ Magazine, where he notes: ―‗If there is one thing that Anglo-
American analytic philosophers and their Continental cousins agree on, and there probably is 
only one thing, it is that the dialectic is as a dead as a dodo.‖127 
Theories about the nature of time and the progression of history have thus long been of 
interest at least to those who perceive themselves as agents of social change, insofar as these 
theories have direct bearings on the conditions of possibility for their collective action. If the 
forces of power have stacked the odds against success, it may still be worth risking life and 
property in the name of justice, however those noble ideals appear less sacrifice-worthy when 
balanced against odds approaching the immutability of the theory of gravity. Put simply, the line 
between bravery and stupidity can be quite thin, and actants socialized understanding of social 
change through historical time may strongly influence where that line is drawn. Historically, the 
appearance of seemingly immutable laws of human nature have acted as liminal constraints on 
political space and social power, as we will see in Chapter Four.  
Counter-vailing commitments may also play a role in the initiation and organization of a 
campaign for social change. Theoretical dispositions also inform the ways that individuals map 
their own identity onto particular value-commitments often tied to territory. As Gearoid O 
Tuathail has argued, geographical notions constitute a co-productive loop with the articulation 
of bounded identity, for example those tied to locality and nation.128 These identities are 
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produced in consonance with disciplinary norms surrounding the Othering of marginal 
populations within dominant discourses, such as the location of colonized peoples in distant 
spaces and ancient times. These discourses do not occur in a power-vacuum, but rather serve 
the distinct cultural purpose of alienating the beneficiaries of the material theft of scarce 
resources from the violence of its extraction. The discourses of geographical and temporal 
alienation of disparate colonized communities thereby become part and parcel of a larger 
discursive project of erasure, of removing the structural exploitation of colonial extraction from 
the products and material wealth which magically seems to appear in the marketplaces of 
colonizer populations, at a price which seems to violate local knowledge of supply and demand. 
Discourses of time also serve as profound elements of this edifice, as I have argued elsewhere129, 
that the situation of colonized indigenous peoples today as ―less developed‖ is in fact a 
schematization operative around parallel civilizational timelines, wherein ethnically 
homogenous spatialized cultures are racing against one another on a chronological timeline of 
social and technological development events, following a teleological trajectory towards an 
idealized future that in fact is only an expression of elite Western values. However, these 
chronologies are always political insofar as they create the implicit value frames from which 
colonialism seems both natural and desirable; indigenous peoples who are ―lagging behind‖ or 
downright ―backwards‖ must be resituated on their timelines, brought up to speed by a 
benevolent colonial intervention, for which the exchange of the colonizer‘s extraction of material 
wealth is of course an overly generous bargain on the part of colonizer nations. The argument of 
benevolent colonialism here recapitulates a chronopolitics of the White Man‘s Burden, where 
colonial administrators are seen as having their hands on the levers of time itself, naturalizing 
the processes of domination and seemingly foreclosing the possibility of resistance. Here, we can 
see that theory does not exist as an abstraction but constellates the material limits of 
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interpretation for the practices of everyday living and the possibilities of collective resistance, 
although discourses are never totalizing or complete, and chance resistance always remains 
possible. 
This relation between theories of human agency and the perceived possibilities of social 
actant remains true today, as we will see in the case of the Critical Art Ensemble in Chapters 
Five and Six, who draw directly from the political ecology of Felix Guattari, and whose tactical 
interventions bear a theoretical reticence both wary of cooption and attendant to the dangers of 
taking the powerful at their word. However, the dominant discourses of history, time and 
geographical space which too often frame discussions of social movements continue to present 
problems of scholarly complicity with reinforcing repressive regimes of power/knowledge. 
These are realms that typically converge around privileged representations, the stories and 
artifacts of those who have fought, killed and lived to tell the tale, who had enough cash to 
finance their version of the truth. In other words, representations which have become dominant 
as winner-written histories, privileged if nothing else by their visibility, by their entry into 
discourse. The histories we know are always the tip of much larger icebergs we can only make 
educated guesses at. The politics we see and read about are simply those that have become 
legible to us. That is why the concept of ―imperceptible‖ politics used later in Escape Routes is so 
vitally important, insofar as it can help us answer questions about how to theorize social 
movements and collectivities that are literally constituted outside of any system of 
representation and burst onto the scene explosively; a bolt from the blue. Imperceptible politics 
offers a way of understanding un-theorized practices of everyday resistance. These practices 
populate and texture the sub-surface volumetric  space of social reality, rather than articulating 
at the level of visible topology, and thus bring to bear a tangled structure of under-currents to 
the dynamic production of large-scale social phenomena. Insofar as these practices can be read 
as ―resistance‖, it is often not merely in spite of but through direct reappropriation of dominant 
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discourses in playful ways, where local contexts provide effective counterinstances for presumed 
universalisms.130  
Thus, chronopolitical and geographical framings which privilege already-dominant 
representations, in particular ―events‖, construct an understanding of history which is already 
inhospitable to contemporary tactics of social change. This is particularly evident wherein events 
are constructed in a manner that assigns them artificially determined beginnings and ends, 
failing to attend to the ways in which practices of dissent become crystallized sub-rosa long 
before emerging as representations first into the sovereign (and frequently colonial) gaze, the 
public fora, the print media, the historical archive of primary source documents. In other words, 
the classic historical timeline that shows ―The French Revolution 1789-1799‖, that situates 
events as objects in time, smoothed like billiard balls along a linear axis of causation; the 
simplified Rube Goldberg-machine of historical happening, is a false heuristic which is only ever 
created in hindsight. What we understand as the conditions of possibility for ―events‖ are often 
merely the rarefied elements of cultural signification; e.g. the official declaration of war, those 
shots heard ‗round the world, the heroic charges led and retreats strategically engineered and so 
on; the romantic revolutionary, flag held aloft, beckoning for the masses to follow him. 
Historians pick the starting points and termini, not the embodied actants, alive in the thick of 
things. One could talk ad infinitum about the absurdity of a Hegelian dialectical motor of history 
which social science has been death-gripping to some degree ever since Marx‘s appropriation, 
driving events into our walls panel by panel as did the ancient cuneiformists, pretending that 
our representations of the past correspond identically with some abstracted view-from-nowhere 
Truth of what an ―event‖ means. As if meaning itself could be bound to a stable and unyielding 
surface without some squirming around. Our representations become evidence; our histories 
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become self-evident. But this is perhaps very different from the empirical of world affect and 
movement in which we live...  
Power relations are not structural, and thus any structuralist analysis of power cannot but 
fail at every hint of chaos, at every ―typical aberration‖. Instead, power relations are constituted 
through discourses in which they are embedded and which they co-create; they are alive and can 
only be sustained through a concerted disciplinary effort. Power relations are iterative rather 
than immutable, and must be performed and enacted again and again. Stability in complex 
social systems in which dynamic feedback loops engender degrees of immanent chaos is the 
exception, rather than the norm, and perceived structures of equilibrium and pacification often 
conceal more antagonism than the well-balanced interests they are supposed to reveal. 
Institutions are the work of entrenched interests that represent centers of gravity within 
networks of discipline, fighting for all their worth against the dissipative tendency of complex 
systems towards de-centralization from centralization, towards autonomy from control, towards 
meshworks from hiearchies, and over the long-term perhaps vice-versa as well. Time is on no 
one‘s side, which is all the more reasons to be wary of ideological discourses which appropriate 
the natural laws of the universe in order to map resistance as a form of capture and control, as a 
zero-sum struggle over fixed material resources. Ultimately, these discourses come to function 
in an insidious complicity with a status quo and only serve to shackle the imaginations of those 
who might fight for a different world. 
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chapter three: active scholarship and two sciences of the social 
 
Returning to Power in Movement as our point of departure, we can see that Tarrow does not 
conceive of social movements as issuing forth from some ahistorical essence of collective action 
that defines both limits and possibilities for organizing. Instead, he focuses on the ways in which 
the emergence and success of social movements are both responsive to concrete historical 
circumstances, while at the same time acting to overcome them. Thus, a proper description of 
group identity formation and contentious politics can never only involve a narrative of self-
empowered bootstrapping and ―bottom-up‖ change, but rather must describe the dynamical 
relationship of measures and counter-measures, repression and cooption in responsive tandem. 
Social change evolves through both resistance and subversion, a historical dance of systems of 
control and liberation that each enable and constrain the possibilities of the other. 
Understanding social movements as only one axis in a much larger frame will allow us to begin 
to see social movements themselves not as static organizational entities, but rather as dynamical 
processes co-evolving with new political opportunities and constraints. In social movement 
theory, this is the same ―political opportunity structure‖ we saw earlier, a necessary empirical 
starting point for concretizing the historical moment in which early modernist social movements 
operated. Historical space and place are by no means deterministic here; just as water will 
sometimes follow the cracks in the sidewalk, we may not see a hidden dent until the stream has 
already diverged, always in hindsight, left to chance until it happens. In other words, causal 
determinism itself can be thought of as affective, how things line up is inexorably situated by the 
liner-upper‘s (historian‘s) own historical place. Understanding social movements as abstract 
entities whose relations are depicted in some sort of vacuum-sealed analysis is, in a very 
palpable sense, theoretical nonsense. 
Social science, as with most sciences, has for quite some time seen itself as being in the 
business of producing truth, where truth possesses a uniquely Platonic flavor, following Manual 
De Landa‘s characterization: ―...truth is conceived as a relation of correspondence between, on 
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one hand, a series of facts about the classes of entities populating reality and, on the other, a 
series of sentences expressing those facts.‖131 As we shall see, this tendency has been equally true 
of contemporary studies of social movements, which attempt to define and deduce the basic 
properties of the individual, group, and social movement as totalized conceptual entities from 
their behavior in particular historical circumstances and then project those behaviors across 
periods of time bracketed by the emergence of particular social and technological forms. While it 
may make good sense and in fact prove instructive to map where, when and under what 
conditions certain combinations  of social practices emerged to become part of collective 
resistance, there are also conceptual pitfalls of taking any axiom, any variable of change, any 
determinant unit of measurement. Our project of pragmatic or radical empirical taxonomy, 
interested in difference and minoritarian evolutions at the margins of representation, differs 
substantively from the project that seeks to fold the process of struggling against oppressive 
power relations into the same authoritative historical record which is today organized, ordered 
and gatekept by elite institutions and signifiers of expert power/knowledge. This is one of the 
core elements necessary in distinguishing and elucidating a process ontology of the social, and it 
is best understood through contrast against the standard taxonomic project of contemporary 
social sciences. 
Deleuze refers to this taxonomic goal-oriented discipline as a ―royal science‖, or that which 
attempts to fix truth to a static element of the world, contrasted against nomad science, which 
seeks to discern evolving movement or fluid patternicity in the world. Depending on what 
percentage of observations about the social field one believes can be adequately characterized by 
stasis or can be reliably contained within the scope of nuanced universalisms, one may 
emphasize one science‘s focus over the other, although Deleuze suggests that every valuable 
scientific endeavor must contain elements of both. Virtual worlds scholar Jeremy Hunsinger 
offers the following clarification of this distinction, writing that: 
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Royal science, objectifying and measuring, is the preferred science of the state where it is 
viewed as definitive, meticulous, and usually true or at least truth seeking. It is the science of 
knowing what is there, what exists, and knowing it completely. Nomad science is the science 
of what is becoming, what will be, what is being created... Nomad science constructs truth 
from movement, whereas royal science constructs truth from placement.132 
 
Thus, for the purposes of historical scholarship, royal science is that which attempts to render 
facts about a particular social order indexical, for the purposes of using them to map a range of 
time as homogenous along a particular axis. In other words, the Age of X, the Epoch of Y, a 
period of time understood through events, battles and technological inventions. Royal science 
becomes indexical precisely as it typically uses events to mark the moments when ages, eras, and 
epochs switch or become characterized by certain attributes more than others. Social truth 
becomes flattened into a fact among facts. 
The ―event‖ becomes one of many like it, and subsequently forms a theory. The theory then 
can become the basis of characterizing other ages and epochs. Hence we see the homogenization 
of the image of historical time around alien axioms. These are usually presumed as universals 
when in fact their origins are quite situated and specific. As noted earlier, the very grammar of 
―modernity‖ only makes sense in the context of a Eurocentric historical narrative of 
industrialization and colonialism. Modernity means something quite different in Mongolia, and 
dependent on a local index of time and social understandings of causality and technology. When 
we speak of ―the modern‖ we are already assuming a false presumption of universalism without 
acknowledging the situated evolution of the metric of historical time itself.  
 Metrics, taxonomic structures, ways of knowing history and social change, are themselves in 
a co-productive relation of emergence with inter-embedded social systems. I have discussed 
many practices, entities and even social spaces of organization as ―emergent‖, and here I would 
like to take a moment to more rigorously approach this term. Emergence, as I am using 
following scholars such as John Holland and Manual De Landa, implies a processual 
evolutionary structure, which is both sensitive to contextual pressures and attractors, while 
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blind to outcomes and anti-teleological in terms of values. No dialectic here, no grand finale, no 
movement towards utopia or apocalypse. Emergence has been articulated through two parallel 
literature bases; one like Holland‘s which focuses on structured evolution, for example through 
studies of machine learning or bounded complex systems where outcomes can be controlled and 
experiments can be repeated, and another which focuses on far more complex self-organized 
systems133 . Emergence reflects the intuition by many that systems themselves possess a certain 
quixotic intelligence, or as F. A. Hayek refers to as a ―spontaneous order‖134 which defies full 
control and explanation, arguing in the case of economics that ―'[w]e have never designed our 
economic system. We were not intelligent enough for that'.‖135 Unfortunately for the former 
camp, an analysis based on the concept of this more deterministic emergence risks re-inscribing 
the same metaphysical presumption of constructive rationalism (the hubristic generalization of 
abstract planned models to unplanned eruptive applications in social space) as John Holland 
aptly demonstrates when describing the scope of his approach at the outset of his key text 
Emergence: From Chaos to Order, writing: 
―...I will restrict study to systems for which we have useful descriptions in terms of rules or 
laws. Games, systems made up of well-understood components (molecules composed of 
atoms) and systems defined by scientific theories (Newton‘s theory of gravity) are prime 
examples. Emergent phenomena also occur in domains for which we presently have few 
accepted rules; ethical systems, the evolution of nations...precise application to those 
systems will require better conjecture about the laws (if any) that govern their 
development.‖136 
 
However, if we accept the earlier criticism of the attempt to apply static rules to complex social 
systems, as Holland seems willing to suggest that we can do, then this application of emergence 
doesn‘t seem particular promising for our investigation. (Indeed, how would one speak of formal 
                                                        
133 Holland also focuses his attention on self-organized system, particularly in his examination of neural 
nets, however as the below quotation will indicate, he considers these systems results as products of sets 
of rules which he seeks to apply across a range of theoretical domains, and is to be distinguished in this 
respect even toward self-organized subject matter. 
134 John Marks ―Two Kinds of Order‖ 1984 
 http://www.ertnet.demon.co.uk/2kinds.html 
135 as quoted in John Marks ―Two Kinds of Order‖ 1984 
 http://www.ertnet.demon.co.uk/2kinds.html (LLL, III, p. 164). 
136 John Holland Emergence: Order Out of Chaos Helix Books, 1997 p. 3 
87 
 
laws governing ―ethical systems‖ in the same manner as chemistry or physics?) However, the 
rules-based scope approach does not disqualify the utility of the concept in identifying the 
movements or formulations that exist behind conceptual blindspots, which are not a result of 
insufficient examination but rather are immanently structural to production of novel entities 
within social space.137 In other words, the study of emergent phenomena is a cultivation of the 
mindfulness of the imperceptible as causally active. The core property of emergent structures 
that interests us, is in fact, precisely that they are not rigidly governed by deterministic laws but 
that they contain the virtual potential of multiple realizable outcomes, or as Ilya Prigogine and 
Gregoire Nicolis write in the context of cellular biology, emergence allows us to ―...arrive at a 
remarkable cooperation between chance and determinism... Stated more formally, several 
solutions are possible for the same parameter value. Chance alone will decide which of these 
solutions is realized.‖138 
 In the context of social movements, an already wide parameter of outcomes, the noise 
introduced by a high level of complexity into any analysis and the fact that the immanent 
dynamics of these evolutions seem to indicate that the outcome may not be specified in advance 
suggests the structures of social science disciplines may often be a greater reflection of 
entrenched power relations than a reflection of emergent social dynamics, since they offer an 
answer where from an empirical perspective, it seems like answers are structurally non-
offerable. Whether your interest is breaking the stultifying solidification surrounding event-
centered political discourse, or to re-articulate the event as such against hegemonic systems of 
prediction and spatio-temporal geopolitical mapping (the incessant creation of axes and axioms, 
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variables to depend and react to possible measurements and variables to depend on nothing 
much at all), this attendance to the empirical vitality of this implication of multiply realizable 
outcomes contained within such an understanding of ―emergence‖ is absolutely crucial. For an 
excellent example of the opposite interpretive strategy, e.g. valorizing events as empirical, non-
representational political becomings, see William Connolly‘s recent writings, where he argues, 
―We seek to participate in the human sciences while dropping the hubris of explanatory 
sufficiency in principle. To pursue such a trail we must supplement modes of efficient and 
probabilistic causality with an idea of emergent causality that requires us at key moments to 
follow real modes of creativity as they unfold to produce new outcomes.‖139 Thus a component of 
engaging with scholarship on social movements must be to read dominant scholarship itself as 
evidence of subducted antagonism between the privileged representational schema of human 
agency and the ability of emergent collectivities. These emergent collectivities are uninterested 
in the official story and will thus fail to conform to it, continuously surprising and befuddling 
institutionalized observers and professionalized knowers. The image of the human agent as a 
Cartesian rational animal therefore can be seen as serving a political purpose, a disciplinary 
frame that narrows the scope of analysis through an impossible lens that is quintessentially 
unable to square with the chaotic dynamics of complex social reality.  
These tendencies to populate the conceptual universe with such images of human agency in 
the academy have historically been ascendant in the humanities and social sciences since the 
rise of the modern State and the royal philosophies of the Enlightenment, as Brian Massumi 
notes:  
―...philosophers have traditionally been employees of the State. The collusion between 
philosophy and the State was most explicitly enacted in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century with the foundation of the University of Berlin, which was to become the model for 
higher learning throughout Europe and in the United States. The goal laid out for it by 
Wilhelm von Humboldt (based on the proposals of Fichte and Schleiermacher) was the 
―spiritual and moral training of the nation,‖ to be achieved by ―deriving everything from an 
original principle‖ (truth), by ―relating everything to an ideal‖ (justice), and by ―unifying this 
                                                        




principle and this ideal in a single Idea‖ (the State). The end product would be ―a fully 
legitimated subject of knowledge and society‖140 – each mind an analogously organized 
mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State.‖141  
 
However, this vision of both what knowledge means and how pedagogy ought respond to 
stratified power relations have been resisted in the second half of the twentieth century from a 
diverse range of scholarly camps. These camps range from poststructuralist thinkers such as 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida to liberated pedagogues epitomized by Paolo Friere and 
Ivan Illich to minoritarian voices in the scientific community (particularly in the areas of biology 
and ecology) such as Michael Ghiselin142 who wished to take Darwin‘s crude notions of 
population to level of their own theories against transcendental categories such as species, a 
process ontology of the empirical universe as an alternative telos to the essentialist DNA-as-
Platonic-blueprint.143 In recent years, this last category of scholarly thinking has become 
ascendant in particular scientific disciplines or in areas where the progressive specification 
scope entailed by a commitment to nomad science seems particularly necessary, as Manual De 
Landa notes in the context of embryogenesis: 
―...most biologists today have given up preformism and accepted the idea that differentiated 
structures emerge progressively as the egg develops. The egg is not, of course, an 
undifferentiated mass: it possesses an obscure yet distinct structure defined by zones of 
biochemical concentration and by polarities established by the asymmetrical position of the 
yolk (or nucleus). But even though it does possess the necessary biochemical materials and 
genetic information, these materials and information do not contain a clear and distinct 
blueprint of the final organism.‖144 
 
While to some extent questions such as the most accurate theoretical disposition towards the 
human embryo are empirical questions which can be settled to greater and lesser extents by 
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open minds and rigorous experimentation, there are also social elements that characterize the 
scientific process, which may be de-stabilized when viewed through alternative frames. One of 
the best examples in the history of modern science is, in fact, the many appropriations of 
Darwinism for theories of political economy and racialized pseudoscience that then dynamically 
fed back into the vocabulary and methodology of biological science. Many of these overlapping 
theoretical formations are currently receiving much-needed scrutiny, particularly through 
interdisciplinary collaborations of scholars such as Kenneth Weiss and Anne Buchanan, a 
biologist and anthropologist who noted even today who the legacy of exchange between Charles 
Darwin and Herbert Spencer has created a social frame for both biology and economics that 
emphasizes competition and selection as fundamental principles, without seeing that the frame 
can be arbitrarily reversed based on the level of detail: 
The 19th Century British sociologist Herbert Spencer, even before reading Darwin‘s Origin of 
Species (Darwin, 1859), proposed that societies change competitively and the best (like 
Imperial England) succeed at the expense of others because it is Nature‘s way. After he read 
the Origin, he suggested the phrase ‗survival of the fittest‘ to evoke the ruthless competition 
that he saw as being at the root of Nature. Darwin and Wallace had originally used the term 
‗natural selection‘ but later adopted Spencer‘s phrase.... We might even turn the common 
view on its head and ask whether the function of cooperation in life is to enhance 
competitive advantage, or the function of competition is to enable cooperation.145 
 
This last example illustrates that in many disciplinary contexts, deciding on the primary units of 
analysis can be determinative of how conclusions are both reached and then framed to reify or 
de-stabilize certain assumptions and intuitions about the way the world works. This point may 
seem trite but it could not be more important. If we choose the atom, cell, individual, species, 
nation-state or planet as the unit of analysis, we will reach radically different conclusions about 
whether or not concepts such as ―competition‖ or ―cooperation‖ can relevantly characterize 
aspects of our social and physical universes. If we are ontologically committed to a particular 
mechanistic understanding of historical happening, then a particular system of axioms will not 
only give us ―facts‖ but it will come attached with implicit value-judgments about which facts are 
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more relevant and how they should be framed, sequenced, communicated and so on146. They will 
also importantly inform which scale and level of detail we choose to observe as primary. Thus, 
how we produce units of analysis becomes a crucial question for scholarship. If we rely on the 
idea that there is a particular homeostatic vision of an entity that is unaffected by its progressive 
specification within a particular concrete time-space, then our units of analysis may similarly 
reflect a metric homogeneity. After all every inch is by definition exactly like every other inch, 
but the same may not be said of cell, organ, torso and so on. The prevalent methodology for the 
production of units of analysis in the social sciences is to take conceptual entities as givens and 
then schematize them according to underlying essential principles which are supposed to 
explain and predict the behavior of given particular cases, even at the level of complex social 
systems. Theorists such as De Landa have characterized this approach towards scholarship, 
which takes homogeneity or unity as a fundamental organizing principle as ―naive realism‖, 
writing that: 
―If one assumes that a class of entities is defined by the essence which its members share in 
common, it becomes relatively simple to conclude that these classes are basically given, and 
that they exhaust all there is to know about the world. The ontological assumption that the 
world is basically closed, that entirely novel classes of entities cannot emerge spontaneously, 
many now be coupled with the epistemological one, and the correspondence between true 
sentences can be made absolute.‖147 
 
 Naive realism as applied to social movements not only fails to produce accurate or useful 
results from the perspective which is concerned only with the sterile accumulation of facts, but it 
is antithetical to the sort of knowledge production that might assist the emergence of novel 
practices of resistance among and between social movements. This form of scholarship proceeds 
by erecting new systems of signs in a desperate attempt to artificially schematize the everyday 
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where writing after Foucault she notes that ―There is no transparent form of knowledge, free from error 
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practices of actual resistors, new terminology and new axioms by which to classify and story-tell 
novel activisms from an apparently apolitical perspective of disinterested academia. However, 
the categorical attempt to fix practices to representations is incommensurate with the reality of 
their constant processual evolution. Social science does not need new buzzwords, the erection of 
ever-more conceptual monuments without regard to the mutation of their empirical 
foundations, rather it needs concepts that can turn with earth! Social reality is neither stagnant 
nor unified, it will not remain still long enough to be representationally mapped or 
photographed. However, the evolved practices of everyday activists, organizers and sympathetic 
political actants which supposedly underlie theories of social change are real and the latent 
combinatorial possibilities offer lots of room to maneuver. Importantly, these quotidian 
practices and spaces have histories, many histories most likely, and understanding the cultural 
repertoires and the access of engaged individuals and groups to social technologies, whether 
that means a moveable-type printing press or a mobile Twitter feed, will allow us to create loose 
diagrams of power relations which may not only help general audiences understand the 
contemporary manifestations of activism but also may be useful to activist themselves. 
Recognizing that abstract neturality is tantamount to complicity with current relations of 
power/knowledge can offer a point of departure for scholars to re-politicize their production of 
knowledge, and situate their frames of relevance relative to the needs and interests of new 
activists and effective strategies of de-structive subversion. 
 Following our earlier discussion of Kuhnian paradigms, we can note that multiple paradigms 
always exist simultaneously, co-habiting the social space of historical time in relations of 
dominance and marginalization. Thus, in arguing for a paradigm-shift, I must illustrate 
examples of scholars whose engagement with social movement theory have directed them to 
activism, and activists whose engagement with organizing has directed them to social movement 
theory. The new paradigm is never ―new‖, but exists as a minor narrative within and against the 
context of an over-arching formation of power through discourse, a social space populated by a 
93 
 
community of knowers and writers who subscribe to particular assumptions. The task of 
identifying and executing a paradigm shift thus consists in mapping these social spaces of 
discourse in order to illuminate the areas where the distinction between objective knowers of 
activist theory and actual practitioners of untheorized tactics have become blurred. The text 
Digital Activism Decoded presents abundant examples, most notably the editor Mary Joyce 
whose new Meta-Activism Project was an outgrowth of her interest in digital organizing 
following her work with social media in Barack Obama‘s 2008 presidential campaign. Similar 
concatenations can be found with Talia Whyte‘s engagements with DigiActive and Global Wire 
Associates, or Timothy Hwang‘s Web Ecology Project. In each of these cases, groups and 
individuals are simultaneously seeking to produce scholarship and practical knowledge around 
digital activism while seeking to advance the social justice goals of many of these transnational 
movements through communication technology. The writings of the Critical Art Ensemble on 
digital resistance, discussed earlier148, also follow this blending of disciplinary orientations, as 
well as other theoretical publications from Autonomedia, and a network of quasi-institutional 
formations such as the Institute of Applied Autonomy, the Center for MetaHuman Exploration, 
and Movements.org. Many transnational organizations that have sprung up around regional 
affiliations, such as the slew of new groups working to build international solidarity with digital 
activists in Syria, such as Suriye Devrimi and Days of Rage. The same sort of organizations, with 
many anonymous and international participants, can be found surrounding the protests in Iran, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and many others, creating a waiting distribution channels for viral videos 
documenting human rights abuses of protestors and enabling potentially high audience costs for 
state violence against demonstrators operating in locally embodied social space. 
From the mid 1990s, examples of these interdisciplinary intellectuals abounded, particularly 
following the popularization of cyberpunk fiction, the rise of the hacker (and hacktivist) 
movements, and the political successes achieved by the international ZLDN, or Zapatista 
                                                        




Solidarity Network. The leader of this last group, Subcommandante Marcos, developed a 
repertoire for digital activism which centered around collective correspondence, stylized 
manifesto-type electronic publications, and the cultivation of a charismatic anonymity (in rare 
photographs his face is covered by a black facemask, out of which can often be seen protruding a 
pipe). These themes, particularly anonymity, have evolved as hallmarks of digital activism, 
particularly when activists are dissenting against repressive regimes that may have the power to 
threaten their embodied social identities.149 
The writings of Subcommandante Insurgente Marcos and others in the ELZN such as Don 
Dorito express an early theorization of on-the-ground tactics ―from the frontlines‖, and offer the 
beginnings of an articulation of what Simon Tormey refers to as post-representational politics, a 
political discourse at once outside of theorization, not a static system of meaning but one which 
is continuously deferred.150 The Zapatistas exemplify a concretization of this active scholarship, 
an anti-theoretical approach to political economy which frames their demands for autonomy 
against the very logic of representation. Such a disposition does not seek to make their activism 
legible to the sedentary apparatuses of political capture through a set of coherent demands 
which would typically entail reconciling local antagonism within the nominalist consensus-
building space of a majoritarian public sphere. Instead, their resistance seeks to push against the 
very terms of this majoritarian inclusion within what Vassilis Tsianos et al. refer to as the 
double-R axiom of political and social representation (the twin impulses to defer political 
autonomy to ―representatives‖ embedded within a political bureaucracy and to schematize the 
lived micropolitics of autonomist resistance within the terms of defined political demands)151. 
These political becomings do not draw their resonances from the cultural economy of the 
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philosophical idols of academia, but rather finds a more lyrical form of anti-theorization from 
the poetry of Pablo Neruda. Taken from the beginning of the Zapatista anthology ―our word is 











and spread  
their lines 
to control us. 
 










Never again will the Zapatistas be alone...152 
 
Much of the Zapatista literature of Marcos and others begins in this figurative vein, drawing 
both on theoretical themes of representation and poetic surrealism. In contrast to Marxist and 
neo-Marxist manifestos addressed to the ―workers of the world‖, the Zapatista writing is 
addressed to an anonymous and diverse audience in digital space. The spirit of their writing is 
tactical, and seeks to activate a cultural sensibility of the everyday within the intertextual 
experience of international readers, readers who could then be drawn upon through the 
Zapatista solidarity network to support and participate in acts of electronic civil disobedience. 
The emphasis on quotidian narrative forms, often in the form of first person descriptions 
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making use of affective perception and psychosomatic imagery, or allegorical parables (such as 
―The Story of the Tiny Mouse and the Tiny Cat‖153) following the thematic repertoires of 
Cervantes‘ Don Quixote to describe the affective incoherence and grim intoxication attached to 
the situated perspective of those on the receiving end of structural exploitation and inequality.  
Social theory is here, riding the undercurrents of an affective political expression, an 
anonymous swarm of voices eluding capture and legibility, creating a purely emotive currency 
with a virtual network. This network is constituted through an initially anonymous audience, 
narratively politicized and attached to the distant struggles of the Zapatista‘s confrontation with 
the Mexican military, struggles for indigenous rights and local autonomy in Chiapas. This is not 
the elitist responses of neo-Derrideans, writing in ―against legibility‖ or in opposition to the so-
called ―tyranny of clarity‖ through concatenated postmodern jargon, but rather harkens back to 
the story-telling traditions of peasant revolts throughout the Middle Ages, and exemplifies 
Michel de Certeau‘s everyday politics through a communicative style and distribution mode 
designed for mass accessibility while at the same time resisting the commodification of literal 
revolutionary discourse. This latter pitfall is a real danger, as one sees with the marketization 
and cooptation surrounding supposedly ―counter-cultural‖ symbols such as the iconography of 
Ché Guevara, who is more recognizable from his massified T-shirt image logo among Western 
audiences than from his political writings or the role that he played as a leader of the Cuban 
Revolution. This resistance to theorization emblematic of the Zapatista writings provides an 
ideal point of departure for future research on novel articulations of active scholarship, a style of 
theory that precedes naming and co-evolves in relation to the local contexts of material political 
struggles. In this dynamic, theoretical indoctrination only occurs after the fact. 
 The Zapatistas are important to consider not only for their theoretical approach but for their 
the real material victories achieved on the ground in Chiapas. These victories were often 
achieved by organizing their vast transnational solidarity network to conduct a form of what has 
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been termed ―electronic civil disobedience‖. In the mid-90s they succeeded in gaining interest 
from a transnational audience by posting information about their struggle online, and making a 
concerted effort to engage a network of transnational digital media. These tactics focused on 
communicating the importance of their struggle against the federalization of the Mexican 
province of Chiapas in favor of local autonomy. Their approach has been described as 
inaugurating the practice of theories of ―tactical media‖ in digital space, a term which has come 
to be associated with the use or appropriation of media technologies to undermine established 
power relations or draw observers into an organizational network for the purposes of collective 
action.154 The transnantionalization of the Chiapas struggle was a singular phenomenon of 
media technologies in that it framed what amounted to an extremely local struggle for self-
determination against the backdrop of encroaching interests of globalization, particularly in the 
run up to and passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), on local interests 
everywhere. The paradoxical notion of a global struggle for local autonomy is hard to conceive 
of outside of a sort of social locality, or diminished social distance within a network (remember 
the earlier analogy to the game of Telephone), enabled by digital communication networks. The 
Zapatista‘s efforts thus created a point of frame convergence around numerous local interests 
situated in disparate national spaces, who could nevertheless see themselves by extension as 
stakeholders in a localist conflict. Here we see the emergence of a conceptually convoluted 
political assemblage in which transnational activists form global networks in the service of 
particularized local struggles.  
 The ELZN was interested in the possibilities of digital communication from the beginning, 
but it was only as the movement grew that they realized the possibility of direct action in digital 
space. While achieving early victories through the establishment of territorial autonomous 
zones, the Zapatistas were militarily in the precarious situation of many rebels and other 
militant groups with respect to security from federal government forces. The Zapatistas 
                                                        




continued to skirmish with federal troops both in limited combat engagement and through 
battles over framing the struggle, the latter which the Zapatistas seemed to more decisively win. 
However, throughout the mid-late 90s they were constantly at risk from encroaching 
federalization, which for reasons of scale they were only able to mount proportionally limited 
military resistance. Annoyed by continued difficulties in exerting territorial control over 
Chiapas, and smarting from international media spin which seemed to favor these upstart 
rebels, Mexican federal troops began escalating the harassment. 
In early 1998, following an episode which became known as the ―Acteal massacre‖, where 
paramilitary soldiers in connection with the Mexican government shot and killed at least fifteen 
unarmed civilians in a Catholic church, the Zapatistas decided to win more than just the 
traditional battle for media sympathy. Their retaliation took the form of direct action in digital 
space, using a program called FloodNet developed by a US-based group called the Electronic 
Disturbance Theater (EDT), a group of performance artists who saw the program as a 
convergence of interests in art and social justice. Following the attack, Zapatista supporters were 
asked to download the program and input the names of those who had died in the Acteal 
massacre into a log, which would then send repeated requests to the websites of both the 
Mexican and US governments using those names, a prime example of a ―distributed denial of 
service‖ or DDoS attack. In communications with their supporters, both the ELZN and the EDT 
framed this collective action in the language of a ―sit-in‖, drawing on frames from the American 
Civil Rights Movement in order to justify the action as a just response to an atrocity in which 
both governments were at least complicit, and whose web disturbance would further the 
visibility of the Chiapas autonomy issue among policy elites. In this frame we can see a 
noticeable juxtaposition between the ELZN, premised on anonymity, mobility and constant self-
reinvention and the EDT whose founders were well-known artists and considered their 




 This action successfully brought visibility to bear on the recent events in Chiapas, allowing 
the Zapatistas to claim a major victory with the temporary withdrawal of federal Mexican 
troops. While to many authorities the attacks appeared to happen ―suddenly‖, as if from 
nowhere, they in fact represented a coordinated practice that had been developed over years of 
experimentation. This experimentation had first achieved visibility earlier in 1998 with virtual 
sit-ins on the websites of Mexican financial companies. These evolved practices of resistance in 
digital space are not isolated from embodied social space more generally, but serve to 
complement, segment and supplement offline actions by increasing their visibility, and creating 
opportunities for coordination between geographically disparate actants. Throughout the 
Zapatista articulation of their localist anti-ideology within a globalized political communication 
space, we see the persistent theme of anonymity, name-lessness, against the representational 
system of accommodation and inclusion. The Zapatistas are not ―fighting for rights‖, they are 
fighting against the system of rights as intrinsically paternalist towards indigenous peoples and 
violently exclusionary in practice. This framing serves both ideological and tactical purpose, and 
lends itself to direct action which focuses on disrupting flows of political information-traffic 
even without a direct link between those interruptions and the Zapatista struggle itself. Here we 
can read anonymity as an emergent tactic to avoid cooption and institutionalization. It is 
precisely these dangers of domestication that successful social movements often face as they 
enlarge, slowly coming to resemble the institutions that they once fought so hard against. The 
sentiments embodied in this experience have been echoed by other groups producing active 
scholarship, such as the Critical Art Ensemble, writing: 
Once named and defined, any movement is open to co-optation. Should tactical media 
become popularized, its recuperation by capital is almost inevitable. Definitions also create 
boundaries. What was once so liquid would become increasingly structured and separated as 
the movement was theorized and historicized. On the other hand, joy can emerge out of 
separation that expresses itself as generative difference...Many felt liberated from having to 
present themselves to the public as a specialist in order to be experts (and therefore valued). 
It was a vindication of the proto-anarchist Fourier‘s idea that pleasure and learning come 
from what he termed the ―Butterfly‖ – the human desire to access as many active processes 
100 
 
and learning resources as possible, or to put it negatively, an aversion to boredom caused by 
the redundancy of specialized activity.155 
 
Thus, we can see the twin developments of both a form of activist collectivity that both exists 
outside of formalized representational practices and the emergence of a way of articulating 
knowledge and value claims outside of the sedimented power relations of expert knowledge and 
traditional scholarship. CAE is an interesting case as well because in addition to producing 
theoretical writings and participating in activist projects ranging from counter-surveillance 
collaborations to anti-copyright promulgations, they also integrate the sensibilities of communal 
art into the core of their framing practices. These communitarian sensibilities are often oriented 
against the institutional pressures of alienating individuality and competition that they see as 
structuring the commercial art world. The above passage also illuminates that a prime concern 
of active scholarship for a new social movements is a fear of cooption, of smooth integration into 
the dominant regime of signs and value that will de-claw the subversive potential of the 
movement by including in within the conventional schema of representation. This fear strongly 
influences the goals of poststructuralist-inspired collective. Whereas more traditional social 
movements often attempted to rest levers of institutional power from deeply entrenched and 
exclusionary interests, many of these digital movements prefer to remain outside institutions. 
However, such movements may still seek to influence policy outcomes by effecting shifts in 
culture and by making institutions more responsive to outside popular pressures. Rather than 
resisting a particular hegemonic edifice by attempting to replace it with a different totalizing 
program for governing, the goal of such movements is to de-structure systems of control 
through localizing networks of autonomy. The Zapatistas uses of tactical media, and particularly 
the DDoS direct action, are prime examples of such counter-hegemonic resistance. 
These concerns about institutionalization expressed above are not merely abstract, but 
directly impact the ability of a collective social action to address the concerns of its members 
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and sympathizers. Direct and explicit focus on integrating a movement with a political 
bureaucracy, which is often a presumed relationship of civil society actors to legislative bodies in 
a representative democracy, can often be extremely demobilizing for advocates of social change. 
Writing about the GLBTQ movement in the United States, veteran activist Urvashi Vaid notes: 
For one, the process of passing legislation differs markedly from the process of building a 
social change movement. Indeed, the two are antithetical. The former requires a fairly 
obsessive and insular focus on 535 members of Congress... Lobbyists and lawmakers are 
intently focused on the passage of a piece of legislation, seen as the ultimate win. This 
limited goal leads them to enter the legislative process ready to bargain and compromise. ... 
Finally, legislative strategies are more vulnerable than any other kind of activism to 
becoming insular, self-referential, and separated from the interests of the broader 
community.156  
 
 Thus, the original magic of the movement‘s initial idealism, the outrage against injustice, the 
recognition of the necessity of collective action to alter the material conditions of oppression, are 
incorporated within a broader rhetorical economy of competing interests, winning and losing, 
compromising within a majoritarian public sphere. These implicit system-driven goals come to 
replace struggles towards an everyday politics of local autonomy, or attempting meeting the 
needs of minoritarian communities and minor cultures. Bureaucratic politics does not typically 
lend itself to inspiration. Historically, the most successful movements, particularly those that 
sought to articulate their rhetorical frames in the context of transnational publics, were those 
which understood that changing the autonomous culture surrounding policy decisions was first 
and foremost vital to social change. In contrast, decision to defer political agency that entailed 
institutionalizing struggles for radical change have proved disastrous for the durability of a fluid 
collective social assemblage, exemplified by the virtual collapse of the nuclear freeze movement, 
one of the largest and most successful transnational social movements of the twentieth 
century.157158 
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In this respect, the Zapatistas offer a suggestion of a novel form of anti-ideological politics, 
one which neither strives for governing power nor seeks to ―speak on behalf of the people‖ in the 
matter of representative democracy, or incorporative discourses, yet attempts to signify 
resistance on behalf of difference in itself. As Marcos writes: ―In the world we want everyone 
fits. We want a world in which many worlds fit.‖159 In the case of the Zapatistas, this valorization 
of difference is articulated through the struggle for indigenous rights against the strictures of 
federalization by a rigid caste system and political economy centralized in the bureaucracies of 
Mexico City. For the Zapatistas, it could never be a question of compromising with the dominant 
schema of federalized representational democracy insofar as within such an apparatus of power 
local concerns are always subordinated to majoritarian interests. The majority by definition is 
distinct and opposed to the minority, and in a political economy where indigenous peoples are 
often treated like racially second-class citizens, it is understandable why the Zapatistas would 
not want to simply have their position represented.160 In a democracy, it doesn‘t pay to have 
your voice heard if you are always destined to be outvoted.  
Unlike many previous self-determination struggles, the Zapatistas do not promulgate a 
grand narrative of liberation or the vision of a political utopia-to-come for which revolutionary 
bloodshed must be made necessary. The revolution is never an ―event‖ for the Zapatistas but 
rather constellated throughout their everyday practices of resistance, including those organized 
through digital space. Furthermore, other than the practices of sustaining zones of local 
autonomy, they do not have final political goals with respect to the centralization of power. The 
Zapatistas have therefore exhibited a tenacity not seen in other revolutionary movements which 
have operated along the principles of the necessity of seizing control of dominant modes of 
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my-Name-Deleuze-Zapatismo-and-the-Critique-of-Representation 
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production from the elites that they have sought to topple161. The Zapatistas are a remarkable 
movement in this and many other respects, but perhaps most importantly for this text are the 
ways in which they epitomize a bridging of the theory/praxis divide, not as mere ―subject 
matter‖ for theorists to map concepts onto, but as the producers of their own concepts that then 
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chapter four: modern movements, modern theories 
 
―Everyday living is a rich affair, whereas theory is a narrowing enterprise.‖ 
--Bruno Latour162 
 
The oft-repeated claim that contemporary social movements are a ―modern‖ organizational 
form is worth interrogating. If this is true, can we then usefully distinguish between historically 
modern movements and emergent forms of collective organizing in digital space? The goal here 
is not to discretely mark beginnings and endings of social epochs, for empirical analysis may 
reveal the same dynamics of anonymous digital organizing in the public fora of medieval 
Europe, while the ―modern‖ dynamics of trade union organizing may be also be found to have 
parallels in the opportunity structures of digital space. The medium never axiomatically 
determines the message. However, by examining the evolution of the ―modern‖ organizational 
form, we can identify the continuing and integrated dynamics at play between the history of 
ideas surrounding human agency and the development of novel tactics of activism. Tarrow 
emphasizes this modernist distinction early in Power and Movement. Whereas contentious 
politics may be a sort of action, social movements are formal organizational vessels in which 
their leadership structure mediates their political goals and enables and constrains their 
possibilities for success. For Tarrow, this organizational form is quintessentially a strategic 
response to the coalescence of the control-structures of the modern state: 
Contentious politics...Such confrontations go back to the dawn of history. But mounting, 
coordinating, and sustaining them against powerful opponents are the unique contribution 
of the social movement – an invention of the modern age and an accompaniment to the rise 
of the modern state.163 
 
Certainly peasant revolts, low-level sabotage, mass desertion, outright mutiny and many other 
forms of collective action have existed as long as the hierarchies of control against which they 
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were opposed. However, are there particular repertoires of contention and evolved tactics of 
dissent linked to social movements that arose in concert with the institutional form of the 
nation-state that makes them somehow distinct, that makes them legible as ―modern‖? While 
modes of dissent have certainly changed over time, making use of new technologies and 
ideologies, these changes alone do not make a social movement modern, at least not for our 
purposes. Rather, it is the ability to frame dissent in terms other than a generalized social ill 
which must be corrected expediently, and usually by force. In other words, modern social 
movements are those which became understood as socially positive, in contrast to their previous 
classical depiction as an ―unruly mob‖. ―Modernity‖ here represents the ability to organize 
people around a moral conviction that the struggle against established power can be just. While 
today this notion may be easily taken for granted, in the days of the divine right of kings, where 
the phenomenological universe of most (peasant) people was entirely controlled by an all-
knowing, all-powerful and all-good God who, despite all His perfection, had nevertheless 
condemned them to a daily life of material deprivation and abjects servitude to elites whose rule 
was often cruel and arbitrary, such an idea was the stuff of utopias.  Such an idea was the stuff, 
eventually, of revolutions. 
For Tarrow, what makes social movements modern is precisely their self-awareness as social 
movements, an awareness that then enables sustained unity of purpose and organizational 
stability over time. For many theorists, the modern era began in 1789, when for the first time 
inside a major European power, the ancien regime foundered, and for a glorious and terrifying 
historical moment, the mob won. However, it is precisely such narratives that attempt to 
inaugurate ―the modern‖ via events and chronological hash marks which we ought to resist. In 
order to do justice to the ways in which contentious politics grew organically, we must first 
attend to the quotidian practices and commonplaces available to popular understandings of 
political agency. These are the usually imperceptible practices of everyday existence that may be 
seized upon to frame elite repression negatively against popular demands for justice. In order to 
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understand this aspect of contention, we must examine the concepts and cultural narratives 
surrounding the evolution of popular dissent. Following the pathbreaking work of Roland 
Bleiker, we can begin to trace a fundamental notion of human agency in the early modern 
writings of a young French thinker named Étienne La Boétie, a thinker of a far earlier time. A 
later friend of Montaigne, La Boétie‘s Discourse on Voluntary Servitude or Anti-One written in 
1522, exemplifies the reactive movement of individual dissent against the contemporaneous 
social strata, which was governed by a divinely ordained monarchy that was becoming 
increasingly absolutist. While certainly not the only thinker of his time to express views against 
the arrangement of established power structures, La Boétie framed his objections not merely 
against a particular individual, but against the process that naturalized exploitive social 
arrangements. What Bleiker finds revolutionary in La Boétie is the belief that power is 
fundamentally contestable. In other words, the simple notion that the world is in fact not 
governed by an immutable and deterministic apparatus of rewards and punishments that 
underlie social reality. From this initial skepticism, from this simple challenge, we find springing 
the fundamental outlook that power relations are contingent, that they exist because they are 
made to exist, not by God but by humans, and thus by humans could be made otherwise. As 
Bleiker writes: 
By linking any form of government to popular consent and ruminating about the 
possibilities that could arise when this consent is withdrawn, la Boetie advances a 
fundamental proposition about the nature of power. Contrary to the prevalent view of the 
time, he does not perceive power as something stable and restraining, a privilege that some 
have and others do not. Power emerges from popular consent and it is relational, a 
constantly changing force field located in the interactive dynamics between ruler and ruled. 
Perhaps most importantly, power is enabling, it provides common people with the chance to 
create opportunities for social change.164 
 
An understanding of power is a template, a diagram, a script in which an individual narrates 
their own political agency through a host of particular situations and arrangements. This 
diagram of implied social relations, inculcated through a belonging within a particular cultural 
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space, informs a willingness to follow orders, submit to unfavorable changes in the distribution 
of scarce resources, and confront authority through collective action. If power is monolithic, if 
power is omnipotent, if power is concentrated in elites and if the desires of those elites are made 
known, where then is there space for the politics of a farmer dissatisfied with the gabelle? What 
about ten farmers, a hundred farmers or even a thousand farmers, all grumbling against the 
theft of their profits and children for foreign wars? The sum total of a million zeros is still 
nothing. While an exclusive focus on ideology misses key material groundings of actual 
possibility, ideology nevertheless informs political agents of their own limits of possibility. 
Where is the voice of someone who has been told that they will never speak? Drawing on 
classical Greek and Roman traditions that saturated his early modernist university education at 
Orleans, La Boétie launched a blistering attack on tyranny, not as a system of oppressive 
governance, but the prevalent system of thought which enabled it.  
―Tyranny‖ here is not merely understood as a condition of coercive bondage, but rather par 
excellence as a consensual blunder in violation of the innate tendency towards making one‘s 
own decisions. It is this innate tendency for self-governance and autonomy that La Boétie saw as 
a natural condition of humanity. Where are the shouts of a multitude that have been told that 
they will never be heard? The key word in the title of La Boétie‘s text is ―voluntary‖, the notion 
that power is intrinsically consensual, that one consents through non-action to the rule of a 
tyrant, but that this consent is fundamentally revocable. Silence is the condition of one‘s own 
political marginalization. Passivity and obedience are the conditions for one‘s own exploitation 
and servitude. In a political philosophy these ideas might crudely equate to the far-later 
ruminations on civil disobedience by Thoreau and Ghandi. Writing well over two hundred years 
before the storming of the Bastille, La Boétie emphasized that it was precisely this very 
contingency of power that contained within it the possibility of resistance, arguing 
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If one concedes nothing to them [the tyrants], if one refuses to obey them, then without 
fighting, without striking, they become naked & defeated & are no more, just as when the 
root is deprived of water and nourishment, the branch withers and dies. 165 
 
 La Boétie‘s fate would lead him to later disavow this expression of his rebellious youth. As 
cynicism about Henry II‘s brutal repression of the Bordeau peasant revolt set in, he tempered 
his humanist tendencies and would later affect a grim acceptance of monarchical rule. This early 
sketch of dissent against prevailing metaphysical models of the social universe may seem crude 
and narrowly drawn (following its political use in the Reformation by the Huguenots, Bleiker 
even goes so far as to call Anti-One  ―a mere political pamphlet that did little more than inflate 
and dogmatise the concept of human agency.‖166) However, one must appreciate such a text as a 
valorization of what would later become foundational democratic principles over two hundred 
years before the revolutions in the United States and France shook the world. Here I am not 
using ―democratic‖ to refer a particular arrangement of government, but the foundational co-
relative principles of the ―consent of the governed‖ and the ―right of revolution‖ which are 
fundamental to ―modern‖ social organizing. These early modern concepts of La Boétie and 
others would create the notional political space for indoctrination of diagrams of power that at 
least superficially valued dissent. Thus, we can see the beginnings of a cultural space co-evolving 
with early Humanist subjectivity throughout the Reformation period and until the beginning of 
the so-called ―modern‖ era of popular dissent in the Westphalian nation-state.  
 In any history of contention, concepts of agency must always be understood as necessary but 
not sufficient. After all, concepts do not stand at the barricades, concepts do not rally together in 
public places where soldiers may fire on them, concepts do not take risks; it is the people who do 
that. Cognitive liberation is crucial, but is not by itself enough. Concepts of human agency may 
serve a limiting function insofar as those who are unable to conceive of a world different than 
the status quo may have difficulty organizing to alter dominant power relations. How does one 
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paint the face of someone that one has never met? Recall the fantastic duration of the so-called 
―Dark Ages‖. How else can one explain such a monotony of political form; a profound and 
pervasive axiomatic in the everyday concrete anatomy of European power relations? Humanism 
tapped a vein of inspiration stoppered since the Classical period and created conceptual space in 
which the courageous and curious could rediscover novel processes of experimentation and 
trouble-making that continue even today. The slow evolution and dissemination of these 
concepts of agency enabled early modern repertoires of contention such as killing tax collectors 
or seizing shipments of grain to become socially valued.  However, these tactics of contention 
were valued through a new teleology; not only as a pointless expression of frustration, as a 
venting, but rather as a means to altering a particular aspect of the social order. Understanding 
themselves as political agents of necessity, groups of peasants and workers in this early modern 
period responded to increasing government demands for taxation and monarchal religious 
mandates with a multitude of direct action strategies aimed at stymieing increases in their 
immiseration, albeit often with low degrees of success.  
Following De Toqueville in The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Tarrow argues that 
it was these nascent consolidations of power by monarchs leading up to the creation of 
territorial nation-states that  created the opportunity structure from which modern social 
movements would emerge. However, opportunity structures by themselves are irrelevant 
without the conceptual cartography with which to navigate them. It isn‘t an opportunity if no 
actant is capable of recognizing it. Ideology matters, and does not arrive ready-made but is 
assembled out of the cultural material through which struggles are framed. We can never know 
what the opportunity structures of the Dark Ages might have looked like to a Europe comprised 
of self-interested liberated atheists living in identical material conditions. The value of this 
thought experiment is limited to the value of demonstrating its own absurdity. If history is an 
inexact science of cause and effects, if outcomes are contingent and under-determined, then we 
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may say that the winners of history are merely the lucky, with the caveat of the cliché that luck is 
simply the moment where opportunity meets the prepared mind.167 
Thus we can observe two related evolutions during the early modern period; one in the 
evolution of a notion of individual human agency based on contingent power relations which 
implicitly includes the possibility of collective action, and a second in the evolution of a 
consolidated opportunity structure around centralized systems of taxation and conscription that 
would become the modern nation-state168. As elites found themselves requiring more capital to 
maintain and expand control over territories which were under the constant perceived threat of 
invasion and insurrection, they found the concurrent need to expand control to over their 
subjects in order to extract larger quantities of wealth and labor from them. Rigid absolutism 
failed through its own inefficiencies; a productive class of merchants and bureaucrats was 
needed to create industry from which the ruler could finance military glory. However, the 
conditions for the competitive expansion of sovereignty and production were simultaneously the 
enabling conditions of its own demise. The rise of a growing well-educated merchant class with 
transnational social ties served to increasingly disseminate privileged networks 
power/knowledge and promulgate dense extra-statist social networks that contained subversive 
potential. Modernity can thus be understood through this feedback dynamic of the expensive 
fantasy of absolute regulation, a fantasy which can only be financed through empowering and 
subjectifying a population in the name of greater production, a productive population who will 
one day come to see their rulers as an atavistic inefficiency whose hassles and regulations ought 
be done away with altogether in the name of production for its own sake, or what is today called 
―the greater good‖. 
However, we must avoid the temptation to think modernity as some sort of property which 
can be mapped onto an internally homogeneous social unit. Tarrow goes badly wrong when he 
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attempts to speak of ―The Basic Properties of Social Movements‖169. This search for ―basic 
properties‖ represents a useless theoretical exercise in essentialist metaphysics, for which 
exceptions will always be found and where the limits of key definitions will inevitably rely on 
unstable semantic distinctions170. For instance, when he suggests that one such basic property of 
a social movement is possessing a ―common purpose‖, one might raise the basic and even 
childlike questions of; ―do all members of the movement believe in the ―common purpose‖ in 
identical ways, and are they all invested in that purpose to the same extent? does everyone in the 
movement understand the meaning of what the movement‘s purpose represents in the same 
way? what about movements in which there is substantial internal disagreement over purpose, 
such as the Sons of Liberty in the American Revolution, or the Bolsheviks in the Russian 
Revolution? did Trotsky cease being a Soviet in formal category prior to his exile by Stalin, or 
was the exile itself performative of a parallel conceptual exile from political Sovietism?‖ and so 
on. An approach of apparent simplicity to a subject matter characterized by complexity is not 
difficult to complicate with empirical counterinstances. In the case of ‗basic properties‘, one 
might recall Whitehead‘s famous maxim: ―Seek simplicity and distrust it.‖ 
In fact, as radical empiricists we can observe there is truly no such thing as a purpose, but 
merely the representation of one, socially constructed inter-subjectively, refracted through a 
multiplicity of perspectives which we only have accessed to through fragmented 
representational evidence. The message here is that there is, in principle, no reason to believe 
that social movements are the sort of thing capable of possessing essential properties mapped 
onto metrically identical social units. There is, in fact, no such thing as an internally 
homogenous social unit of analysis. Units are simply representations, which cannot describe 
empirically heterogenous social space through identical references. Instead, units must 
represent processes, continuously in the act of evolution even while seemingly remaining stable, 
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in the same way in which the eternal mountains are in fact constantly locked in drifts and 
tectonic movement and cycles of geologic destruction and renewal. To believe otherwise is a 
form of naive realism as we saw earlier, which imprisons the collective energy of social 
organizing within sterile concepts and static signifiers. Naive realism takes social movements at 
their intentions and stated goals (rather than their active becomings or formations of 
power/knowledge) and is unable to articulate a politics outside of its own tautological system of 
signification, or representation, a system wherein new movements simply become evidence of 
old theories.  
In considering the evolution of social movements along early modernist trajectories, and the 
interplay with the emergence of novel non-intentional and anonymous forms of participation 
and expression in digital space, it is useful to consider the approach offered Actor Network 
Theory (ANT) of the sociologist Bruno Latour. This is not a theory in any traditional sense, as 
indeed Latour himself once explained, lamenting the label: ―"The third nail in the coffin is the 
word theory. As Mike Lynch said some time ago, ANT should really be called 'actant-rhizome 
ontology'... If it is a theory, of what is it a theory?‖171 In the context of writing on social 
movements, perhaps Latour‘s most useful concepts are that of the actant, a non-specific unit of 
distributed agency across a wide range of distinct material assemblages. The notion of actant is 
almost entirely empty, since it simply implies that the referent described possesses the potential 
to affect the process and/or outcome of a movement of material within its local context, wherein 
power/knowledge is always already networked. Unlike an actor or organization or institution, an 
actant does not possess abstract properties which are concretized in local cases, but exists as a 
singularity in the passage of spacetime. The fundamental property of an actant is, paradoxically, 
its irreducibility beyond the concrete contexts of its local space and place. For Latour, the 
metaphysical simplicity of describing social systems in terms of actants is that one avoids the 
oft-committed fallacy of reducing effects to causes, tracing monocausal narratives of teleological 
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success or failure of a movement, or even situating the movement in relation to abstract 
historical principles such as ―modernism‖. As Graham Harman explains: 
... the world is made up of actors or actants ... Atoms and molecules are actants, as are 
children, raindrops, bullet trains, politicians, and numerals. All entities are on exactly the 
same ontological footing. An atom is no more real than Deutsche Bank or the 1976 Winter 
Olympics... an actant is not a privileged inner kernel encrusted with peripheral accidents and 
relations. After all, this would make a thing‘s surface derivative of its depth, thereby spoiling 
the principle of irreduction. ... a thing is so utterly concrete that none of its features can be 
scraped away like cobwebs or moss. All features belong to the actor itself: a force utterly 
deployed in the world at any given moment, entirely characterized by its full set of 
features.172 
 
Let us discuss what this means in a concrete case of analysis. Insofar as the ontological entities 
we are examining are such irreducible actants, we are not interested in listing representations, 
such as ―rational choice‖ or ―political opportunity‖ alone as ―causes‖. In the local concreteness of 
the earlier case study, we are thus not interested in whether or not it can be said that the 
interpenetration of digital networks within South Korean social space ―caused‖ the eruptive 
demonstrations in the summer of 2008. In any case,  such a notion of causality can only be 
established in reference to the heuristic of the appearance of conjunctive representations, 
deriving from the classical political ontologies of the study of social movements as a ―royal 
science‖, always attempting to axiomatize the becomings of chaotic collectivities around sterile 
concepts173. As Srnicek describes the failure of contemporary royal scientists, ―...their analyses 
remain too static. They are capable of relating elements to each other when they remain stable 
for a significant period of time, but are unable to account for the dynamic genesis of contentious 
episodes or any of the aspects which constitute them.‖174 Digital space and social networks do 
not constitute distinct applications of transcendent properties which can be Venn-diagrammed 
onto particular applications. Instead, digital movements constitute immanent elements of the 
embedded social contexts in which actants combine to open new possibilities previously 
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foreclosed to activist organizing, based on the speed and multi-valence of social communication 
technologies and web literacy. Relational concepts here are thus not alienated nor distinct, as 
one might find in Tarrow or McAdam‘s scholarship. This metaphysical open-ness is against the 
closure of fixed delineation of reference that demands concepts possess a scope ranging across 
different particular cases. Instead, concepts are understood as abstract machines in virtual 
space, existing in (multiple) concert to produce the actual conditions of possibility. These 
abstract machines are not essential for any form, but are accidental, immanent to the 
production of conceptual/historical entities in their constitutivity.  
 Through ANT, we are approaching a ―nomad science‖ of social movements, where what 
Mary Joyce would call ―optimistic‖ narrators of digital activism can perceive it rife with 
emergent subversive opportunity structures. One such commentator, Nick Dyer-Witheford, has 
declaimed as much, following the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri on ―new 
combinations‖, writing: ―The history of the Internet is in fact that of a hyperaccelerated ―cycle of 
struggles,‖ .... Today, cyberspace is the scene within which the vectors of e-capital tangle and 
entwine with those of a molecular proliferation of activists, researchers, gamers, artists, 
hobbyists, and hackers.‖175It is precisely this acceleration which makes nomad science so 
important for understanding forms of valuation in digital space. The speed of both technological 
development and network growth has been so astounding that emergent forms that once would 
have been the product of decades, if not centuries, of blindly evolved social practice now achieve 
genesis exponentially faster. Think of digital space as the fruit fly avatars of human social 
behavior, being born and dying with enough speed that biologists can observe the causal genetic 
relations on manageable timescales.176 This acceleration of social interaction coincides with the 
development and socialization of new repertoires of communication and contention cycling 
through a 24-hour global noosphere of a fantastically heterogeneous composition.  
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A viral meme, an image of an animal or a celebrity quotation or animation style, can quickly 
become part of a shared cultural discourse for digital natives to draw on in contention. This is 
precisely what we saw in the 2008 protests in South Korea, where symbols such as the 
―candlelight girl‖ made use of digital animation as a symbol against the restrictive protesting 
laws. The identification with and dissemination of the ―candlelight girl‖ thus came socialize a 
sense of immanent resistance, an active element of identifying with protests as a form of civil 
disobedience. The use of the ―candlelight girl‖ was also important in the crucial overcoming of 
gender stratification in South Korean society, which may otherwise have presented an initial 
barrier for female students and women more generally to participating in the mass 
demonstrations.177 Here we are truly in the realm of nomad science, which articulates becoming 
out of a closed system of representations by integrating the plane of consistency on which 
multiple outcomes are always possible, and classical political axioms are never deterministic. As 
Brian Massumi argues in his introduction to Deleuze and Guattari‘s A Thousand Plateaus: 
 Nomad thought replaces the closed equation of representation, x=x=not y (I=I=not you) 
with an open equation:...+y+z+a+...(...+arm+brick+window+...). Rather than analyzing the 
world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the One of identity and ordering 
them by rank, it sums up a set of disparate circumstances in a shattering blow. It synthesizes 
a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential 
for future rearranging (to the contrary). 178 
 
However, this dynamical ―evolution‖ itself is a barren term that requires an additional level 
of detail in order to be meaningful, particularly when discussing social processes which only 
become concretized historically. Forms and organizations are already immanently embedded 
within the cycles of contention and repression which they collectively constitute, and cannot be 
reduced to forms outside of the movements from which they arise. Terms like ―collective action‖ 
and ―social movements‖ ought not become empty analytical categories lest we risk painting the 
                                                        
177 Seung-Ook Lee, Sook-Jin Kim, Joel Wainwright, ―Mad cow militancy: Neoliberal hegemony and social 
resistance in South Korea‖ Political Geography xxx (2010) 1e11 
http://geography.osu.edu/faculty/jwainwright/publications/Lee%20Kim%20&%20Wainwright%202010
%20Mad%20cow%20militancy.pdf 
178Brian Massumi ―Translators Preface‖ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987 p. xiii 
116 
 
history of popular dissent with an overbroad brush; saying everything correctly by in fact saying 
very little at all. This is where Tarrow gets it exactly right, when he writes: 
People do not simply ―act collectively.‖ They petition, assemble, strike, march, occupy 
premises, obstruct traffic, set fires, and attack others with intent to do bodily harm. No less 
than in the case of religious rituals or civil celebrations, contentious politics is not born in 
organizers‘ heads but is culturally inscribed and socially communicated. The learned 
conventions of contention are part of a society‘s public culture.179 
 
In fact, Tarrow is perhaps re-stating the notion of ‗diagram of power‘ offered by Michel 
Foucault, and here contextualized in terms of the history of collective action: what it means to 
dissent is co-productively informed by what it means to be repressed. Obedience has never been 
total; as Foucault phrases it apropos of the common belief about the repressive attitudes 
defining nineteenth century British sexuality; ―we have never been Victorians‖.180 The complex 
opportunity structures of modern social systems offer a wide diversity of possible spaces, 
asymmetrically aligned against (while simultaneously being produced by) the repressive forces 
of power to maintain control and stability. Following Foucault, what we understand as 
repression is in fact vitally productive of subjectivity, and that is no less true for oppositional 
politics as it is for those mobilized through the taxonomy of populations or in the name of a 
sovereign‘s glory.  
The sovereigns of early modern society became increasingly reliant on the collection of taxes 
to finance their consolidation of political power. Suddenly, the harassment or even murdering of 
tax collectors becomes a common style of direct action. In the pursuit of extracting greater 
wealth from the merchant class, the rulers of territory directed their subordinates to facilitate 
the production of roads paved with cobblestones that became key routes for commerce; 
suddenly the barricade becomes an effective mode of opposition. With the advent of mass 
newspaper distribution and a substantial increase in literacy, media symbols gained pre-
eminent value with the explosion of political propaganda and the advertising industry. Thus the 
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protest sign becomes a powerful megaphone where it once would have been a curiously useless 
cryptograph. And so on. What does it mean to dissent today? Ten years ago? A century ago? 
Answering these questions historically means specifying the conditions of control and 
repression against which dissenting collectivities are strategizing, and evolves through counter-
measures; call and response. Hausmann had in mind more than views from tall windows when 
he gave Paris thoroughfares wide enough to prevent barricading.  
These strategies of dissent have been called repertoires of contention by the scholar Charles 
Tilly in his major study Popular Contention in Great Britain 1758-1834. These repertoires are 
both material and semiotic; they draw on easily available pools of resources (why is it that 
rioters throw bricks?) and well-recognized cultural memes to frame their struggles (why is it 
that marchers sloganize?). These repertoires are repeated in a variety of contexts and they gain 
and lose social meaning through their repetition. They evolve slowly over time through the blind 
selection of mutations that occur among an experimental minority, while the majority 
predominantly relies on the tried and the true. As we have seen in South Korea, repertoires of 
contention evolve in response to local contexts and opportunity structures, but also may be 
simultaneously constituted on multiple different planes of consistency (e.g. embodied and 
digital social spaces, gendered and nationalistic resonances). The candlelight vigils for example, 
became both a symbol for the participation of women in political life through the symbol of the 
of the ―candlelight girl‖, as well as an engagement with the opportunity structure which 
prohibited demonstration gatherings after dark except for ―cultural activities‖. In the case of the 
former symbolism, it gained currency as a meme posted on chat sites of Agoras as a way of both 
spreading the word of the protests and showing solidarity with demonstrators, virally spreading 
to lower the social barriers of entry for new friend-groups and creating positive network 
externalities for new actants to take up its mantle.  
Tilly‘s theoretical framework of repertoires of contention has been extended to digital space 
by Sasha Costanza-Chock who has examined the ways in which quotidian protocols and 
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commonplaces within digital culture have informed instances of electronic civil disobedience, 
direct action that occurs through digital space such as distributed denial of service or DDoS181 
attacks, which may be used to temporarily disable the web presence of institutional entities.182 
As I have suggested, the potential for social action is immanent to digital space itself which is 
necessarily already collective, e.g. it is constituted as a network series of flows of information, 
imagery, nonsense and so on. If the dynamics of these viral groundswells can be found in the 
same reappropriative hypercycles (to use Dyer-Witheford‘s description) by which a YouTube 
video of two kittens fighting over a remote control becomes a quiet national media sensation, 
then the repertoires for communicating and emphasizing certain themes and messages become 
the conditions of cultural possibility for more explicitly political forms of organizing. These 
repertoires are not alienated from offline conventions of organizing and collective dissent, but 
instead seek to re-capitulate the abstract machine of these older collectivities in the new cultural 
economy. This is a cultural economy in which digital space only represents one valence, one 
surface topology of visibility for the imperceptible volumetric space where everyday practices of 
communication coalesce. As Constanza-Chock has shown, the DDoS repertoire has appropriated 
the cultural frame of the ―sit-in‖ to articulate the value of participation for online actants who 
may be sympathetic to the goals of collective action but may initially be unfamiliar with effective 
digital methods, as shown in her case study of the Virtual Sit-In for a Living Wage @ Harvard 
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Change, IDEBATE Press, 2010 p. 218 where a DDoS attack is defined as ―An explicit attempt by Internet 
attackers to prevent legitimate users from accessing a website or other online service. Attackers make 
repeated requests to the website, sometimes by simply reloading a Web page in their browsers or, more 
often, by using a botnet or other software to create automatic requests. The high number of requests 
overloads the capacity of the servers on which the site is housed, thus the servers are no longer capable of 
responding to requests—either legitimate or illegitimate—from people trying to access the site, often 
resulting in the display of an error message to the site‘s visitors. 
see also Andrew Chadwick Internet Politics Oxford University Press, 2009 
182 Sasha Costanza-Chock ―Mapping the Repertoire of Electronic Contention,‖ in Andrew Opel and 
Donnalyn Pompper (eds.), Representing Resistance: Media, Civil Disobedience and the Global Justice 
Movement. NJ: Greenwood, 2003 
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University.183 The goals of digital collective action thus parallel two long-held goals of traditional 
social movements; first, creating a disturbance in the ―business as usual‖ operations of 
institutions supportive of or complicit with practices and power relations perceived as unjust, 
and second, raising barriers to retaliation and response (especially through offline political 
repression and real violence in embodied social space) by creating audience costs for strategic 
counter-measures by elites, limiting the range of response options through the threat of a public 
relations fiasco. 
Returning to the construction of edifices of power/knowledge, these tactics are immanently 
subversive in that even if unsuccessful in accomplishing either goal, they often further the limits 
of a third, less apparent goal; that of denaturalizing the authorial frame of elites to dictate the 
terms of engagement for activists to mount public challenges. Whether or not the collective 
actions succeed in their explicit goals, they challenge the assumptions of the immutability of 
social conditions, and thereby ground the potential for future action with greater success. In 
other words, even if collective action does not translate into direct policy changes or institutional 
reforms, they still alter the inter-subjective activity of what the German historian Thomas 
Lindberger has described as ―street politics‖, in a social space with valences both on and 
offline.184 ―Street politics‖, Lindberger argues in the context of early twentieth-century Germany, 
need not take an explicitly political form as its starting point but may emerge out of collective 
cultural forms such as public funerals.185 Collective social gatherings, such moments of 
communicative encounter that also occur in digital space, present the opportunity for social 
movements or acts of dissent to gain increased visibility. These cultures of digital collaboration 
and the immersion of social space in virtual worlds has co-evolved with a strong in-group gamer 
                                                        
183 see Thomas Lindenberger Strassenpolitik: Zur Sozialgeschichte der offentlichen Ordnung in Berlin 
1900 bis 1914 Dietz, 1995 from references in Charles Tilly and Lesley J. Wood Social Movements 1768-
2008 Paradigm Publishers,2009   
184 see Thomas Lindenberger Strassenpolitik: Zur Sozialgeschichte der offentlichen Ordnung in Berlin 
1900 bis 1914 Dietz, 1995 from references in Charles Tilly and Lesley J. Wood Social Movements 1768-
2008 Paradigm Publishers,2009 
185 see Charles Tilly and Lesley J. Wood Social Movements 1768-2008 Paradigm Publishers,2009 p.82-83 
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culture, that often both participates in and co-creates the social rules for insular gameworlds at 
the same time grounding the potential for collective action by rapidly increasing the density and 
strength of virtual network ties and real human connections through and around gameplay (e.g. 
forum discussions).  
While a sustained ethnography of gameworlds is beyond the scope of this text, the case of 
the Cloudmakers186 provides an exemplar for how the ―street politics‖ of on-line gameworlds can 
become fertile ground for collaborative organizing. In 2001, the long-awaited release of the film 
A.I. (for artificial intelligence) had many science fiction fans poised with bated breath, as well as 
a degree of anxiety over its final incarnation. A narrative concept proposed as early as the ‗70s 
by notorious director Stanley Kubrik, the film had encountered preproduction development 
problems nearly every step of the way, even in spite of Kubrik‘s clout and ascendancy as his 
impressive library of international successes grew over the years. The film has been described as 
Kubrik‘s final labor, a project he was truly committed to but was nevertheless endlessly deferred 
due to technical failures and production logjams. These snags finally cleared only in time for his 
death in March 1999, at which point Steven Spielberg was asked to take over as director. As both 
a marketing ploy and an effort to pay homage to Kubrik‘s secretive and labyrinthine production 
techniques, the film was co-released with a nameless puzzle-style game, only accessible to those 
who pursued a series of strange clues buried in blog and media commentary surrounding the 
film‘s release. The initial clue was embedded in the film credits, where a credit for ―Sentient 
Machine Therapist: Jeanine Salla‖ provoked Kubrik acolytes and other curious fans to plug the 
credit in as search terms, eventually leading them to the Salla family site, documenting a series 
of fictitious identities purportedly from the year 2142. Combing the website for clues lead these 
amateur sleuths to a series of puzzles whose solutions lead to other puzzles comprising a vast yet 
simple gameworld. This gameworld was integrated with a narrative of the Salla family and the 
                                                        
186 I am indebted to Tauel Harper for pointing me towards this case study. See his work on the 
Cloudmakers in the context of spaces of play in Tauel Harper ―The Smooth Spaces of Play: Deleuze and 
the Emancipative Potential of Games‖ symploke - Volume 17, Numbers 1-2, 2009, pp. 129-142 
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puzzles were linked to a mystery surrounding the murder of a character named Evan Chan. By 
posting clues on chat forums, the puzzle-solvers communicated information to one another 
quickly and within days had created an insular community in digital social space where people 
from all over the world collaborated to solve different elements of the game. By the fourth day of 
gameplay, the chatforum has surpassed a thousand posts and an informal system of moderators 
had been established, along with a remarkably talented problem-solving assemblage. The group 
then began to assume the identity of The Cloudmakers, who achieved collaborative problems-
solving results that few would have thought possible given the complexity of the puzzles created 
for them to solve187. The game designers associated with A.I. observed the growth of this 
community and began to respond tactically through the modification and dynamic re-design of 
new puzzles and narrative progression, correcting or devising new explanation to account for 
noticed inconsistency and dramatically increasing the game‘s complexity.  
As Cloudmaker Jay Bushman writes in his firsthand account of this virtual community‘s 
evolution, ―[l]ike religion or art, it couldn‘t be explained to anybody who didn‘t already get it. Or 
at least, in the rush of spring 2001, that‘s how it felt to the initial converts.‖188 For Bushman it 
was the namelessness of the game and the experience of a new type of social play that opened up 
a parallel social reality, soon populated with over 7000 members, which quickly came to 
function as an insular culture marked by distinct terminology, norms of interaction and shared 
goals/values surrounding the game itself. He uses the term ―rabbit hole‖ to describe the 
disappearance of himself and others into this alternate reality, a new type of game that co-
evolved with its players and allowed for a space of shared monomania among the game‘s 
                                                        
187 This episode would later prompt network-think to become a prime research interests of scientists at 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to launch the Red Balloon Challenge, in which 
large red balloons would be stationed at geographical coordinates near major highways and network 
teams could compete to aggregate the information that would allow them to submit the correct locations. 
see John C. Tang, Manuel Cebrian, Nicklaus A. Giacobe, Hyun-Woo Kim, Taemie Kim, Douglas "Beaker" 
Wickert ―Reflecting on the DARPA Red Balloon Challenge‖ Communications of the ACM Vol. 54 No. 4, 
Pages 78-85 10.1145/1924421.1924441 




transnational participants, who withdrew from their offline lives in order to devote themselves 
to a new community, and quickly developed strong social bonds. 
It is precisely these sorts of evolved networks which have become vital for understanding 
digital social action. Elements such as network density, the speed of growth, the diversity of the 
members embodied identities and the pre-existing social ties of prominent members are an 
important initial enabling factor for successful future organizing. After the socialization of 
community-members had taken place to the extent that individuals felt comfortable engaging in 
desirable offline encounters, the Cloudmakers as an assemblage was brought to bear as an 
invisible machine for generative social organizing, initially around issues that were directly 
relevant to their starting subject matter (e.g. artificial intelligence advocacy). As Bushman 
describes,  
On the evening of May 6th, 2001, I dawdled on the corner of 4th Street and Avenue A in New 
York City, trying to decide if I really would attend a rally for the Anti-Robot Militia.... I 
wouldn‘t know anybody there. Sure, I had corresponded with some of them through an 
online message board. ... this would be more than just kibitzing about an online curiosity. 
This was the real world. I thought about going home. ... I could skip a strange evening with a 
bunch of weird geeks, turn in early and get ready to face Monday morning. I could read 
about what happened behind the safety of my monitor. Standing on that corner, I hesitated. 
At last, I chose the road with the robots and the weirdoes. And that has made all the 
difference.189 
 
This testimony illuminates several different elements of the Cloudmakers social assemblage 
relevant to social movement theory. First, it demonstrates the potential of digital networks to 
become social sites for the development of new collective spaces in which repertoires of 
contention can emerge in tandem with specialized social practices, as one might see in a socially 
insular community such as a monastic order. However, unlike a monastic order, these 
communities are constituted by a self-reflexive representational identity which is only a small 
part of the multiply constituted ontology of their social space more generally. In simpler terms, 
it‘s not as if these people don‘t have lives outside of the gameworld. Virtual networks don‘t per se 
compete with or substitute for embodied social space, but rather supplement and interpenetrate 
                                                        




increasingly throughout it at different strata simultaneously, and this is particularly true in the 
case of mobile technology. These strong social bonds allow a collective space that lowers the 
barriers for individual members to politicize specific issues and organize collective action. 
Organizing, as for some protestors in the Korean or Cloudmakers case, may be seen primarily a 
means to advancing the social cohesion of the group as a whole by providing an excuse for 
facilitating offline encounters.  
 This dynamical relation has the potential to invert previous assumption about the linear 
relation between social practices and contentious politics, where the goal of fighting injustice 
may be less significant than the material value in collective organizing itself. In other words, the 
goal of ―meeting up‖ offline may be more important to the private social goals of the individual 
organizers than the political goal of achieving substantive reform. Nevertheless, these 
individuals may feel passionately about the cause to demonstrate their commitment to a 
newfound social group. In doing so, they may increase the solidarity of the group through 
reciprocity, which then becomes a self-reinforcing collective good, a social resource that can be 
mobilized to great effect. If accurate, such an abstract machine would transmute the 
conventional opportunity structure analysis which examines costs and benefits of collective 
action from a purely individualistic or ontologically singular perspective (in which collective 
action is seen as a cost and the goal to be achieved in terms of institutional reform is seen as a 
benefit) into a simple win-win, where the process is more important to the organizers than the 
outcome. In the South Korean context, we have seen some explicit articulation of this valuation, 
as activists often seek to emphasize the democratic form of mass demonstrations over the actual 
outcomes of mere victories, where the injustice is related to the policy process which appears 
secretive and corrupt, rather than a particular policy outcome. This sentiment also echoes the 
notion of collective action as a space for metaphoric social articulation of perceived universals 
which are always necessarily deferred, signifiers such as ―equality‖, ―justice‖, ―liberty‖ and so on 
which are never concretized and thus always remain works in progress. In these cases, the 
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protest itself is a re-signification of their authority, legitimacy and resonance, and thus become 
part of the fermentation of new cultural frames on which future activists and policy-makers can 
draw.  
This is part of why the achievement of short-term concessions from entrenched institutional 
interests, while superficially allowing the movement to achieve ―success‖, is in fact de-mobilizing 
and antithetical to the social interests of digital movements precisely because it seeks to deny 
the processual value of collective anarchical action. Such processual valuation places collective 
action itself as a goal, achieving in its mere act a victory against the stultifying subduction of 
everyday life into a knowable, controllable bureaucratic order. As Slavoj Zizek puts it, 
connecting to the earlier discussion of protests as metaphors for social condensation, ―the 
protest is no longer actually just about the demand, but about the universal dimension that 
resonates in that particular demand (for this reason, protesters often feel somehow deceived 
when those in power against whom their protest was addressed simply accept their demand – as 
if, in this way, they have somehow frustrated them, depriving them of the true aim of their 
protest in the very guise of accepting their demand).‖190 The main achievement of digital 
movements is not new tactics against authoritarian regimes or novel constructions of socially 
relevant messages, but rather a new social space in which repertoires of contention can be 
produced with a wide and subversive audience in ways which are largely unrecognizeable to 
those in power and thus will prove far more difficult to intercept and coopt. 
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chapter five: anomalies and emergent collectivism 
 
 
―If resistant culture has learned anything over the past 150 years, it‘s that ―the people united‖ is 
a falsehood; this concept only constructs new exclusionist platforms by creating bureaucratic 
monoliths and semiotic regimes that cannot represent or act on behalf of the diverse desires and 
needs of individuals within complex and hybridizing social segments.‖ 
 
-- Critical Art Ensemble (CAE)191 
 
We are now beginning to sketch the evolutionary process of collective contentious politics in 
greater detail, but are we any nearer to establishing the first-order ontological questions of what 
entity exactly is doing the contending, the protesting, the active dissenting? Surely collectivity is 
not merely a random assemblage of individuals, yet it also seems a mistake to speak a priori of 
―a group‖. We are back to the old conundrum; are we seeing a forest or simply many trees? 
However, classification should never be the primary concern, a stop-gap to articulating 
empirical indistinction. Through these fluidly limited entities, we must understand the ways in 
which actants align and coalesce in order to sketch patterns in the dynamic relationships of 
social movements. 
While our current theoretical framework may pass muster from a historical perspective, 
there are good reasons to mistrust its claim to universality when it comes to the definition of 
both contentious politics and social movements. As we move on to focus on the repertoires of 
contention made possible by digital space, keep the following questions in mind: first, Is it 
possible to imagine an evolution of such repertoires (in virtual space) that renders our previous 
theoretical understanding of collective political action obsolete? and second, How well does 
contemporary movement theory fare when confronted with social networks in digital space? 
 Unfortunately, the answer to this crucial second question superficially appears to be: badly. 
In the Editors Introduction to the second edition of The Social Movements Reader: Cases and 
Concepts, a collection of core theoretical essays and case studies on social movements, editors 
                                                        




Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper define social movements as: ―...conscious, concerted, and 
sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-
institutional means.‖192 This model for contention, which relies on self-conscious participation 
in a collective action framed around a unity of purpose, has problems dealing with what we saw 
in the case of South Korea. In fact, recent protests driven by mobile technology, from Mexico to 
Moldova to Myanmar, offer  numerous examples in which this definition could be multiply 
inverted; a movement where many members are not conscious of any explicit ―membership‖, 
where their efforts are ad hoc and uncoordinated, where they flare up for extremely brief but 
potent moments, where they may only be advanced by a small number of extraordinary people 
to change some aspect of someone else’s society using extra-institutional means.  
Consider as a particularly thorny counterinstance to this definition the recent activity of 
Julian Assange, WikiLeaks, and Anonymous, in which a small group of extraordinarily talented 
hackers provoked the outrage of many national governments simultaneously by releasing 
classified military and diplomatic documents. The only common thread that seems to 
typologically unite Assange with more traditional social movements in Goodwin and Jasper‘s 
definition seems to be extra-institutionality.  Yet,  if we consider a movement such as the 
antinuclear Ploughshares Foundation or the American labor movement as embodied in the AFL-
CIO, we find them to be perfectly institutional in practice, office buildings and suits and ties and 
regular meetings and so on. Of course, these examples perhaps blur the lines between ‗social 
movements‘ and lobbying groups or think-tanks, but then, where would the standard definition 
draw that line? In other words, most traditional social movements that have been successful 
over the long haul now find themselves culturally similar to any other institutional bureaucracy, 
and thus excluded from the standard definition of a social movement, despite the fact that they 
are often cited as exemplars of the definitional model! Surely, this is not what these authors had 
in mind. Or was it? The problem with analytical precision is that it gives rise to zones of 
                                                        
192 Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper ―The social movements reader: cases and concepts‖ Second Edition, 
Wiley Blackwell, 2009 p.3 
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empirical indistinction when approached with concrete examples of multiply overlapping 
criteria. Do we re-classify the anomalies or revise the theoretical approach? If the tired question 
of ―what is a social movement?‖ sounds like a useless theoretical precondition to active 
scholarship, then why not dispense with it and see where the emergent voices of the new 
paradigm take us? In any event, it seems like a question that can never be usefully answered 
according to rigid rules of reference, and one ends up forever playing semantic games within the 
text, while outside the actants of a new political economy are busy making our theories obsolete. 
Against the theoretical frames which seek to identify distinct causal relationships between 
social movements and the historical ―events‖ that they give rise to, I propose to follow Actor 
Network Theory‘s principle of irreducibility to reverse the abstract constitution of historical 
events. Instead of understanding events as ready-made objects waiting to be discovered by 
neutral scholars situated in distant historical time, I want to suggest an understanding of social 
movements as sustained events that breaks the frame of event-centered historical/political 
analysis. Re-thinking events as continuous, always partially imperceptible, and co-created 
through the politicized representations of scholarly power/knowledge allows us to withdraw 
from the pretension of neutral historical time and begin investigating the ways in which our 
situated perspectives inform our analysis. Thus, ―events‖ as recapitulated through historical 
scholarship become a form of Deleuzian refrain193 through which the semiotic frames of the 
movement are made re-available to contemporary activists articulating new conditions of 
possibility. The purpose of memory here is always political, and the scholarship-as memory of 
social movements are then made available to become fodder for the re-combinant repertoires of 
contention that draw non-linearly from diverse pools of cultural material. We are once again 
speaking of historical objects of our own making, which function as concrete actants in their 
own rights, immanently situated in time and space and renewing the real economy of cultural 
signification from which social movements fashion new frames for mobilization. In such an 
                                                        




understanding, social movements as assemblages and actants take the place of events in an 
arrangement of historical causality. This is the terrain out of which ―emergent‖ social forms 
arise, from which they slowly coalesce in consonance with their articulation through an 
embodied collectivity, only finally bursting into the realm of visibility where naming becomes 
possible. 
 If we can understand the evolution of classical social movements as a rough mirror of the 
growth of the modern nation-state‘s repertoire of repressive tactics, the network possibilities of 
digital communication shatters the mirror with an opportunity structure that doesn‘t easily lend 
itself to standard methods of control. Insofar as we have chosen to understand the relationship 
between social movements as reciprocally fitted with those of its managerial opponents, we are 
already far through the looking glass, wandering amongst a conceptually fertile terrain of 
dynamic possibility, past the staid analysis of intentions, goals, resources and stated 
preferences. Classical images of political opportunity structures give way to a much richer, 
heavily textured opportunity structure at the micro-level of everyday politics, where connections 
are mobile and easier to forge than in times past. The transcendent edifice of the ―opportunity 
structure‖ paradigm itself gives rise to a much more complex theoretical landscape. Multiple 
disjunctive opportunity structures appear nested within and between one another at different 
levels of detail, presenting radically disjoint pathways for organizing social change depending on 
where one chooses to ontologically constitute actants. Here we can see ANT giving rise to what 
some scholars have termed process ontology194, where the relevant questions are not located at 
the level of static definitions, but rather within the dynamic interactions that threaten to 
destabilize the very limits of reference that static definitions suggest or imply.  
This theoretical commitment entails emptying the transcendent notions of definitions 
themselves, which inexorably serve to limit the possibilities of social actants, in favor of a 
radical empirical materialist understanding of emergent social systems existing simultaneously 
                                                        
194 Nick Srnicek ―Assemblage Theory, Complexity and Contentious Politics The Political Ontology of Gilles 
Deleuze‖ [unpublished thesis] 2007 p. 24 
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at multiple registers and articulations, in order to give rise to a descriptive vocabulary capable of 
accommodating phenomena underneath and outside of representation. In other words, the 
limits of theoretical definitions are not merely accidents, but rather exemplify the limitations 
inherent within the practice of defining, always doomed to be surprised by those who have never 
fully learned what is and is not supposed to be possible. 
We will see that digitally organized collective activism looks very difficult for contemporary 
social movement theory, as currently articulated in its essentialist paradigm, to accommodate. 
Of course, one could always respond that it is not necessary to include these examples under the 
standard definition of ―social movements‖, however this is precisely the sort of circular semantic 
metaphysics criticized in the introduction. One is left constantly drawing ever-more epicycles in 
order to defend the purity of a conceptual system inexorably riddled with counterinstances, 
drawing scholars into circular semantic debates about how to join concepts together which are 
too alienated from their subject matter to be truly useful. This thesis has not and will not seek to 
present a definition of ―social movements‖, nor will it attempt to examine the essential 
properties of any social unit; rather I will seek to elucidate the ways in which digital space may 
cause us to problematize and revise some of our assumptions about how political-social 
collectivities function and evolve. I have sought to do this in the service of providing multiple 
juxtaposed levels of detail against a metaphysics which seeks to taxonomize conceptual parts 
within homogenous wholes. 
 However, we are still wrestling with the problem of situating analysis at a particular level of 
detail; what should the descriptive unit of analysis be, at least grammatically? The group? The 
individual? The movement? The difficulty of this question lies in the motivation of two opposed 
modes of theoretical parsing: atomism and holism. On the one hand, the whole seems 
overwhelmingly complex and incoherent without a firm grasp of the parts, inclining us to 
atomize conceptual and physical entities and thereby create manageable units of analysis. This 
inclination may be motivated by both rigor and pragmatism; otherwise the inevitable question 
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of where to begin seems difficult to answer empirically. However, the world of phenomena 
synthesized by our sensoriums may then again induce us to holize, seeing mere figurative atoms 
as only parts of much larger social units joined in nested cosms (think for example of the 
intuitive appeal of the medieval European macrocosmos), where anything is always already part 
of the Greater Everything. This is a sensibility tied to the identification with a sense of 
impending doom, the ephemerality of infinity, of the Everything around which the unity of 
presumed ontological entities may once have formed.195 As W. P. Ker described in his history of 
medieval literature: 
The tragedy of the Doom of the Powers, the end of the world, seems to have been the ruling 
idea of the later Northern mythology... Originally perhaps a nature-myth, of the death of 
summer, or of the day, its ideas of mortality were retained after the natural origin of the 
story was forgotten; it became the symbolic tragedy of all death, the triumph of Time. The 
idea also that the whole system of the world – Heaven and Earth and the Gods – was fated to 
disappear, was probably a very old one.196 
 
Narrative structures surrounding these holistic presumptions have not disappeared with the 
illuminating influence of Enlightenment thought, rather they have crystallized around seemingly 
more noble ideals as the goal of human aspirations, while still retaining the image of the world 
as an object to be fixed by power. Here the impulse to holize is a function of apocalyptic 
wrestling with the collective anxiety about institutional mortality, the giving way of the staid 
walls of the office or cloistered hallways of church, university or government to the tactile space 
of encounter, inaugurating the premonition of abject terror.  Tactile encounter, the absence of 
an institutional framework through which one threads a daily life gives rise to a more elemental 
set of fears, which Elias Cannetti begins his major work Crowds and Power, describing that: 
                                                        
195 Indeed, the notion of unity of form is a corrollary of finality in the narrative sense, for all forms must be 
tied or part of a larger whole in some profoundly basic way in order for ―the entire story‖ to come 
climactically to an end, as in apocalyptic narrative form. See also Stephen O‘Leary Apocalyptic Argument 
and the Anticipation of Catastrophe: The Prediction of Risk and the Risks of Prediction‖ Argumentation 
11: 293–313, 1997, where for example he presents the argument in terms which may also be germane to 
our socialized understanding of political science, suggesting  ―Predictions of the future are never offered 
in a vacuum; they influence action in the present by offering both positive and negative scenarios as 
consequences of choices made by the audience.‖ 
196 W. P. Kerr ―The Dark Ages‖ New American Library, 1958 p. 43 
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―[t]here is nothing that man fears more than the touch of the unknown.‖197 We must worship the 
hierarchies which make us retched, lest we be cast into the abyss. But if we must, perish, let us 
make it mean! The world as we know it must come to an end, the story must not simply 
dissipate into the entropic void of meaningless vacuuum-space, the death of the social, the 
complete individuation and disaggregation of all indivisible singularities and the slow 
weakening and unraveling of all relations. It is against these poles of inertia and dissipation on 
one hand and monomania and symbolic totalization on the other that the impulse to occupy the 
same body arises; the group as a mind of many crowds198, the crowd within and between the 
embodied ―individual‖. From the anxieties of this affective unraveling comes the schizophrenic 
composition of a new symbolic universe of frames and attractors into which the desire of a 
situated perspective is poured to co-mingle with others and form a new sort of reflexive social 
body, a formation that is always in the process of being constituted. This is the group. We are 
together, we are all here to validate on another‘s actions and meanings. The group is a building 
of a new world. 
Atomization/Holization: the binaristic dualisms that collapse in the intersection of 
individual and group, node and network, the combinations which are immanently concrete, 
already configured as an ontological multiple, part and whole. These opposed tendencies often 
function at different levels of detail, of scale although not always. The organic molecule can be 
both the whole of the atom and the part of the cellular organelle, thus existing as the overlapping 
disciplinary foci of chemists and biologists. However, both impulses represent a metaphysical 
                                                        
197 Elian Cannetti Crowds and Power Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1960 p. 15 
198 see the opening for Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus, ―The two of us wrote Anti-
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singularization of the swarm, valorization of certain marks of perceptible politics against which the 
mundane interactions and collective becomings of the group disappear, subvert, a group that is only 
named to make the eventual ideal of its becoming ―unrecognizable in turn.‖ Collective politics is at its best 
(and worst) when it becomes unrecognizable through an intensification of the dynamics at the limits of its 




urge to describe at some level a totality, a smooth conceptual space even at the level of the 
infinitesimally minute. The salient feature of this smooth conceptual space is that it has already 
been described by the category that it belongs to in advance, and therefore simplifies the 
theoretical work of explaining relations. 
 In opposition to this metaphysics of totalities great and small, I would like to contrast a 
Foucaultian/Deleuzian microphysics199 of relations, which replaces smooth units of analysis 
with dynamics of progressive specification. The necessity of nuance offered by some sort of 
alternative methodological approach to thought is difficult to dispute when it comes to culture, 
where objects are always partially constellated in the flux of social feedback loops which include 
the flows of matter, energy, and social meaning. As Michel de Certeau writes: ―Analysis shows 
that a relation (always social) determines its terms, and not the reverse, and that each individual 
is a locus in which an incoherent (and often contradictory) plurality of such relational 
determinations interact.‖200 While classical metaphysics in the social sciences is interested in 
determining the essential properties of defined units: ―the individual‖, ―the group‖, ―the social 
movement‖ which grounds their meaning in ahistorical linguistic terms, this adaptive 
microphysics is interested in precisely the ways in which multiply co-evolving historical contexts 
may alter the conceptual tools, metaphors and descriptors that we may use to understand the 
dynamics of contentious politics. Another way to put this is that while metaphysics is interested 
in how things stay the same, conceptual microphysics is interested in how things change from 
when we started talking about them, to recognize the frailty of truth-preservation in our 
language. Here I am not merely suggesting that this is somehow a superior way to do social 
science, but rather that from a rigorous philosophical perspective, it represents the only possible 
way of achieving meaningful rigor in analysis. As Manual De Landa explains, after one has 
adopted this ontological constraint: 
                                                        
199 Michel de Certeau uses Foucault‘s term here from Discipline and Punish, quoted as ―microphysics of 
power‖, from which I am borrowing, see ―General Introduction‖ The Practices of Everyday Life, 
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―...the world itself emerges transformed: the very idea that there can be a set of true 
sentences which gives us the facts once and for all, an idea presupposing a closed and 
finished world, gives way to an open world full of divergent processes yielding novel and 
unexpected entities, the kind of world that would not sit still long enough for us to take a 
snapshot of it and present it as the final truth.‖201 
 
Imagine the classical taxonomic practice as puzzle-making; the goal of the social scientist is to 
create linguistic representations of the world through the formulation of sentences and 
diagrams (and occasionally, even specimens) that are the epistemic equivalents of the pieces of a 
jigsaw puzzle; each sized proportionally and fitted onto a smooth surface, a manageable 
enumeration of data that when joined together with its proper cousins in the right formations 
can form an image of the world. Consider such an image of the world present in a concept such 
as the genus; a Linnaean reduction of species to a few essential properties shared by many other 
species. This process of nesting categories (―X is a type of Y is a type of Z is a type of...‖ and so 
on) represents the conceptual legwork of Kuhn‘s ―normal science‖ for the taxonomic project in 
social science.  Such a process can only serve to continuously re-validate the selfsame practices 
of typologization in every new case, inserting caveats and accommodations and footnotes for 
anomalies while attempting to preserve the overall project of fitting the world into grid 
categories embodying immutable types. 
 In order to understand the importance of an antireductive (and therefore antitaxonomic) 
approach to the intersection of social movements and digital space, it may be useful to examine 
an instance where the standard taxonomy seems to go badly wrong. Tarrow‘s more recent text 
on emergent social movements, The New Transnational Activism, offers a case in point. Here, 
Tarrow examines the way in which organizers have begun working across borders to advance 
common economic and political goals effecting transnational populations. As Tarrow aptly 
points out, these transnational movements are hardly new, however with the pre-eminence of 
discourse on globalization they have achieved a greater visibility, particularly following the rise 
of the Global Movement for Justice (GMJ) and the coalescence of a huge number of 
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transnational activists during the 1999 meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle202. As 
a global political economy emerges composed of vertical aggregates (e.g. hierarchical corporate 
entities) which span borders, models of organizing which appear to limit their scope within 
national spaces seem archaic at best, and a grave misdirection of scarce resources at worst. This 
is not to say that national governments are no longer central sites of struggle, or that they do not 
have a role to play in contesting notions of rights and protections. For the time being, national 
governments will remain a standard form of social machinery used to mark and safeguard 
cherished constructs of space and place. However, the way in which these struggles are 
constellated often must be complemented with a transnational political lens. Consider the South 
Korean case; even though the target of the movement was the administration of President Lee 
Myung-Bak and his legislative coalition in the Blue House, the issue of the struggle was formed 
around a transnational trade relation with the United States. Even more importantly, the issue 
gained substantial traction in large part because the United States had negotiated similar trade 
deals with surrounding nations such as Japan, which did include protections designed to limit 
the risks of mad cow disease, whereas the deal to South Korea did not. Thus, examining the 
protest by looking only at its domestic context would have missed crucial framing questions 
which were important in mobilizing otherwise satisfied South Koreans to dissent. 
 However, Tarrow‘s difficulty in analyzing transnational movements comes in constituting a 
transnational cultural space. Since the individuals who participate in these movements are often 
separated by great geographical distances and have local political opportunity structures which 
may deter transnational coalescence around a grievance, how is it that these movements manage 
to get going? In arguing why globalization and economic integration is not sufficient to explain 
the rise in transnational organizing, Tarrow writes: 
Acting collectively requires activists to marshal resources, become aware of and seize 
opportunities, frame their demands in ways that enable them to join with others, and 
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identify common targets. If these thresholds constitute barriers in domestic politics, they are 
even higher when people mobilize across borders.203 
 
This conceptual difficulty of attempting to nest national contexts within transnational contexts 
represents a profound error in many modern scholars who attempt to negotiate transnational 
cultural space in reference to national space or identity, as if transnational cultures are 
inexorably reactive against national social units. The assumption is that transnational cultural 
space is constituted in the same way as national political space once was, and therefore the 
barriers to organizing in national space, including distance and resource mobilization, will be far 
more constrained when those barriers are raised. In other words, the standard observation that 
one might take from a survey of modernist movements in national space is that the greater the 
distance in actors and the lack of access to common resources and cultural frames, the higher 
the cost of organizing and the harder it will be for a movement to form and gain momentum.  
 However, this equivocation of national with transnational cultural space is badly mistaken. 
Conventional metrics of social movement success, derived from modernist social science 
research, reveal to be badly equipped to deal with many contemporary transnational movements 
because they fail to understand that supra-national cultures have formed through profoundly 
distinct abstract machines than those that constitute the space of national cultural identity. 
Transnational culture here, signifying through a multiplicity of communications technologies, 
does not come to replace national cultural space but rather serves to augment cultural reality of 
embodied actants by providing the opportunity for geographically disparate social linkages to 
form as powerfully as those that form within a locality such as a neighborhood, city or national 
space. Consider, for example, that two people living on different continents who both play World 
of Warcraft may be socially closer than two geographical neighbors within a national cultural 
space. Transnational networks of digital and mobile communication have become the basis for 
enlarging and transforming this transnational cultural space, and are embedded within and 
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throughout a networked cultural structure which is virtually overlapping with national cultural 
space constituted through territorial boundaries. This new dis-embodied cultural space is 
increasingly absorbing more of the everyday cultural activities of the denizens of developed 
countries. Understanding digital space as the conditions of possibility of the contemporary 
formations of many distinct transnational cultures is absolutely vital for interpreting the 
startling emergence of transnational organizing on a massive scale, and recognizing that 
―closeness‖ in a network has many more metrics than geographical space or immediate proximal 
access to material resources. Communicative or social closeness plays a far greater role in 
organizing than the geographical proximity of the participating actants, although the latter 
criteria is by no means insignificant. 
 However, this is not to imply that there is one single space of ―transnational culture‖. As 
Tarrow aptly recognizes, there are a multiplicity of cultures that become political through their 
transnationalization, writing ―...even prosaic activities, like immigrants bringing remittances 
home to their families, take on broader meanings when ordinary people cross transnational 
space. Most studies of transnational politics focus on self-conscious internationalists; we will 
broaden that framework...‖204 Remittances is a particularly good example, given theorists 
recognition that the size of the remittance economy at this point overwhelms and exceeds any 
conscious effort at engineering development policy by elites in developed countries, and 
represents in some ways a bottom-up form of redistributive wealth (albeit, while also fostering 
economic dependencies and depriving sending countries of robust members of their labor 
market).205 This move to recognize non-intentional political formations, which are political 
before they are named and come to represent a reservoir of social practices that inform and 
contour social space regardless of any individual‘s particular orientation to it is vital to 
understanding what exactly allows revolutionary political action to crystallize and grow through 
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digital space206. The question for understanding emergent forms of social organization becomes 
three-fold: First, what overlapping cultural spaces constitute the limits of organizing in actor-
networks? Second, how do the cultural spaces inform both the conditions of possibility and the 
political opportunity structure for a collectivity to become articulated as an identity? and third, 
what catalysts exist to combine and give rise to socially apparent cycles of contention? These 
questions do not imply that the imperceptible or underlying features of a contentious social 
form ought be devalued in relation to the social bodies that may exist before they are named. 
Rather, it is to suggest that what may catalyze social theorists to become attendant to the 
quotidian practices of contentious formation is precisely that moment where contention 
becomes recognized by non-participants as a distinctly political phenomenon. These questions 
demand a high threshold of analysis while at the same time recognizing the necessity of initially 
identifying an iceberg by its visible tip (rather than the submerged majority), in the manner of 
approaching subterranean social formations which may exist outside of the theoretical 
continuum of representation (the second half of the double-R axiom in Tsianos et. al.)207 
Framing our approach to transnational activism is equally important. Many theorists from 
Rousseau to De Tocqueville to the mid-twentieth century commentators on civic culture such as 
Robert Dahl and Walter Lippman have framed social movement as participatory in the larger 
structure of democratic civil society. Social movements become mere evidence within a political 
economy of representative democracy, or come to function as repetitive demonstrations that 
―the system works!‖ Insofar as they manage to mobilize change, they are incorporated into a 
depoliticized homeostasis that supports and uncritical attitude towards the underlying edifice of 
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elitism and the consolidation of power in formally democratic societies. In other words, social 
movements become folded into the narrative that the democratic order, constituted at the ‗ideal 
circles‘ (Deleuze‘s term) of state, economy and civil society208 is the apotheosis of political 
community, where every new deviation is simply reconceived as evidence of the system‘s infinite 
ability at incorporation of difference, of homoginization within the dominant narrative ―that of 
representative participatory politics‖.209 However, contemporary transnational social 
movements often lack a defined place in these discussions outside of the abstract promises for 
global civil society, promises constantly undermined by national claims of sovereignty. The 
claim that transnational social movements will eventually become evidence for a functional 
transnational democratic order is precisely the same sort of flawed equivocation we saw earlier 
with Tarrow‘s description of transnational movements using metrics and descriptors developed 
in observing modernist movements in national space. 
 The hope to create an international democratic order in which social movements fulfill the 
role of mere evidence of representation appears today as hopelessly naive. From a theoretical 
standpoint, it epitomizes the attempt to incorporate an entirely different abstract machine of 
social becoming as ―anomalies‖ into a pre-determined taxonomic structure, whose definitions 
are unable to account for the relation of transnational movements to national loci of repression 
and containment. The point here is not to try and come up with some way to accommodate 
transnational movements within the dominant paradigm, but to recognize the ways in which 
they undermine the classical project of definition itself. The Zapatistas provide a perfect 
example of how a post-represenational social movement can thrive in digital space. How would 
it be possible to do justice to these activists by using a theoretical frame based in an analysis of 
political economy that is directly at odds with how these activists have organized themselves? 
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To do so would be to reduce their own theoretical labors as active scholars to mere curiosity 
objects in the social scientists‘ specimen room.   
However, this concern should not give way to pessimism or theoretical paralysis. As Marcelo 
Svirsky has argued, it is the attempt to understand activism enframed within a larger continuum 
of democratic grand narratives and hierarchical political orders which precisely constitutes the 
royal science earlier discussed in the context of narrating history through discrete events. 
Svirsky points to examples such as WikiLeaks, which constitutes a form of collective digital 
activism aimed at the mantle of secrecy that often accompanies the tactical registers of sovereign 
power210. In the case of WikiLeaks, this resistance is constellated with reference to military 
actions and the ―collateral murders‖ of civilians and repressive tactics against forms of dissent 
that are unable to be smoothly incorporated into grand narratives of militarized liberation and 
the Westernized democratic community. The very tension between the neoconservative 
narrative of ―democracy promotion‖ and the antidemocratic forms of secrecy undermines the 
incorporation of WikiLeaks democratic dissent into the larger narrative of the triumphal 
homeostasis of the liberal democratic order. In other words, WikiLeaks is antitheoretical 
precisely because its main target is not the sovereign itself but the presumed sovereign authority 
to determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of acts of violence. 
This incorporative form of scholarship, Svirsky argues, is not merely an active reification of 
the idealized forms of dominant structures of representative democracy. It actively subverts the 
possibilities of a nomad science of activism, denying the capacity or desirability of recognizing 
the conditions of possibility in novel spaces of resistance. We begin to understand activism in 
the narrow terms of only that which acts intentionally to directly change the state, denying 
forms of direct action which may be more effective in altering the cultural space necessary to 
achieve widespread social change. Examples of these other spaces include; critical teaching in 
schools, eruptive public discourses in the form of graffiti and anonymous activism such as the 
                                                        




anti-Scientology Guy Fawkes crowds which emerged following the popularization of the film V 
for Vendetta (2006).211 The schema we use for articulating activism can thus be understood as 
greatly responsible for the way that those articulations signify politically; as complicit or 
subversive, as conforming to expectations of political participation or undermining previously 
understood conditions of possibility. This level of analysis will be important when examining the 
recent social upheavals in Northern Africa and the Middle East, in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and 
so on, which caught the world ―by surprise‖ before being inexorably cast as ―struggles for 
democratic freedom‖ by media outlets and social theorists alike. The royal science paradigm 
thus provided the conceptual frames necessary validating long-held neoconservative worldviews 
about the essentially Westernizable conditions of all humans and paving the way for justifiable 
military intervention by the United States and European powers against Qadaffi‘s forces in 
Libya. Regardless of whether or not these events as unfolded are understood as normatively 
desirable by readers, it is important to investigate how the knowledge and narratives 
surrounding these upheavals have been produced. Dominant scholarly frames play an important 
role in rendering what initially appears as images of raw dissent, disorganized masses and 
generalized discontent into the image of democratic participation and a popular uprising with 
the goal of regime change and representative democracy. The royal science of activism is alive 
and well in the production of these dominant representations and we would do well to attend to 
the theoretical texture of the ideas it produces, learning to read the violences of conceptual 
production that ideology so easily naturalizes and erases. 
 
                                                        




chapter six: politicizing digital space 
 
 
―The destructiveness of the crowd is often mentioned as its most conspicuous quality... [t]he 
destruction of representational images is the destruction of a hierarchy which is no longer 
recognized.‖ 
 
-- Elias Cannetti212 
Proponents of virtually every major ideology have rushed to claim the social field of digital 
technology as their own. On the Left, many thinkers have viewed the possibilities of digital space 
with guarded optimism concerning the possibility of grounding a new form of ―commons‖ or 
collectivism that would be impossible to appropriate for a self-interested profit-motive. Unlike 
the historical ―commons‖  of Northern England, upon whose fabled tragedy of over-grazing were 
founded the advances of the enclosure movement, and where value was based on 
excludability213, the digital commons did not whither from use but rather grew with it. This 
growth-from-use dynamic was true both in terms of economic and social value, which quickly 
became co-productive with the rise and dominance of Internet media and advertising over print. 
Insofar as digital space can be enclosed, it only becomes valuable at the point where it is passed 
through, used, contributed to, and therefore seems to be an ideal enabling condition for 
organizing cooperative social action. What is crucial in this understanding of enclosure (as 
juxtaposed against the possible ―commons‖ that theorists may seek in digital space), is that it 
provides the conditions for interaction of a particular sort, the conditions for valuing space in a 
particular way, and the conditions for producing identity as bounded towards a socialized 
construction of territory. As Ronen Shamir writes: 
Practices of enclosure, even in extreme cases of sealed total institutions, must always rely on 
some selection procedures that distinguish that which may come across from that which 
cannot. During the feudal era, most people could not leave their communities without 
written consent, and those who did risked imprisonment and death. Feudal estates closely 
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watched their boundaries, deriving revenue from fees of passage and multitude types of 
tariffs and excise duties.214 
 
In other words, the precise aspect of cultural space that motivated profitable excludability in the 
physical historical ―commons‖ of Northern England (zero-sum consumption) is reversed in 
digital space, where value is produced through inclusive use. This inversion creates a reverse in 
the incentive for membership in community. Classically, the social value of community 
membership is enhanced through excludability and rigidly defined boundaries and entry costs. 
On the Internet, audience value provides a collective enhancement for community membership, 
and includability determines the value of cultural space.215 
Some contemporary Marxists and other critics have expressed suspicions about the 
emancipatory promises of a technology, which after all has surely been harnessed for market 
forces, was originally developed for military communication, is highly susceptible to both 
efficient surveillance technologies, and is frequently used to mask violent power relationships 
through cuddly interfaces.216 However, many left-libertarians, autonomists and anarchist 
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activists took the vision of digital space as a free area of positive association beyond its purely 
―market‖ harness. During the early evolution of the internet, activists such as John Barlow 
heralded the inauguration of ―dot-communism‖; a post-property barter economy where agents 
were unconstrained by compulsory employment but were instead rewarded collectively for 
creative inspiration that benefited the greater good.217 From this and other writings developed 
an understanding of the internet as an intellectual space where the practical constraints of 
private property to enclose ideas (via intellectual property) dramatically failed, as in the piracy 
of music, videos and so on. This trope has hardly withered; witness the publication of Eben 
Moglen‘s ―The dotCommunist Manifesto‖218 in 2003 and Kevin Kelly‘s proclamation of the new 
―digital socialism‖ in a 2009 article for Wired Magazine219. For many of these commentators, the 
unbelievable growth of cooperative network sites such as Wikipedia (the world‘s largest 
aggregation of information) by people working for free, combined with the advent of virtual 
worlds and communities constituted outside of geography and based on networked affiliation of 
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shared interests or purposes are persuasive demonstrations that cyberspace belongs to their 
future. 
This discourse of inevitable change that re-writes the rules of social engagement and 
represents a clear break with the past is hardly novel and cannot be understood as neutral, but 
rather participates in the historical legacy of what anthropologist Gabrielle Hecht refers to as 
―rupture-talk‖220. Rupture-talk is a classic element of postcolonial discourse which Hecht 
identifies in particular with the development of nuclear weapons, but represents a strategy of 
amnesia for the violent legacy of colonial resource-theft, racist dehumanization, and mass-
murdering. The belief that ―everything is suddenly different‖ is a way of avoiding a confrontation 
with the realities of colonialism that are still very much present in the structural inequalities and 
artificial boundaries of the late capitalist nation-state system. How simple would it be if 
technology by itself could just change the channel on the evident hypocrisy of the West‘s bloody 
hands, the start afresh with all forgotten and forgiven? However, while Hecht discusses this with 
particular relevance to the almost mystic reverence surrounding the technoscientific discourse 
of nuclear weapons development, testing and deterrence, this ―rupture-talk‖ is nowhere more 
clear today than in discussion of social technologies of dissent. In particular, the fetish for social 
media technology enframes many discussion in the Western media of the recent revolutions in 
Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Qatar and others. Of course, wouldn‘t it be perfect if 
Twitter and Facebook actually changed everything, enlightened the masses to the need to 
democratize, to Westernize, to properly integrate themselves into the global market economy? 
To overcome all those pesky authoritarian dictatorships, many of which were supported for 
years by substantial military support and arms sales from Western powers?  
The Western media loves nothing if not to display and reify its latent fetishism for every sort 
of digital technology every ten minutes of the nightly news cycle on Middle Eastern revolutions . 
The message is clear: we did our part, we stood with the heroes, we gave them the information 
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weapons to fight their techno-clueless oppressors! Commentators passively observe that the 
media is no longer a passive observer of social change, but is now on the front lines of the 
struggle (virtually, of course) to democratize the world without needing a costly military 
intervention. The focus is never on the emergence of the movement, dis-organized and illegible 
to Western audiences, but rather on the pre-formed narrative used to articulate the struggle of 
oppressed (brown) people in the language of Western technoscience; rupture-talk on repeat. 
Every new social media platform becomes the inauguration of a new era, and the social theory 
surrounding innovation has become a pathetic reflection of this media techno-fetishism that 
always subordinates the role of imperceptible material formations under the grand narrative of 
technical advancements, positing a deterministic relationship between technology and social 
change.  
On the political right and center-right, thinkers following the insights of economist Friedrich 
Hayek have begun to view digital networks as an abstract space for aggregating market 
information, a theoretical dream which technology has finally perfected. Rather than relying on 
misleading price signals, susceptible in practice to manipulation and distortion, digital space 
could enable a market space of direct information, from the horses mouths of buyers and sellers. 
For many, this optimism was tied to a previous understanding that so-called ―market failures‖ 
(where the market caused instability by mis-valuing relative supply and demand of a good or 
service) were caused by ―market imperfections‖ which were largely due to the presence of 
assymetric networks of information bracketing large populations of individuals. This privately 
held information, such as what products consumers wanted to buy or the expectation of a future 
event‘s likelihood was not intentionally kept secret, however there was no reliable forum where 
access to this information could be presented to market participants equally.  
Thus, for proponents of free markets, digital space represents the ultimate informational 
evening of the playing field, a smooth space of market interactions that will chaotically optimize 
actionable conditions for everyone. This perfected market space finally makes the positive 
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externality of markets much more widely accessible, thereby making private information into a 
public good. In an information economy, the notion of ―enclosure‖ represents a market 
inefficiency in a similar way that tariffs represent an inefficiency when analyzing the markets of 
global trade. The free movement of information can either be read as ―transversal‖ in the sense 
of dissent against solidified territorial norms of identity, or an efficient means of creating 
aggregates of information for market analysis, consumer profiling, the development of a 
surveillance economy based on digitally revealed preference and a data economy based on the 
buying and selling of personal information. Commentators such as Cass Sunstein refers to this 
evolution as an ―infotopia‖221, where the information that is most relevant to the choices of a 
centralized decision-maker have finally become within that decision-makers grasp through 
methods of collectively aggregating information. Want to know what everyone‘s talking about? 
Just check the trending topics on Twitter! However, the desirability and salience of many of 
these externalities to advocates of social change has proved dubious at best, particularly given 
the far-Left leanings of many transnational activists. 
The contest over what digital space itself means has become politicized. There is no ―correct‖ 
answer here, although there are ways for each interpretation to accommodate the other. One 
could easily see digital space as a market which includes social as well as purely economic value, 
and that the value of joining a collaborative community such as Wikipedia creates an incentive 
for individuals to participate. This evolved incentive structure of social capital then operates as a 
complex social system of intangible costs and benefits, authorizing a theory of digital space as a 
vast informal market. One could perhaps just as easily see the infotopian distribution of 
information as the emergence of a collective release from the self-restraint normally associated 
with egalitarian commons. Such a view would permit the ideals of socialism to co-exist 
compatibly with the values of individualism through a participatory network that grows and 
evolves in response to aggregated participation levels but does not answer to the beck and call of 
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a single individual, thereby avoiding any risks intrinsic to the ―dictatorship of the proletarian‖. 
However, just as we risk a danger of committing historical amnesia through rupture-talk, the 
opposite danger also looms. We must further resist simply re-articulating the evolution of digital 
activism through the myopic lens and language of a historical ideological schema, which would  
simply reintroduce the problems of essentialism at the level of interpretation. Each such effort is 
doomed to the same tautological difficulties of self-reference, insofar as it grafts a historical 
narrative onto the material emergence of both the digital space and the activity that comes to 
constitute it, which operate in co-production with one another. No ideologist ever tells us 
anything new, except perhaps how clever they have become in explaining the world with their 
own particular language. The challenge is to attend to the ways that social movement actants 
within digital space articulate their own conditions of possibility, while simultaneously 
recognizing the ways in which those conditions are historically situated within and beyond 
previous repertoires of contention and narrative frames of social change.  
However, the politicization of digital social organizing has also achieved importance for 
policy-makers in reference to sovereign definitions of security. Wide-ranging challenges to the 
conventional order will not simply be ignored but must somehow be classified. The historical 
amnesia of rupture-talk surrounding nuclear weapons, in which abstract frames of security and 
mythic apocalypse were introduced as a way of concealing the violence of their production 
through colonial relations (e.g. uranium extraction from and nuclear testing on the territories of 
indigenous peoples) has a parallel in digital space. In this novel arena, the political antagonism 
of digital activists‘ confrontations with state authorities is subsumed within a post-political 
security discourse of technical managerialism of ―cyber-threats‖ which are presumed objective. 
Here we see the development of the parallel discourses of ―cyberactivism‖ and ―cyberterrorism‖, 
where actants espousing divergent concerns have invested substantial social resources in 
framing and re-framing the debate in different ways. While this discussion reached a fever pitch 
with WikiLeaks posting of classified documents from the US military actions in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan, as well as classified diplomatic cables, the issue was dealt with forthrightly much 
earlier, particularly following the ZLDN action in the mid-90s by the Critical Art Ensemble‘s text 
―Digital Resistance: Explorations in Tactical Media‖.  
The key framing question here is a presumptive understanding of ―terrorism‖ which is then 
brought to bear on digital space. Is terrorism a simple violation of order, a willingness to wreak 
havoc and wantonly shut down business as usual in the name of some political cause (or in the 
case of nihilistic hacktivist, as an end in itself), or more strictly, must it include the willful or 
negligent murder of civilians? While this previous issue has been treated with a great deal of 
theoretical analysis from differing perspectives of culture and power (often expressed in the 
phrase ―one person‘s terrorist may be another‘s freedom fighter‖)222, the question of whether or 
not the frame has any meaning at all outside of the self-referential universe of security 
apparatuses becomes far more tenuous in the context of digital space. The facile extensions of 
current frames surrounding terrorism into digital space are not difficult to find. Consider a fairly 
common definition of cyberterrorism offered by Sergei Krasavin as ―use of information 
technology and means by terrorist groups and agents.‖223 Here the definition of the users within 
a static ontological entity is presupposed. One might easily complicate such an approach to 
political ontology by asking if ―ecriterrorism‖ might mean ―the use of writing technology and 
means by terrorist groups and agents‖, or if ―entymologiterrorism‖ might mean ―the collection 
and categorization of insects using scientific methods by terrorist groups and agents‖? Here we 
see the political ontology of terrorism preceding the process of organization and collective 
activity through an essentialist frame which forecloses the possibility of ever reading such 
activities positively. It is the fact that certain groups and individuals are terrorists, in some basic 
and inexorable way, that makes anything they do by definition ―terrorist activity‖.  And as we‘ve 
seen time and time again in authoritarian regimes, that definition of ―terrorism‖ is often 
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irresponsibly and violently appropriated for use against troublesome dissenters and political 
opposition groups.224 
 Reasonable people may disagree about the utility, value and abuse of the terms and frames 
surrounding terrorism when it comes to political violence in embodied social space. That‘s at 
least a good indication that the very term itself is already political. However, when it comes to 
the use of the frame in taxonomizing digital dissent within a royal science, it seems difficult to 
see the term as anything other than self-serving, as it comes to establish new consolidations of 
technocratic power. As the CAE have argued: 
How can terror happen in virtual space, that is, in a space with no people – only 
information? Have we reached a point in civilization where we are capable of terrorizing 
digital abstractions?...Terrorism is a strategic form of contestation, in which the resistant 
faction attacks the designated oppressor by using tactics of near-random violence against its 
citizenry...terrorism requires organic bodies to house the terror... The inherent civility of 
electronic disobedience is being deliberately and officially misconstrued under the sign of 
that which it is clearly not – terrorism...225 
 
Thus we see at play a contest, not merely over particular struggles, but the authority of sovereign 
institutions to constellate digital dissent and online direct action within the post-political 
specter226 of the Terrorist, the absolute Evil who is, of course, the enemy of the Good of  all 
society, and who must be opposed by any means necessary (including terrorization itself, the 
rescinding of civil liberties, the creation of legal states of exception in which paramilitary 
violence, torture and so on become permissible).227 This is not to say that direct action in digital 
space such as the Zapatistas DDoS attacks on the Mexican government, or the attacks of 
Anonymous on financial and security institutions do not cause real damage in the form of 
monetary loss and so on, but rather that they exist in a different register from, for example, an 
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improvised explosive device set off in a busload of civilians. The framing contest between groups 
who are advantaged by the new opportunities in digital space and those entrenched interests 
who seek to mobilize public support against these emergent possibilities can thus be exemplified 
in the use of activist/terrorist framing devices. These frames are a crucial site of contestation 
because, in the mind of many publics, they already presume a series of agreed-upon political 
remedies, restrictions and so on. However, effective contestation of this framing question may 
allow for the possibility of online free spaces, communal fora for collective dissent, as well as 
securing sovereign protections for the airing of grievances and mobilization of demonstrations 
on and offline. 
The stakes couldn‘t be higher, but it thankfully it is likely impossible for either side to truly 
―win‖. The era of true ―hegemony‖ in the sense of an imagined smooth space of absolute control 
has ended, if it ever existed.228 Rather the dynamic interplay between these frames operates to 
produce local opportunity structures in which different assemblages can play to contextual 
advantages. In order to examine the political opportunity structure of digital activism, it is 
important to see the interplay between nation-states and other sovereign institutional entities 
and counterinstitutional oppositional groups, for example the ZLDN in Mexico, the GJM in 
Seattle and the candlelight vigils in South Korea. A key distinction in the formation and 
participatory structures of actants nested within both groups can be described as the contrast 
between representation and direct action, and correlates directly with the time horizon and 
complexity of the expectations for tasks that the groups will have to work on229. Consider, in 
contrast to these extra-institutional formations, the police. A police bureaucracy in a democratic 
society is expected by its political superiors and the electorate to serve as an ongoing response to 
protect the public by locating and removing criminals from the general population, as well as to 
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enforce the general laws passed by the legislature and/or signed by the executive. The cops who 
walk a beat and the detectives who solve cases do not have a great deal of say in the content of 
the laws they enforce (indeed, they have about as much say as you or I) but they are expected to 
enforce the mandates of the law without asking too many questions. Like the rest of us, they 
have political representatives who inform the content of the laws, and more directly, they have 
superiors who may provide them more detailed instructions about exactly how particular 
mandates are to be enforced. Here we see the representational structure of most institutions and 
bureaucracies in which the participants appear alienated from their political agency by a system 
of consensual deferral, a political ―division of labor‖ in which non-institutional power is so dilute 
that single individuals must go to great lengths to see changes which they may believe favor 
them or the public in general. This inertia goes a long way towards promoting a general 
atmosphere of inactive apathy. In contrast, the social movements that we have been describing 
are systems based on participants direct action, where many of the same people who decide on 
core concepts such as issue-framing and the dissemination of key media items are the ones 
waving signs in the streets and helping to mobilize in other physical locations.  
This structure affects (and is affected by) the speed at which institutions and 
counterinstitutions evolve and adapt to one another‘s opportunity structures, and create grand 
strategies of population managements and microphysics of subversion and molecular liberation. 
Bureaucracies are notoriously unresponsive to changing circumstances and have difficulty 
adapting to cultural shifts. At the same time, such institutions constitute their own microphysics 
of power which have great proficiency at successfully sedimenting particular cultural practices of 
administration and replicating those practices throughout their ranks, built to endlessly 
reproduce the grand totality over time. Social movements, particularly of the fluid variety that 
we‘ve been discussing, are almost entirely characterized by their responsiveness and 
adaptability, their mutant disorganization and their potentiality, yet have difficulty maintaining 
the will of their participants and the emergent structure over time. This is not necessarily true 
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for all digital movements, particularly for those such as the ZLDN or Anonymous where ―direct 
action‖ frequently takes place in digital space.230 The strength of the opponents are assymetric, 
but if one believes that the social field is accelerating most prominently within digital space, 
then the possibility of continuously emergent tactics and repertoires of contention for digital 
social movements seems promising. The conflict over how global publics come to understand 
and interpret these contests relative to previous and well-entrenched frames such as ―security‖, 
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To radically shift regime behavior we must think clearly and boldly for if we have learned 
anything, it is that regimes do not want to be changed. We must think beyond those who have 
gone before us, and discover technological changes that embolden us with ways to act in which 
our forebears could not. Firstly we must understand what aspect of government or 
neocorporatist behavior we wish to change or remove. Secondly we must develop a way of 
thinking about this behavior that is strong enough carry us through the mire of politically 
distorted language, and into a position of clarity. 
 
-- Julian Assange231 
  
Social movements have always evolved through the cultural spaces of their actants. As 
segments of that culture are increasingly enacted within digital space, the propensity for social 
movements to make use of this space and the repertoires of digital culture for contentious 
politics are sure to increase as well, as indicated by some of the cases investigated in this thesis. 
This cultural activity in digital space will never entirely replace offline encounters, organizing 
and direct confrontations with authorities in physical social space. Digital activism has not 
empirically shown to exist in a zero-sum relationship with offline organizing, but augments and 
supplements conventional organizing strategies in radically new ways. Information technology, 
and particularly mobile technology, allows for the evolution of a de-centralized and fully 
integrated information network which groups of motivated individuals may appropriate to 
communicate with their members. Furthermore, it can allow an established or nascent 
movement to grow a transnational audience for specific causes which can be made more broadly 
identifiable, allowing geographically disparate populations to become stakeholders in local 
causes which they have not material interest in, as we saw with the Zapatistas. There can be no 
theory of digital activism, of organizing in digital space, which is divorced from local contexts 
and particular manifestations of digital culture. There are no final answers, no essences for 
stable ontological unities that may be firmly grasped by the disciplinary knowledges of political 
science. There is no matrix by which to define social movements in digital space through 
                                                        




essential properties that can then be generalized across many instantiations of vacuum-sealed 
models. Social change happens antitheoretically. 
 However, that does not mean that digital social movements are impossible to understand, or 
that political ontologies are outside the purview of scholarly analysis. The realities of complex 
social systems and the impossibility of determining outcomes through specific images of certain 
futures hardly entails quietism, or disengagement from this subject matter. Rather, the 
arguments I have presented suggest a re-positioning of scholarship in ways that attend to and 
recognize the situated-ness of all analytic perspectives. This situaded-ness recommends 
investigating the ways in which knowledge co-evolves in relation to edifices of privilege and 
marginalization, constructions of professionalization and identity within and outside academic 
cultures. Such a commitment entails recognizing the political dimensions of scholarship, and 
activating political understandings of social movements which begin with the perspective of 
activists and organizers. In this schema, the goal becomes to produce socially useful knowledge 
by which one may imagine new possibilities and tactics for real social movements. I have argued 
that such an approach is preferable to remaining complicit with the entrenched interests of the 
status quo by passively describing exploitive power relations as if they were natural or 
inevitable. Today we cannot afford to be naive about our own frail approximation of 
omnividence, and should not make our extrapolations conditional on ideal relations between 
variables which may never exist at the level of local contexts. Human perspectives are 
incomplete and fragmentary, only ever capturing a pinch of the actual, ground up in a host of 
heuristics and inseparable232 from the paradigms used to interpret data about social systems. 
 These commitments are part and parcel of the emergent paradigm of active scholarship, 
where activists and organizers describe their approaches and commitments, outline concepts as 
they co-evolve with tactics and uses of social technology. In these groups and individuals we see 
a performative overcoming of the classical distinction between theory and practice, thought and 
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action, in which the active processes of emergent social forms constitute a sort of lived theory of 
the social. Theory does not take a back seat to these discussions, but rather plays a key role in 
framing social issues and broadening constituencies for local concerns, as we saw in the ability 
of the Zapatistas to mobilize a transnational coalition concerned with the inequalities of 
globalization around the particular conditions of a localist struggle. A crucial element of social 
movement development and success occurs that the level of framing, both of the issues 
themselves and the possible strategies for resistance. Therefore, theory can play a vital role in 
the ability of groups to achieve Doug McAdam‘s notion of cognitive liberation, a condition 
which, as we have seen, is necessary but not sufficient for social movement formation and 
success. 
 The complexity of spontaneously ordered social networks in digital space has allowed for the 
evolution of social movements through non-intentional or spontaneous structures, as with the 
dissemination of viral media through segments of alienated populations and diverse social 
assemblages. Understanding the dynamics of contagion and the network properties of social 
systems will thus provide a powerful tool for activists to make the most effective use of these 
digital media ecologies to amplify their frames. Examining the immanent components of 
network space will further allow digital social movements to effectively contest the attempts of 
dominant actors to engineer spin and socially construct dispositive passivity among global 
publics as ―political spectators‖.233 The illusion of withdrawal and non-participation can thus be 
overcome through cultural encounters for micropolitical engagement, and evolved practices of 
social collaboration ―indigenous‖ to digital space. This is precisely what we saw with the evolved 
collective repertoires of The Cloudmakers, which was then appropriated for contentious political 
action. The illusion of spectatorship is in part sustained by a dispositive approach to 
intellectualism that suggests that passively describing reality constitutes a form of apolitical 





expertise, when in fact inaction often serves to foster complicity with structurally violent power 
relations, as we saw in Jeff Schmidt‘s examination of academic professionalism. Examining the 
augmented contexts of information technologies will also prove crucial. The dynamics of digital 
space further create an incentive for offline collective socialization, driven by social anxieties to 
remain in communication with real friend-groups, and thus social movements can become an 
excuse for more basic quotidian goals of building group identity and having a good time with 
friends.  
 There is nothing deterministic about organizing large groups of people and information 
through digital space, and the dynamics are constantly evolving through new repertoires of 
digital culture. However, understanding and attending to the emergent properties of these social 
networks will assist activists in approaching these possibilities, ready to take every advantage. It 
will also allow activists to recognize novel opportunities within communication technology and 
the mass dissemination of information as a form of social organizing in and of itself. Thus, it will 
become important to examine approaches to activism which subvert and undermine dominant 
enframings of social space through integrated media technologies. The social space from which 
broad-based activism emerges may seem a terrain of constant flows, moments of capture, as 
Dyer-Witheford has argued, cycles of appropriation and reappropriation. Signification is more 
difficult to fix here, more susceptible to performative recontextualization. Locality can become a 
stand-in for universality. The Zapatista struggle provided a focal point for activists who saw 
heightened inequality and increasingly exploitive social stratification to identify a Zizekian point 
of metaphoric condensation in the struggle taking place in Chiapas, since the Zapatistas 
autonomy struggle had risen to prominence in light of the contentious passage of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).234 Sandor Vegh and others have argued that it was 
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the growing condensation around the Zapatista struggles that eventually made possible the 1999 
―Battle for Seattle‖ and the establishment and growth of a new community of transnational 
organizers. In this effort, Vegh argues that the communication methods offered by digital space 
and the ability for a transnational audiences to focus their attention on local struggles was vital, 
writing ―...it probably would not have been possible to familiarize the world with the case of 
Chiapas in Mexico had the Zapatista movement not relied on the Internet for communication 
and mobilization.‖235 The role of digital space in these and other tactical contestations function 
precisely to lower social barriers, to create new possibilities for solidarity that have not 
previously existed. 
 These dynamics are complex, and outcomes are uncertain. The solution is not to craft an 
overarching theoretical framework in order to delude ourselves with illusions of precision and 
certainty, but rather to recognize the empirical vitality of undetermined social space. We are not 
in need of a new paradigm, a new ‗theory of everything‘; the new paradigm is already upon us in 
a swarm, providing a torrent of opportunities to make our theory political, to become students of 
active scholars who create new possibilities for collective identity through their actions. The 
process of understanding these emergent possibilities is one of learning to recognize the 
situated-ness of our perspectives and from there to learn to listen to the situated perspectives of 
activists, to comb the new manifestos of those who will achieve victories for autonomy and 
localized struggles in transnational digital space in the coming years. These struggles are already 
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